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Executive Summary 
The aim of the project was to examine the advisability of creating a new mechanism 
to address laws that discriminate against women.  The terms of reference specified 
two key objectives. The first was to overview existing UN mechanisms to ascertain 
the extent to which they addressed the issue of discriminatory laws. This involved 
interviewing UN human rights and agency officials working in both Geneva and New 
York1 and also reviewing the reports and jurisprudence of human rights committees 
and special procedure mechanisms.  The second was to try to get national data on 
laws that discriminate against women. This was to be done by means of a 
questionnaire. On the basis of the data gathered, the consultant was required to advise 
on whether a special mechanism addressing discriminatory laws was needed. 
 
Divided into six parts, the report begins with a consideration of the concept of 
equality.  It is now accepted that a formal model of equality based on “reversing the 
sexes and comparing them” will no longer suffice. Instead there needs to be a 
substantive approach.  The Committee on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has noted that this requires States to 
monitor through measurable indicators, the impact of laws, policies and action plans 
and to evaluate progress achieved towards the practical realization of women’s 
substantive equality with men.  In order to achieve this, it may be necessary for States 
to consider putting into place temporary special measures. These have been used to 
increase women’s participation in decision making bodies. Also considered in the 
report is the importance of adopting an intersectional approach that recognises the 
experiences of those who face multiple forms of discrimination simultaneously. 
 
The report assesses how reservations entered by States parties when ratifying human 
rights treaties have impacted upon the attainment of equality and specifically 
women’s ability to enjoy their rights. The fact that some reservations entrench legal 
discrimination against women calls into question the commitment of States parties to 
the principle of non-discrimination. 
 
Part B of the report is a consideration of regional human rights systems. In line with 
the United Nations human rights instruments, they all appear to uphold the principle 
of non-discrimination including on grounds of sex and also provide for equality 
before the law. However, there appears to be, in some jurisdictions, instances where 
international commitments are made subject to domestic laws. 
 
Part C focuses on the work of human rights treaty bodies and special procedures 
mechanisms.  An assessment is made of treaty bodies’ jurisprudence as it pertains to 
laws that discriminate against women. It would appear that after the 1993 Vienna 
World Conference on Human Rights, greater attention has been paid to women’s 
rights in interaction with States parties and also in general comments produced by 
treaty bodies. Although most of the communications sent to those treaty bodies with a 
communication mechanism are sent by men, there is evidence to show that issues that 
impact directly upon women’s enjoyment of their rights have also been addressed, 
and that there is now greater use of the individual communications procedure of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 
 
                                                 
1 In New York, interviews were also arranged with three not-for-profit organizations. 
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Analyses of the work done by special procedure mandate holders shows that there 
has, over the years, been greater attention paid to issues affecting the enjoyment by 
women of their rights. This may reflect the fact that some mandates now specify that 
mandate holders look at issues pertaining to women/gender in their work.  While 
some have identified (discriminatory) laws affecting women’s ability to enjoy their 
rights, many more have focused on the de facto situation of women painting a picture 
of exclusion. Nevertheless, it remains true to say that with some notable exceptions, a 
consistent focus on the rights of women has, at times been missing.  
 
Part D of the report is an analysis of the questionnaire responses focusing on the laws 
identified as discriminating against women.  There is clear evidence that even those 
States whose constitutions guarantee equality before the law (the majority) have laws 
that discriminate against women.  Personal status laws were identified as the most 
problematic. Discriminatory provisions were found in laws enshrining a lower age of 
marriage for girls than boys and, in some cases, sanctioning child marriage, paternal 
power vis-à-vis decisions concerning the child which was often linked to marital 
power over the wife, discrimination in nationality and citizenship laws, different 
grounds for divorce and discriminatory property division on death and divorce. Even 
procedural laws were sometimes found to be discriminatory privileging male 
witnesses over female ones.  Discriminatory practices and provisions were also 
identified in employment law and criminal law.  
 
The penultimate part of the report (Part E) canvasses the arguments put forward by 
interviewees and questionnaire respondents for and against the appointment of a 
Special Rapporteur on laws that discriminate against women.  From the questionnaire 
responses, the vast majority of those addressing the advisability of a Special 
Rapporteur on laws that discriminate against women were in favour of the creation of 
such a mechanism. Those who were opposed or sceptical about the need for the 
creation of new mechanism argued the following in outline: 
i) that the creation of new mechanism would result in duplication;  
ii) it would take away from the work of CEDAW;  
iii) other committees would stop focusing on women’s rights issues; 
iv) that there was already a Special Rapporteur dealing with violence against 
women;  
v) that a focus on de jure discrimination was not helpful.  
 
These arguments were considered in turn.  Those in favour of the creation of a 
separate mechanism argued that CEDAW and a new Special Rapporteur on laws that 
discriminate against women should be seen as complementary mechanisms. The 
Special Rapporteur could assist CEDAW by following up on its (and indeed other 
committees) concluding observations vis-à-vis laws that discriminate against women. 
Indeed it was noted that CEDAW could issue instructions to the Special Rapporteur 
about States that needed following up and that the two would have a symbiotic, co-
operative relationship.   The Special Rapporteur could maintain an on going dialogue 
with States parties and undertake thematic surveys as well as sharing data on good 
practice.  It was also noted that there were examples of other treaty bodies having 
“duplicated” special procedure mechanism, and that these operated without undue 
overlap.  
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While the work undertaken by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women is 
crucial, not all violations occurring to women were violence related. Some 
respondents also noted that although a focus on de jure laws would not solve all the 
problems facing women, it would be an important step in the right direction.  At the 
very least laws that apply to everybody should not be discriminatory. Discrimination 
cannot be stopped overnight. Laws reflect the government position on women’s 
rights. States should therefore repeal or amend laws that discriminate against women. 
 
The final recommendation of this report is that consideration should be given to the 
appointment of a Special Rapporteur on laws that discriminate against women whose 
mandate should mirror those of existing special procedure mechanisms. If the UN is 
to maintain its credibility and not be dismissed as a mere talking shop, then it will 
have to ensure that the failure to meet what should be a simple pledge, the removal of 
laws that discriminate against women made in conference documents in 1995 
(Beijing), reviewed in 2000 (Beijing+5) and which remained unfulfilled a decade later 
in 2005 (Beijing +10), is dealt with as a matter of urgency.   
 
In addition to the impressive work already being done within the human rights 
monitoring system, particularly by CEDAW, and also the work of special procedures, 
the time may well have come to have a focal point to address this very important 
conference pledge whose fulfilment underpins a great deal of UN policy and work, 
not least in the delivery of the Millennium Development Goals.  Addressing the 51st 
session of the Commission on the Status of Women (2007), the President of the 
Human Rights Council noted: 
 
“…I believe that the commitment to the human rights of women and the girl child 
undertaken in Beijing has been strengthened with the reform of the UN human rights 
system. At the World Summit of 2005, the Heads of State and Government 
recognized Human Rights as one of the pillars of the United Nations and reaffirmed 
their commitment to uphold the rights of women, gender equality and the 
empowerment of women. 
 
Within this framework, the Commission and the Council have an important role in 
order for the United Nations to undertake integrated and coordinated strategies for the 
effective promotion and protection of the rights of women and the girl child.” 
 
The time for action has come. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The founding document of the UN, The UN Charter provides in its preamble that 
there is a need “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women.”2The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which followed and which forms the basis of 
bills of rights of many national constitutions was equally clear providing in article 1 
that, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. Article 2 
speaks of the entitlement of all persons to the enjoyment of the rights contained within 
the Declaration “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.” The two instruments coming out of the UDHR, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (ICESCR) also so provide.3 This International Bill 
of Rights guarantees equal protection before the law to all.  
 
Instruments tackling specific elements of discrimination include the 1967 Declaration 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,4 which predated 
to the Women’s Convention otherwise known as Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).5 Other international 
instruments including, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989,6 the Migrant 
Workers Convention, 19907 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, 2006 (Disabilities Rights Convention)8  provide for non-discrimination 
and equality before the law. The latter goes further making special provision for the 
rights of disabled women.9
 
                                                 
2 See also articles 1(3) and 55 (c) of the United Nations Charter. 
3 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR), 999 UNTS 171, articles 2, 3 
and 26. The International Covenant Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (IESCR), 993 UNTS 
3, articles 2 and 3. 
4 UN Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, GA Res. 22263 
(XX11) of 7 November 1967. 
5 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979, 34 UN GAOR 
Supp. No. 46, 193, UN Doc. A34/46. 
6 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by GA Resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989. 
7 International Convention on the Protection of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 
A/RES/45/158, art. 7. 
8 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, A/61/611, preamble paras. a, h and p and art. 
2, 3 (b) and (g) and 5. 
9 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 6. 
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The ratification by most States of at least one of the above listed human rights 
instruments, suggests that there is universal acceptance of the norm of equality. 
However, the reality is somewhat different.  The principle of non-discrimination is 
often not respected, frequently in the area of women’s rights.10  The clearest 
manifestation of this is in the continued existence of laws that directly discriminate 
against women, despite clear international legal obligations requiring States to 
abolish, amend or repeal laws that discriminate against women on the basis of sex.11 
This is compounded by lack of implementation of laws which promote women’s 
equality and the absence of institutional mechanisms to promote the human rights of 
women. 
 
History of the Project 
 In 1995, at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, Governments 
undertook to ‘revoke any remaining laws that discriminate on the basis of sex.’12  In 
2000, at the Special Session of the General Assembly to review the Beijing Platform 
for Action, the outcome of the World Conference, States set 2005 as the target for 
removing discriminatory legislation against women.  In 2005, the Commission on the 
Status of Women (CSW) reviewed the commitments that had been undertaken at the 
Fourth World Conference, recalling the pledge to revoke remaining discriminatory 
laws, it expressed concern  that ‘legislative and regulatory gaps, as well as lack of 
implementation and  enforcement  of  legislation  and  regulations, perpetuate  de jure  
as  well  as  de facto  inequality  and  discrimination,  and  in  a  few cases,  new  laws  
discriminating  against women  have  been  introduced.’ It decided to consider ‘the 
advisability of the appointment of a special rapporteur on laws that discriminate 
against women, bearing in mind the existing mechanisms with a view to avoid 
duplication …’13
 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was requested to 
submit its views to the 50th (2006) session of CSW on the implications of the creation 
                                                 
10 D. Otto “‘Gender Comment’: Why Does the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights Need a General Comment on Women?” 14 (2002) Canadian Journal of Women’s Law 1. 
11 CEDAW, art. 2  
12 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 1995, reproduced in (1996) 35 International Legal 
Materials 404, para. 232 (d). 
13 E/CN.6/2005/11, Final Report of the 49th Session of the CSW, Resolution 49/3 on the Advisability of 
the appointment of a special rapporteur on laws that discriminate against women. 
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of a position of special rapporteur on laws that discriminate against women.  It 
complied with this request in December 2005.14 CSW took note of the report 
containing OHCHR’s and other views  and asked for further ‘views on ways and 
means that could best complement the work of the existing mechanisms and enhance 
the Commission’s capacity with respect to discriminatory laws,’ for consideration at 
its 51st (2007) session.  OHCHR responded on 10 October 2006 that while its views 
contained in the afore-mentioned report were unchanged, certain developments such 
as the review of the Special Procedures had to be taken into account.  OHCHR 
suggested that a decision on the usefulness and viability of a special rapporteur be 
deferred to CSW 52nd session (2008) in order to incorporate and build on the review’s 
outcome.  To further assist the process, OHCHR offered to prepare an analytical 
report on the compatibility of such a mandate with the existing mechanisms, 
identifying how the existing mechanisms have addressed de jure discrimination 
against women and the resulting protection gaps. This paper was accordingly 
prepared. 
 
The paper has two key objectives: to overview of existing UN mechanisms to 
ascertain the extent to which they addressed the issue of discriminatory laws.15 This 
involved interviewing UN human rights and agency officials working in both Geneva 
and New York16 and also reviewing the reports and jurisprudence of human rights 
committees and special procedure mechanisms.  The second was to collect national 
data on laws that discriminate against women. This was to be done by means of a 
questionnaire which was sent, by electronic mail, to a number of agencies around the 
world.17
 
Structure 
Following this introduction is Part A which examines the twin concepts of non 
discrimination and equality as they have developed in UN jurisprudence. Part B of the 
report is an overview of regional instruments and their interpretation.  The report then 
moves on, in Part C, to look at mainstreaming within the UN. It first considers in brief 
                                                 
14 E/CN.6/2006/8 (13 December 2005). See also E/CN.6/2007/8 (13 December 2006). 
15 The terms of reference are attached as Appendix A. 
16 In New York, interviews were also arranged with three not for profit organisations: Center for 
Reproductive Rights, Equality Now and Human Rights Watch. 
17 A more detailed methodology section can be found in Appendix B, while the questionnaire can be 
found in Appendix C. A list of questionnaire recipients is in Appendix D. 
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the work of treaty bodies in the area of discriminatory laws. Here the consensus seems 
to be that with the exception of CEDAW human rights committee did not, until the 
Vienna Conference 1993, pay much attention to women’s rights.18 Thereafter the 
mandates of existing Special Rapporteurs and their work on women’s rights are 
examined. 
 
Part D of the report analyses the data from the questionnaires. It also includes 
information already produced by Equality Now which first gathered information on 
discriminatory laws and which has lobbied for the creation of a Special Rapporteur on 
laws that discriminate against women and filed communications with the CSW on the 
issue.19 This part of the report does not purport to be comprehensive in its coverage. 
A survey of the laws of 192 States in the time given and with the resources at hand 
was clearly impossible.  It should therefore be seen as a snapshot and not as designed 
to focus on some States when others which have equally problematic laws are not 
mentioned. While every effort has been made to verify the information provided 
by correspondents, any mistakes remain those of the consultant and not of the 
United Nations. The penultimate part of the report (E) considers the arguments for 
and against the advisability of appointing a Special Rapporteur on laws that 
discriminate against women before making concluding recommendations in Part F. 
                                                 
18 R. Johnstone “Feminist Influences on the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies” (2006) 28 
Human Rights Quarterly 148, 175. But see Human Rights Council A/HRC/4/104, 15 February 2007, 
paras. 14-20. 
19 Commission on the Status of Women Report of the forty-ninth session (28 February -11 and 22 
March 2005), E/2005/27-E/CN.6/2005/11. Chapter 3 paras. 1 and 5(3).  Equality Now Words and 
Deeds: Holding Governments Accountable in the Beijing + 10 Review Process, Women’s Action 16.5, 
update March 2004. See letters from Equality Now to CSW on communications on the status of 
women, 19 August, 2004,  31 August 2005. J. Neuwirth “Inequality before the Law: Holding States 
Accountable for sex Discriminatory laws under the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination against Women through the Beijing Platform for Action” (2005) 18 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 20. Equality Now Annual Report 2005, 5-7. Equality Now “Words and Deeds: Holding 
Governments Accountable in the Beijing +10 Process” Women’s Action 16.9 – update February 2007. 
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PART A – NON-DISCRIMINATION AND EQUALITY 
The principles of equality and non-discrimination form the basis of all human rights 
instruments and cut across all the rights found within human rights treaties 
influencing both the interpretation and enjoyment of rights.20 Article 1 of CEDAW 
provides a definition of discrimination against women on the basis of sex. 
 
“For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination against women’ 
shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has 
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment and 
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men 
and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil or any other field.” 21
 
Article 2 highlights that the State is responsible for violations of rights within both the 
public and private sphere regardless of whether those violations are committed by 
State or non State actors.22  Article 1 of CEDAW includes both direct and indirect 
discrimination23 and requires States parties to ensure equality of opportunity and 
result, thus taking it beyond the formal (liberal) model of equality which Mackinnon 
argues simply requires a reversal and comparison of the sexes. 24  Mackinnon argues 
that by relying on a false premise, namely that the playing field is level for both men 
and women, a formal model of equality fails to take into account socio-structural 
inequalities  which result in women not being able to enjoy their rights on an equal 
                                                 
20 W. Vandenhole Non Discrimination and Equality in the view of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
(Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005). CESCR general comment 16 on equal rights of men and women in the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, E/C.12/2005/4, 11 August 2005, paras. 2, 3, 10 and 
22. Human Rights Committee general comment 18 on Non Discrimination, CCPR/C/21.Rev.1.Add1, 
para. 1.  The ICCPR also has the free standing article 26 which “does not merely duplicate the 
guarantee already provided for in article 2 but provides in itself and autonomous right. It prohibits 
discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public authorities. Article 26 is 
therefore concerned with the obligations imposed on states parties in regard to their legislation and the 
application thereof. Thus, when legislation is adopted by a State party, it must comply with the 
requirement of article 26 that its content should not be discriminatory. In other words, the application 
of the principle of non-discrimination contained in article 26 is not limited to those rights which are 
provided for in the Covenant.” Human Rights Committee general comment 18 para. 12. 
21 It is noteworthy that both the CESCR and the Human Rights Committee have adopted the definition 
of discrimination found in article 1 of the Women’s Convention, which provision was modelled on the 
definition of discrimination found in Article 1 of the Race Convention.  CESCR general comment 16 
para. 11, Human Rights Committee general comment 18 para. 6. Finally see Disability Convention art. 
2. 
22  CEDAW general recommendation 19 on violence against women, A/47/38, para. 9. 
23 For definitions of direct and indirect discrimination see CESCR general comment 16, paras. 12 and 
13. 
24 C. Mackinnon Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (Boston, Harvard University Press, 1989) 
217. See generally C. Mackinnon Sex Equality (Westgroup, 2001). 
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basis with men.25 True equality is not simply about reversing the sexes and 
comparing, nor is it simply about passing laws that appear on the face of them to be 
gender neutral. Indeed some “gender neutral laws” may constitute discrimination 
against women for example if a State fails to provide services needed exclusively by 
women, not least in the provision of reproductive services.26 An example of direct 
discrimination against women was highlighted in the 2006 CESCR concluding 
observations to the Mexican report where the Committee censured the State for the 
practice in the textile industry produce whereby women were required to provide 
medical certificates proving that they were not pregnant in order to be hired or to 
avoid being fired.27  By way of contrast, Chile in its fifth report to the Human Rights 
Committee detailed how it had amended its labour law to prohibit the “making a 
woman’s access to employment, mobility, promotion or contract renewal dependent 
on her not being pregnant.”28 Identified as equally problematic by CEDAW and 
constituting discrimination against the girl child is the requirement in some States that 
pregnant girls be excluded from school, but interestingly not the boys responsible.29 
This damages the life chances of the girl whose right to education is curtailed 
unnecessarily. 
 
In its general recommendation 25, CEDAW calls for a comprehensive understanding 
of equality: 
                                                 
25 Ibid (1989). 
26 CESCR general comment 16 para. 18. CEDAW general recommendation 24 on Health, 
A/54/38/Rev.1, paras. 14 and 31 (b), (c) and (e), and see also Centre for Reproductive Right (CRR) and 
University of Toronto International Programme on Reproductive and Sexual Health Law Bringing 
Rights to Bear: An Analysis of the Work of the UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies on Reproductive and 
Sexual Rights ( New York,  CRR and University of Toronto, 2002), 145-148. R. Cook and B Dickens 
“Human Rights Dynamics of Abortion Law Reform” (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 1. Center for 
Reproductive Rights Women of the World: Laws and Policies Affecting their Reproductive Lives: East 
and South Asia (NY, CRR, 2005). CRR Women of the World: South Asia (NY, CRR, 2004), CRR 
Legal Grounds: Reproductive and Sexual Rights in African Commonwealth Countries (NY, CRR, 
2005). Interview L. Katzive, Center for Reproductive Rights, New York, 9 March 2007. Email 
response on questionnaire received from Professor R. Cook, 14 April 2007. Paulina Del Carmen 
Ramirez Jacinto /Mexico, (Friendly Settlement) 9 March 2007, Inter-American Commission Petition 
161-02, Report No. 21/07, paras. 13, 19 and 26.  Human Rights Committee Llantoy Huaman v. Peru, 
Communication No. 1153/2003, CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (2005). 
27 CESCR Concluding Observations: Mexico, E/C12/CO/MEX/4 (17 May 2006), para. 15.  Human 
Rights Committee general comment 28, para. 20. 
28 Act No. 20.005 of March 2005, amending the Labour Code. Chile, Fifth periodic report, 
CCPR/C/CHL/5, para. 58 (e). 
 29 See CEDAW Concluding Observations: Togo, CEDAW/C/TGO/CO/3, paras. 24-25. See also 
Student Representative Council of Molepolole College of Education v. Attorney General [1995] (3) 
LRC 447. Mfolo and Others v. Minister of Education Bophuthatswana [1992] (3) LRC 181. 
Mandizvidza v. Chaduka NO, Morgenster College and the Minister of Higher Education 1999 (2) ZLR 
375 (H). 
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“In the Committee’s view, a purely formal legal or programmatic approach is not 
sufficient to achieve women’s de facto equality with men… In addition, the 
Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered 
by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to 
guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well 
as socially and culturally constructed differences between men and women must be 
taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women 
and men will be required in order to address such differences. Pursuit of the goal of 
substantive equality also calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming under-
representation of women and a redistribution of resources and power between men 
and women.”30
 
Substantive equality demands that consideration be given to the ways in which the 
different roles and position of men and women in society, generally known as gender, 
impact upon women’s ability to claim and enjoy their human rights.31 It also requires 
States: “to monitor, through measurable indicators, the impact of laws, policies and 
action plans and to evaluate progress achieved towards the practical realization of 
women’s substantive equality with men.”32
 
The principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sex is an immediate and not a 
progressive obligation.33 The Human Rights Committee has noted that the principle 
should be guaranteed, including during states of emergency while any public 
emergency derogations should show that they are non discriminatory.34
 
One of the ways advanced for mitigating inequality or accelerating women’s equality 
is by using temporary special measures, provided for in article 4 of CEDAW.  Human 
                                                 
30 See also CEDAW General Recommendation No. 25 on Temporary Special Measures, 
CEDAW/C/2004/WP.1/Rev.1, para. 8. Montreal Principles on Women’s Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 760 at 768 para. 9. See also CESCR General 
Comment 16 on equality between men and women, para. 7 and 8. S Fredman “Providing Equality: 
Substantive Equality and the Positive Duty to Provide” (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 163, at 165-166. CESCR general comment 16, para. 14 
31 This is recognised in part by the inclusion within both the Millennium Declaration and the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of gender equality as essential to the realisation of the 
objectives of the Millennium Declaration. United Nations Millennium Declaration (8 September 2000), 
GA Res. 55/2. See also S. Ali Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law (The Hague, 
Kluwer, 2000) 85, 88. 
32 Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to the 
combined second and third periodic report of Azerbaijan (CEDAW/C/AZE/2-3) at its 765th and 766th 
meetings, on 23 January 2007 CEDAW/C/AZE/CO/3, para. 14 
33 CESCR general comment 3 on the Nature of States Parties Obligations, UN Doc E/1991/23, para, 2. 
CESCR general comment 16, paras. 16 and 40; CESCR general comment 13 on the Right to Education, 
E/C.12/1999/10, 10 December 1999, para. 31. 
34 Human Rights Committee general comment 18, para. 2; Human Rights Committee general comment 
28, para. 7. 
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rights law provides for the principle of non-discrimination to be derogated from in the 
use of such measures.35 This is on the understanding that the measures will be 
dismantled once the position between men and women has been achieved.36  In order 
to avoid a reversal of gains made, it is equally important that temporary special 
measures are not   dismantled prematurely. 
 
In the European case of Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen37the court identified 
three different aims of temporary special measures or positive action: 
 
“A first model aims to remove, not discrimination in the legal sense, but a condition 
of disadvantage which characterises women’s presence in the employment market. In 
this case, the objective is to eliminate the causes of the fewer employment and career 
opportunities which (still) beset female employment…A second model of positive 
action may be discerned in actions designed to foster balance between family and 
career responsibilities and a better distribution of those responsibilities between the 
two sexes…A third model of positive action is  that of action as a remedy for the 
persistent effects of historical discrimination of legal significance; in this case, the 
action takes on a compensatory nature, with the result that preferential treatment in 
favour of disadvantaged categories is legitimised, in particular through systems of 
quotas and goals.”38
 
It is further noted that that while the use of temporary special measures appears to be 
discriminatory, it is only by deviating from the principle of equal treatment that true 
equality can be achieved: 
 
“In the final analysis, what is involved is only discrimination in appearance in so far 
as it authorises or requires different treatment in favour of women and in order to 
protect them with a view to attaining substantive and not formal equality, which 
would in contrast be the negation of equality.”39
                                                 
35 Human Rights Committee general comment 18, para. 20; Human Rights Committee general 
comment 28, para. 3; CESCR general comment 16, paras. 15, 35 and 36. CESCR general comment 13 
para. 32. CEDAW general recommendation 23, para. 15. CEDAW general recommendation 25. 
36 CEDAW art. 4 (1), CEDAW general comments 4 and 25. CERD art 1 (4), CERD general comment 
14 on the Definition of Discrimination,  HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 3, para.2. Human Rights Committee general 
comment 18, para. 10, Human Rights Committee general comment 28, para. 3. CESCR general 
comment 16 paras. 15 , 35 and 36. Disability Convention art 5 (4). 
37 Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Case No.: C-450/93, reproduced in R. Emerton, K. Adams, A. 
Byrnes and J. Connors International Women’s Rights Cases  (London, Cavendish, 2005), 158. 
38 Ibid, para. 9 (Emerton et al. pp.168-9). 
39 Ibid, para. 17 (Emerton et al p. 172).  The court held that the use of positive action contravened the 
Equal Treatment Directive.  U. O’Hare “Positive Action before the European Court of Justice-Case C-
450/93 Kalannke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen” 1996 Web J. of Current Legal Issues available at 
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1996/issue21/ohare2.html.  Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 
409/95, 1997 ECR 1-6363. See also EFTA Surveillance Authority v. The Kingdom of Norway, CASE 
E-1/02, 24 January 2003. 
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To date temporary special measures have generally been used to accelerate women’s 
participation in public bodies especially the legislature, and.40 have been particularly 
successful in Latin America.41 Indeed it is notable that those States with over thirty 
per cent42 participation of women within their legislatures have generally used 
temporary special measures to boost female participation.43  In 2004, Argentina was 
commended by CEDAW: 
 
“The Committee commends the State party for its measures to increase the 
participation of women in public life in the renewal process of the country. It 
particularly welcomes the fact that two women judges have been appointed to the 
Supreme Court of Justice, and that women now constitute 41.67 per cent of senators, 
33 per cent of members of Parliament and 27 per cent of deputies in the provincial 
legislatures. It also welcomes the fact that, further to the adoption of National Law 
No. 25.674 and Decree No. 514/2003, known as the Law on Trade Union Quotas, a 
woman is now part of the presiding body of the confederation of labour.”44
 
These developments notwithstanding, the lack of equality in participation remains a 
global problem with the European Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and 
Men noting: 
 
“The under-representation of women in elected office hinders the full development of 
democracy in most of the Council of Europe’s member States.  I recall that the 
Assembly has invited the member States to set a target of 40% as the minimum level 
of representation of women in parliament and other elected assemblies by the year 
2020.  At present, only Sweden has reached that critical mass of 40% of women in 
parliament. There are 22 countries with between 20% And 40% of women in 
parliament (Finland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Iceland, 
                                                 
40 CEDAW general recommendation 5 on Temporary Special Measures, UN Doc A/43/38; CEDAW 
general recommendation 8 on the Implementation of article 8 of the Convention, UN Doc. A43/38; 
CEDAW general comment 23 on women in public life, UN Doc A/52/38/Rev. 1, at 61, para. 15; 
CEDAW general comment 25, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, para. 192. 
41 UN DAW “Equal participation of women and men in decision making processes, with particular 
emphasis on political participation and leadership” Expert Group meeting, Addis Ababa, 24-27 
October 2005.  United Nations The Millennium Development Goals Report 2006 (New York, UN, 
2006), 9. Quotas are said to have been used successfully in the Arab World. UNDP Arab Development 
Report 2005 (UNDP, New York, 2006), 205-206. 
42 While 30%-35% is clearly not equal, this is the figure that has been deemed to constitute “critical 
mass” where women are said to be able to make a difference. See CEDAW general recommendation 
23, para. 16. 
43 IDEA and Stockholm University Global Database of Quotas for Women: A Joint Project, available at 
www.quotaproject.org. Decision on Mainstreaming Gender and Women’s Issues in the African Union, 
CM/Dec. 683. S. Tamale “Towards Legitimate Governance in Africa: The Case of Affirmative Action 
and Parliamentary Politics in Uganda” in E. Quashigah, O Okafor (eds) Legitimated Governance in 
Africa (Hague, Kluwer International, 1999), 235. 
44 Concluding observations to the fifth periodic report of Argentina (CEDAW/C/ARG/5/Add.1), 
16 July 2004, CEDAW, A/59/38 part II (2004), para. 368. 
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Austria and Germany have more than 30% of women MPs), 16 countries have 
between 10 and 20% and 7 Council of Europe member States have fewer than 10% of 
women in their parliaments.”45
 
The Equal Opportunities Commission in the UK has noted that at the current rate of 
progress it will take 200 years before the Westminster Parliament has equal 
representation of men and women.46
 
Sometimes women are not even put up for election, so that while identifying that 
women constituted 48% of the electorate, Yemen, in its report to the Human Rights 
Committee  noted that of the 1369 candidates nominated to stand for election, only 11 
were women.47  This situation seems to cry out for the use of temporary special 
measures. In its shadow report to CEDAW in June 2006, the European Roma Rights 
Centre and Romani CRISS requested that representations be made to amend the 
electoral laws to include a quota system for women and minorities.  The report noted: 
“In the present government, there are only three female ministers and just 13.3% of 
the secretaries and deputy secretaries of state are women; there are no Roma ministers 
in the Romanian government and only one male Roma Member of the Parliament.”48
 
This was picked up by CEDAW in its questioning of the State and also in its 
concluding observations to the Romanian report where it noted: 
 
“The Committee urges the State party to take a holistic approach to eliminating the 
multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination that Roma women face to accelerate 
the achievement of their de facto equality through the co-ordination of all agencies 
working on the Roma, non discrimination and gender equality issues.  It urges the 
State party to implement targeted measures, within specific timetables, in all areas and 
to monitor their implementation.”49
                                                 
45 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and 
Men, Doc. 11220, 30 March 2007, para. 4. See also para. 3 urging States to provide for temporary 
special measures in their Constitutions. In 2005, the Human Rights Committee urged Korea and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to use temporary special measures to try to redress the gender imbalance in public 
sphere participation of women. Human Rights Council Concluding Observations, Korea, 28 November 
2005, CCPR/C/KOR/CO/3, paras. 10 and 70. Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22 November 2006, CCPR.BIH/CO/1, para. 11.  
46 Equal Opportunities Commission The Gender Agenda: The Unfinished Revolution (London, Equal 
Opportunities Commission, 2007), Press release dated 24 July 2007 available at: 
http://www.eoc.org.uk/Default.aspx?page=20563 
47 Yemen, Fourth periodic report, CCPR/C/YEM/2004/4, at 5. 
48 European Roma Rights Centre and Romani CRISS, Shadow Report to CEDAW, 35th Session, 15 
May to 2 June 2006. 
49 CEDAW Concluding Observations: Romania, CEDAW/C.ROM/CO/6, 2 June 2006, para. 27. See 
also paras. 26 and 19. 
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On occasion States have used temporary special measures to try to address historical 
disadvantage experienced by certain groups hence India’s (constitutional) provision 
for the use of reservations for Dalit groups and women.50  Similarly section 13(3) of 
the Nepalese Interim constitution of 2007 has a proviso to its widely drawn non 
discrimination provision to the effect that: 
 
“Provided that nothing shall be deemed to prevent the making of special provisions by 
law for the protection, empowerment or advancement of the interests of women, 
Dalit, indigenous ethnic tribes, Madeshi, or peasants, labourers or those who belong to 
a class which is economically, socially or culturally backward and children, the aged, 
disabled and those who are physically or mentally incapacitated.”51
 
The importance of women’s participation in peace making and post-conflict societies 
was recognised by the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, 
Peace and Security, which resolution has been incorporated into the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women, 2003 
(African Protocol for Women).52
 
According to Professor Elizabeth Evatt, in Australia there is an Equal Opportunity for 
Women in the Workplace Act 1999 (the EOWW Act). She notes that there is an 
agency that works with employers who are required to report on the measures that 
they have taken and also in the balance of employment at their workplace.53 In March 
2007, Spain adopted the Organic Law 3/2007 designed to “guarantee equal 
opportunities and equal treatment” not least by requiring companies employing more 
than 250 people to set up specific equality schemes defined as: “an ordered set of 
measures…geared towards achieving equal treatment and opportunities for women 
and men in companies and towards eradicating gender discrimination.”54
 
                                                 
50 Constitution of India s.15 (3) (women). However, for criticism of the special provisions clause see 
CRR Litigating Reproductive Rights: Using Public Interest Litigation and International law to 
Promote Gender Justice in India (NY, CRR, 2006), 45. 
51 See also Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007, art. 35(14), from UN NEPAL questionnaire response 
part A:1 and part C:1. 
52 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 
2003. Assembly /AU/Dec 14 (II), art. 10. 
53 E. Evatt, response to OHCHR questionnaire part C:2, May 2007. Professor Evatt is a former 
chairperson of CEDAW who was writing in her personal capacity. 
54 Art 4(1) Organic Law 3/2007 as cited by Professor Theresa Piconto Novales, Zaragoza, Spain –
narrative response to questionnaire at p. 6, May 2007. 
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Given the role of judges in deciding if particular laws discriminate against women, 
also important must be a consideration of the use of temporary special measures to 
increase the number of women judges, particularly in the higher courts.55 In Guido 
Jacobs v. Belgium,56 the use of temporary special measures to appoint judicial 
officers was challenged by an unsuccessful male candidate who argued that the lack 
of women applicants for public service appointments showed that they did not fulfil 
the criteria (were not good enough). Finding against him,  the Human Rights 
Committee countered that the fact that few women had applied for the positions, 
should not be seen as pointing to women’s inadequacy or inability to fill roles, but 
rather as reflecting the pervasive and on going discrimination that they suffer. This 
justified the use of temporary special measures. 57 The participation of women judges 
can have a significant impact on both the construction and interpretation of law so that 
of the Akayesu58 case it is noted; 
 
“The only woman judge on the ICTR, was instrumental in questioning witnesses and 
evoking testimony of gross sexual violence…eventually leading to the defendant’s 
conviction for genocide due to those acts, the first time an international tribunal held 
that rape and sexual violence can constitute genocide…Judge Pillay observed recently 
‘Who interprets the law is at least as important as who makes the law, if not more 
so…I cannot stress how critical I consider it to be that women are represented and a 
gender perspective integrated at all levels of the investigation, prosecution, defence, 
witness protection and judiciary.”59
 
Equally important is for closer attention to be paid to the participation of women 
within international bodies including the United Nations.  Figures for women’s 
participation on human rights committee bodies showed that at the end of elections in 
2004, women represented: “36.5 per cent of members of treaty bodies. However, 
women are over represented on treaty bodies examining issues related to women and 
children (CEDAW and CRC) and represent less than 14 per cent of the 74 members 
of the other five treaty bodies.”60 Similarly a survey of special procedures mandate 
                                                 
55 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human Rights, 1998, OAU/LEG/AFCHPR/PROT (III), art. 12 (2). African Protocol on 
Women’s Rights, art. 8 (e). 
56 Guido Jacobs v Belgium, Communication No 943/2000, CCPR/C/81/D/943/2000. 
57 Ibid, paras. 9:4, 9:5. See also CEDAW general recommendation 25. 
58 In the Case of Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T. 
59 N. Lasslop “Understanding the Impact of Women Members in Parliament on Peace, Security and 
Decision Making” ACCORD Conflict Trends, Issue 1, 2007 32, 35. 
60 E/CN.4/2005/68, 10 January 2005, para. 45.  See also R. Johnstone (2006). 
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holders showed that women represented 26.4 per cent of mandate holders.61  It is 
unsatisfactory that the body responsible for standard setting and encouraging member 
States to use temporary special measures to improve the situation of women is itself 
failing. This numerical inequality is unfortunate not least because the UN analysis of 
the work undertaken by those women who are appointed shows: “Similar to treaty 
bodies, experts appointed to carry out mandates of the Commission on Human Rights 
tend to devote more attention to women’s human rights and gender mainstreaming 
when these are consistent with their personal experience and background.”62
 
Provision has also been made, in both international human rights law and national 
legislation, for women to receive “special protection” during pregnancy and while 
lactating.63 While this is an attempt to recognise biological differences between men 
and women which render the application of a formal model of equality inappropriate, 
Mackinnon has challenged the special protection rule arguing that it reinforces the 
idea that men are the “norm” or the standard against women must be measured. 
Maternity and reproductive differences make women “unlike” men by reinforcing 
their distance from the male “norm” hence the need for “special protection.”64 
Moreover, the apparent privileging of women’s maternal roles post delivery may in 
fact reinforce rather than challenge gender stereotypes.  Making, by law or policy, 
women primarily responsible for the care for young children, can constitute 
discrimination against both men and women.65 An example of this is the South 
African case of Hugo. 66 On his election to the Presidency of South Africa, Nelson 
Mandela granted an amnesty permitting the release of certain categories of female 
prisoners who had children under the age of 12 years old, the reasoning being, the 
children needed their mothers. The appellant, a male prisoner within the amnesty 
category of prisoner, challenged this as constituting discrimination against him on the 
grounds of sex.  Although the Constitutional Court dismissed his appeal noting that 
the amnesty merely reflected the status quo, that is that women bore the primary 
                                                 
61 E/CN.3/2005/68, para. 38. 
62 Ibid, para. 58. 
63 See CESCR, art. 10 (2); ICCPR, art. 6 (5); Human Rights Committee general comment 18, para. 8; 
CEDAW, art. 4 (2), 5 (b), 11 (1) (f), 11 (2) (a) and 12 (2); CRC 24 (1), 24 (2) (a) and (d). CEDAW 
general recommendation 24, para. 28. 
64 C. Mackinnon (1989), 220 and 225-6. 
65 Petrovic v. Austria, European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 20458/92, Judgment of 27 
March 1998. See also Hugo v. The President of South Africa, 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
66 Hugo v. The President of the Republic of South Africa, 1997 (4) SA 1. 
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responsibility of looking after children and to ignore this would in itself be 
discriminatory, in a dissenting judgment Kriegler JA noted that the majority decision 
merely reinforced, rather than challenged gender stereotyping.67
 
Intersectionality 
 Linked to the issue of substantive equality must be the recognition that women are 
not a homogenous group.68 Their heterogeneity requires us to take into account the 
fact that women do not experience discrimination in the same way.69 Women are 
separated by age70, caste71, class, race72, religion, disability73, indigeneity74, minority 
status75 including sexual orientation76 and multiple other factors. This demands that 
we take a holistic look at the way societies are organized and the differential impact 
of discrimination on the various groups within it. This last point has been termed 
                                                 
67 Ibid. 
68 E. Spelman Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (London, Women’s 
Press, 1990); K. Bhavanani (ed.) Feminism and Race (Oxford, OUP, 2001). Human Rights Committee 
general comment 28, para. 30. 
69 United Nations  Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, 20 December 1993, GA 
Res. 48/104, preamble. OAS Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
against Women, 1994, reproduced in (1994) 33 International Legal Materials 1535, art. 9.  African 
Protocol on Women’s Rights, 2003, arts. 22-24. 
70 CESCR general comment 6 on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons, 8 December 
1995, E/1996/22. CEDAW general comment 24 on Health, UN Doc A.54/38/Rev.1, para. 6. 
71 C. Bob “‘Dalit Rights are Human Rights’: Caste Discrimination, International Activism, and the 
Construction of a New Human Rights Issue” (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly, 167.  CERD general 
comment 29, article 1, paragraph 1 of the Convention (descent), 01 November 2002, paras. 11-13. 
72 The CESCR raised the issue of racial discrimination against black people with Libya in its 
concluding observations. CESCR Concluding Observations Libya Arab Jamahiriya, 
E/C/12/LYB/CO/2, 25 January 2006, para. 12. 
73 Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, art. 6, Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action para. 232 (p)/ CEDAW general comment 18 on Disabled Women, UN Doc. A/46/38, CESCR 
general comment 5 on Persons with Disabilities, 26 April 2001, E/1995/22, para. 19. CRC general 
comment 9 on the Rights of children with disabilities, CRC/C/GC/9, 29 September 2006. 
74 CERD general comment 23 on Indigenous Peoples, 18 August 1997, A/52/18, annex V. UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Persons, Human Rights Council Resolution 2006/2, June 29 
2006, in UN Doc. A/HRC/1/L.10 (annexe). Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of 
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, ILO Convention 
No. 107, 328 UNTS (1957). Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, ILO Convention No. 169, Reprinted in ILM 1382 (1989). P. Thornberry Indigenous Peoples 
and Human Rights (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2002).  The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas 
Tigni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment 31 August 2001, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Ser.C No 79 (2001). 
75  UNOHCHR “Meeting the Challenges of Discrimination against Women from Minority Groups”,  
Statement on the occasion of International Women’s Day, 8th March 2006, by Gay McDougall, UN 
Independent Expert on Minority issues. CERD general comment 27 Discrimination against Roma, 16 
August 2000, A/55/18, annex V. Human Rights Committee general comment 28, para. 32. Center for 
Reproductive Rights (CRR) Forced Sterilisation and other Assaults on Roma: Reproductive Freedom 
in Slovakia (New York, CRR, 2003). Ginova & Ors v. Slovakia, European Court on Human Rights, 
Case No. 15966/04. 
76 CRR and University of Toronto (2002), 211-215. Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 
488/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488, (Human Rights Committee, 1994). 
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“intersectionality” – a process by which one recognizes that certain groups may suffer 
multiple forms of discrimination simultaneously. 77
 
The consequences of discrimination are different for those who suffer single issue 
discrimination than for those who suffer from intersectional discrimination.78 There 
has over time been greater normative recognition given to the principle of 
intersectional discrimination.79 The Race Committee has in its general comment 25 
on gender related dimensions of racial discrimination80devised a four point 
“intersectionality questionnaire” which is helpful in considering how people are 
differentially impacted by gender based discrimination. It requires one to consider:  
 
i) The form a violation takes; 
ii) The circumstances in which a violation occurs; 
iii) The consequences of a violation; 
iv) The availability and accessibility of remedies and complaint mechanisms.81 
 
Questionnaire respondents furnished many examples of intersectional discrimination. 
Writing about the situation in Spain, a questionnaire respondent reported: 
 
“In Spain certain groups of women are more vulnerable than others to the various 
forms of discrimination. In this regard, it should be pointed out that in issues such as 
gender violence, difficult access to housing, the right to education and training, equal 
access to the women’s welfare measures and policies provided by the Spanish 
institutions, equal opportunities in the occupational sphere, equal wages, etc. are twice 
as difficult for some particular groups of women, such as rural women, undocumented 
migrant women, Gypsy women or disabled women.”82
 
Another example of intersectional discrimination and its effects was highlighted the 
issue of equal pay in England and Wales. The questionnaire respondent noted that 
                                                 
77 K Crenshaw “Demarginalisng the Intersection of Race and Sex” (1989) U. Chi Legal F. 139, K. 
Crenshaw “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of 
Colour” (1991) Stanford Law Journal 1241,1244 n.   
78 F. Banda and C. Chinkin Gender, Minorities and Indigenous Peoples (London, Minority Rights 
Group, 2004). CESCR general comment 16, para 5. 
79 UN Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination and Related Intolerance, 
2001, UN Doc A/CONF.189/12. 
80 CERD General Comment 25 on Gender Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. 
A/55/18, Annex V. Human Rights Committee general comment 28, para.30. 
81 CERD General Comment 25 on Gender Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination, para. 5. 
82 T.Piconto Novales, questionnaire response : p.2 narrative response. 
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research undertaken by the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) showed that 
ethnic minority women in the workplace experienced disadvantage.  The 
research83that she refers to revealed, in part, that while the ‘average’ discrepancy in 
pay between men and women was 17% (with (white) men earning more), Pakistani 
women experienced a 28% differential in pay. This suggests that, in addition to the 
‘gender deficit’ of 17%, there is an additional 11% which is ‘unaccounted for,’ or put 
differently, can be accounted for in part, by factoring discrimination based on race 
and religion.”84  While the gap between the pay of white women and men held steady 
at 17%, the research showed that in the 24-54 age group, the full time hourly pay gap 
“increases for Indian (15 per cent), Black African (23 per cent) and Black Caribbean 
(13%) women.”85 This shows that one cannot lump all minorities into one group who 
are all discriminated against because of a combination of sex and race 
differentiation.86 Other reasons for the pay differentials may include different working 
patterns. There is also the fact that women are sometimes found in caring and service 
sectors which may command lower wages. Moreover, it is telling that the research 
also revealed differences in pay between white men (the highest earners) and men 
from other ethnic groups, with Indian men experiencing the lowest pay differentials 
and Bangladeshi men the highest pay differential of a 39 per cent deficit vis a vis full 
time wages for white men. 87Again this highlights the importance of an intersectional 
approach to examining discrimination; the causes for the pay inequality may reveal 
different pressure points for seemingly “alike” groups and may therefore call for 
different responses or interventions. 
 
A major challenge that is thrown up by intersectional discrimination is the perceived 
tension between rights of minorities and respect for culture88 and other human rights 
principles, not least non discrimination.89 Minorities or indigenous people may argue 
that they have the right to practise and to enjoy their right to culture without external 
                                                 
83 L. Platt Pay Gaps: The Position of Ethnic Minority Women and Men (London, Equal Opportunities 
Commission, 2006) v, 43. 
84 A. Stewart, questionnaire response Part A:6, April 2007. 
85 Ibid, vi. 
86 Ibid, 20. 
87 Ibid, 43. 
88 ICCPR, art. 27; CRC, art. 31. See also Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No R. 6/24/1977, 
Human Rights Committee, views of the Committee, 30 July 1981, UN Doc A/36/40, Supp 40.   
89 UNDP Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World (New York, 
UNDP, 2004). 
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interference. While, technically all rights are subject to the filter of non 
discrimination,90 the situation is more complex for as a UN official noted “Human 
rights mechanisms find it difficult to interfere with non State structures.”91  
 
Notwithstanding what appear to be clear normative commitments to achieving 
equality between the sexes, the practice of States parties, indicates that there is still a 
equivocation over the principle of non-discrimination based on sex. States, and some 
academic writers, sometimes seek to invoke national, cultural or religious 
justifications for the non-implementation of equality, claiming that the local 
interpretation of the norm is at variance with the international.  Often this starts with a 
challenge to the notion of “sameness”.  During the drafting of CEDAW for example, 
the Moroccan representative argued for a change in the wording of the provision 
“men and women have the same rights and responsibilities during and after the 
dissolution of marriage” because as drafted the provision: “Failed to take account a 
fact which was a matter of common sense, namely, that men and women, in order to 
be truly equal, did not need to be treated as being the same, which would be contrary 
to nature.”92  Preferred in some quarters is the equivalence or complementarity model 
which holds that men and women are “complements” of each other.93 Of this “dual 
sex” construction of sex difference, Nzegwu notes: 
 
“In a dual-sex context, where individuals are valued for the skills they bring to 
community building and the role they play in developing the culture, gender identity 
is differently constructed. Identity is not abstractly construed in terms of sameness, 
but concretely defined in terms of the worth of social duties and responsibilities. 
Because gender equality implies comparable worth, women and men are 
complements, whose duties, though different, are socially comparable.”94
 
The difficulty of course is in the different economic and social value placed on the 
roles that men and women play. Additionally, sometimes both sexes are denied the 
                                                 
90 Human Rights Committee general comment 28, para. 32.  Human Rights Committee general 
comment 23 on the rights of minorities (1994), ref paras. 4 and 6:2. K Knop Diversity and Self 
Determination in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), 360-372. 
91 Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, E/CN.4/2002/83, at 3. 
92 L. Rehof Guide to the Travaux Preparatoires of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Discrimination against Women (Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1993), 147. See also the reservations 
made to CEDAW art 16 by Iraq and Morocco.  
93 L. Welchman Women and Muslim Family Laws in Arab States (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University 
Press, 2007), 35 and 38-39. 
94 N. Nzegwu “Gender Equality in Dual-Sex System: The Case of Onitsha” (2001) 1 Jenda: a Journal 
of Culture and African Women’s Studies available at: http://www.jendajournal.com.  
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opportunity to take on roles including in the domestic or public spheres that do not 
conform to the gender roles imposed upon them reinforcing stereotyping and denying 
them valuable opportunities to work.95
 
State equivocation over the principle of equality can most clearly be seen when 
looking at the reservations entered to human rights instruments. 
 
Reservations 
International human rights law permits a State to enter reservations96  to a treaty 
provided that the reservation is not incompatible with the objects and purpose of the 
treaty.97 The object and purpose of CEDAW, whose construction of discrimination is 
accepted as the base line standard for other treaty monitoring bodies, is that States 
parties move progressively towards the elimination of discrimination against women. 
98 Reservations threatening the achievement of this goal are contrary to the object and 
purpose of the Convention. Despite this, there is a clear link between reservations 
made to CEDAW (and other instruments) and the areas where discrimination against 
women continues to prevail, not least in family and nationality laws.   States have 
entered a large number of reservations to CEDAW, in particular reservations which 
are broad and imprecise.99 This had led scholars to query whether the principle of sex 
discrimination can really be considered to be part of customary international law as is 
asserted by some scholars,100 as States parties from all geographic regions, and 
                                                 
95 World Bank Middle East and North Africa Development Report: Gender and Development in the 
Middle East and North Africa (Washington, World Bank, 2004), 13, 21 and 93-127,  (hereafter MENA 
Development Report, 2004). A. Abusharaf “Women in Islamic Communities: The Quest for Gender 
Justice Research” (2006) 28 HRQ 714. 
96 Although states sometimes seek to pass off reservations as interpretive declarations or 
“understandings”, it is clear from the objections made by other states that there is little in practice to 
distinguish them in their effect.  Human Rights Committee general comment 24 on issues relating to 
reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or 
in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add6 (1994), 
para. 3; Bellilos v. Switzerland (1988), ECHR Series A, vol. 132; Statement on Reservations to the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, reproduced in UN, IWRAW, Commonwealth 
Secretariat Assessing the Status of Women: A Guide to Reporting under the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2000) 90, at para. 4  (hereafter CEDAW statement on reservations, 2000). 
97 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, art. 19; CEDAW, art. 28 (2). 
98 R. Cook “Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women” (1990) 30 Virginia Journal of International Law 643. 
99 H. Steiner and P. Alston International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford, 
Clarendon, 2000), 180. S. Engle Merry (2006), 80-81. 
100 S. Ali Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law (The Hague, Kluwer, 2000). 
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different religious and legal systems continue to enter reservations limiting women’s 
enjoyment of their rights. 
 
CEDAW has frequently addressed reservations and has identified reservations to 
articles 2 (State obligations), 9 (nationality), 15 (equality and freedom of movement), 
16 (marriage and family relations) as contrary to the object and purpose of the 
Convention, and therefore impermissible,101 In general comment 21 CEDAW urged: 
“States parties should where necessary to comply with the Convention, in particular in 
order to comply with articles 9, 15, and 16 enact and enforce legislation.”102
 
As the analysis of the responses to the questionnaire will later show, many of the laws 
that discriminate against women are in these areas (article 9 – nationality; article 15 – 
equality before the law; and article 16 – marriage and family relations). 
CEDAW has also noted that States that, while not entering reservations, have laws 
and customs that are discriminatory towards women, thus making it “difficult for the 
Committee to evaluate and understand the status of women.”103 The Constitutions of 
Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe104 exclude customary personal laws from the reach 
of the non-discrimination provision, meaning in effect that discrimination against 
women in personal status law is permitted.  
 
States frequently give as the reason for their reservations, their constitution, 105   
national law, custom and religion106 despite the fact that the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, 1969 provides that “a party may not invoke the provisions of its 
                                                 
101 See CEDAW general recommendation No. 21, paras. 41, 43, 44 and 48. CEDAW statement on 
reservations (2000) identifies articles 2 and 16 as the core provisions. See para. 6,  Arab Development 
Report (2006), 191 et seq.   
102 CEDAW general recommendation 21, para. 49. See also S. Engle Merry (2006), 81. 
103 CEDAW general recommendation 21, para. 46. 
104 See Constitution of Botswana, 30 September 1966, s. 15 (4); Constitution of Zambia, 1991 (Act 
No.1 of 1991), s.23 94 (c); Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1979 as amended (Zimbabwe Constitution 
Order SI 1979/1600 of the United Kingdom), art. 23 (3).  
105 See for example Monaco general reservation to CEDAW; Pakistan reservation to art. 2 of CEDAW; 
and the “understanding” of art. 2 of the ICCPR entered into by the United States of America and the 
objections of other states (Finland) thereto.  See also reservation of Bangladesh to arts. 2 and 3 of the 
CESCR. Available at: http://www.hri.ca/forthereCord1998/documentation/reservations/cescr.htm. 
106 C. Chinkin “Reservations and Objections to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women” in J. Gardner (ed) Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s 
Right to Opt Out (London, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1997), 64; J. 
Connors “The Women’s Convention in the Muslim World” in J. Gardner (ed) (1997). A.E Mayer Islam 
and Human Rights (Boulder, Westview), 125; UNDP Arab Development Report 2005, 179-182. 
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internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”107 Moreover, the 
reservations ignore treaty obligations requiring States to change or repeal 
discriminatory laws.108 Reservations are often general in nature thus making their 
scope and reach difficult to ascertain.109
 
In 2002 the Special Rapporteur on Religion produced a comprehensive report 
identifying the myriad ways in which religions and more precisely, the interpretation 
of religious tenets was used to rationalise and legitimise discrimination against 
women in both practice and law.110 The use of reservations played a key role in the 
legal disenfranchisement of women. 
 
The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and belief also notes that: 
 
 “varying interpretations of the same religion shows an urgent need for less 
ambiguous rules and principles.  The issue is extremely delicate, but that should by no 
means deter us from confronting it.  On the contrary, I believe that the longer we 
postpone tackling it, the greater the risk of embedding gender inequalities in the field 
of human rights.”111
 
The Children’s Rights Convention is also subject to a large number of reservations112 
based on culture, national law and religion.113 Using the life cycle model114, one can 
see how qualifying the enjoyment by the girl child of her rights is merely a pre-cursor 
to gender based discrimination faced by older women. With this in mind, human 
                                                 
107 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, art. 27. Specific Human Rights 
Issues: Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, Final Working Paper submitted by F. Hampson, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/42, 19 July 2004, para. 56. 
108 See for example CEDAW, arts. 2 (a) – (c) and 3. 
109 Human Rights Committee general comment 24, para. 1. 
110 Droits Civils et Politiques et, notamment: Intolérance Religieuse. Rapport soumis par M. 
Abdelfattah Amor, Rapporteur spécial, conformément a la résolution 2001/42 de la Commission des 
droits de l’homme.  Additif: Etude sure la liberté de religion ou de conviction et la condition de la 
femme au  regard de la religion et des traditions, E/CN.4/2002/73/Add. 2, 5 avril 2002 (hereafter 
Special Rapporteur on religion, 2002).  UNDP Arab Development Report 2005, at 145-147. See also 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men 
“Women and Religion in Europe” Doc. 10670, 16 September 2005. 
111 A. Jahangir, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, speech given at 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/Records/2005/E/0510041000E.htm#5t. 
112 For reservations to the CRC see http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/crc-reserve.htm.   See for 
example Afghanistan, Botswana, Bosnia Herzogovina, Canada, China, Croatia, Egypt, Holy See, 
Jordan, Indonesia, Iran, Kiribati (culture), Iraq, Kuwait,  Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,  Mauritania, 
Monaco (nationality), Morocco, Oman, Poland (custom, Qatar,  Saudi-Arabia, Singapore,  Slovenia, 
Syria, Thailand, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates. 
113 K. Hashemi “Religious Legal Traditions, Muslim States and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child: An Essay on the Relevant UN Documentation” (2007) 29 HRQ 194.  See also Special 
Rapporteur on Religion (2002), para. 74. 
114 CEDAW general recommendation 24, para.2. 
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rights committees and the children’s agency UNICEF have all noted the 
“discrimination connection” between denial of education on grounds of sex, early and 
forced marriage, premature child birth and violence against women.115
 
Challenging reservations is difficult,116 With the exception of the Race Convention 
which includes a regime to address impermissible reservations,117 the validity of 
reservations is governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. There is a 
limited number of States which object to reservations which they consider contrary to 
the object and purpose of the treaty. Objecting to another State party’s reservation 
may help to highlight a problem, but short of proclaiming that the convention will not 
come into force inter-partes, an objection has little discernible effect in (deterring) the 
making of reservations by those States which are determined to do so.118 Moreover, 
Chinkin notes reluctance on the part of some States to object to reservations made by 
other States parties because to do so might be perceived as an “unfriendly act.”119 
However, there is a group of States, which is prepared to object to those reservations 
that they perceive to be contrary the object and purpose of treaties. In 2007, CEDAW 
congratulated the Netherlands for its willingness to challenge reservations that were 
incompatible with the objects and purpose of the Convention.120
 
Attempts by the Human Rights Committee to take a robust approach to reservations, 
claiming competence to decide on the compatibility of reservations with Covenant 
provisions and severing those that it found to be incompatible with the object and 
                                                 
115 Plan International Because I am a Girl (London, Plan, 2007). UNICEF  Progress for Children: a 
Report Card on Gender Parity and Primary Education, No. 2, April 2005. UNICEF The State of the 
World’s Children 2006: Excluded and Invisible (New York, UNICEF, 2006), 8, 22 and 44-47. 
UNICEF The State of the World’s Children 2007: Women and Children, the Double Dividend of 
Gender Equality (NY, UNICEF, 2007). CRC general comment 4 on Adolescent health and 
development in the context of the CRC, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2003/4 (2003, paras. 20 and 24.  Human 
Rights Committee general comment 19, article 23, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 28, 1994, para. 4. 
CESCR general comment 16, paras. 27 and 30. Human Rights Committee general comment 28, paras. 
23 and 28. 
116 Vienna Declaration and Platform for Action, 1993 (II), para. 39.  Beijing Platform for Action, para. 
230 (c); Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development “Asian governments must ratify treaties, 
remove reservations, report and remedy rights violations”, Statement  issued to mark human rights day, 
Sunday 10 December 2006, available at http://www.forum-asia.org. 
117 CERD, art. 20 (2). 
118 B. Clark “The Vienna Reservations regime and the Convention on Discrimination against Women” 
(1991) 85 AJIL 281. 
119 C. Chinkin (1997), 64 and 76. 
120 CEDAW Concluding Observations to the Report of the Netherlands, UN Doc. 
CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/4 (2007), para. 7 
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purpose of the Covenant121 have met with resistance.122 Other treaty bodies have tried 
to grapple with the plethora of reservations by issuing general comments123 and by 
engaging with States during the reporting phase.124 While there has been some 
success in persuading some to uplift or modify their reservations,125 but there is still 
much to be done.126
 
The Special Rapporteur appointed to look into the matter of reservations by the 
International Law Commission has yet to reach a conclusive decision on how 
(incompatible) reservations should be dealt with.127
                                                 
121 Human Rights Committee general comment 24. The Committee notes that its approach is in keeping 
with the European approach. R. Baratta “Should Invalid Reservations to Human Rights Treaties be 
Disregarded?” (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 413. M. Scheinin “Reservations to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Its Optional Protocols-Reflections and State 
Practice”, undated article found on the internet. 
122 See Observations by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on General 
Comment 24 Relating to Reservations, (1995) GAOR, UN Doc. A/50/40, Annex VI.  A. Boyle and C. 
Chinkin The Making of International Law (Oxford, OUP, 2007), 191-194. 
123 CEDAW general comment 4 on Reservations, UN Doc A/42/38; CEDAW general recommendation 
No. 20 on reservations to the Convention, UN Doc A/47/38. CEDAW general recommendation No. 21, 
paras. 41-45 and 48. CEDAW’s statement on reservations (1998).  
124 CEDAW Guidelines Regarding the Form and Content of Initial Reports of States Parties provide 
that states that have entered reservations should say why the reservation is necessary, the effect of the 
reservation on national law and policy and the plans, including a timetable for uplifting the 
reservations. General reservations are considered to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
Convention. See UN Doc CEDAW/C/7/Rev.3, para. 8. 
125 States uplifting or modifying their reservations entered include, but are not limited to, Lesotho, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Malawi and Turkey. 
126 CEDAW statement on reservations (1998), paras. 11 and 19. 
127 A. Boyle and C. Chinkin (2007), 193. 
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PART B – REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES 
Running parallel to the UN norm making process, have been regional initiatives to 
create instruments that reflect the cultural historical values of the various regions. 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights 
The oldest of these is the European Convention on Human Rights, 1950.128 Although 
containing a non-discrimination provision in article 14, the treaty requires an 
allegation of discrimination on listed grounds (which include sex) to be brought in 
conjunction with another Convention provision. The test for discrimination was 
enunciated in the Belgian Linguistic case129: 
 
“The principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction has no objective 
and reasonable justification. The existence of such a justification must be assessed in 
relation to the aim and effects of the measures under consideration, regard being had 
to principles which normally prevail in democratic societies. A difference in treatment 
in the exercise of a right laid down in the Convention must not only pursue a 
legitimate aim: Article 14 is likewise violated when it is clearly established that there 
is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the 
aim sought to be realised.130”  
 
An examination of European case law seems to show that claims of discrimination on 
grounds of sex are not made solely, or exclusively, by women, with a number of cases 
appear to be brought by men131 complaining, mainly, of distinctions in social security 
law or regulations about entitlements to benefits.132 For women, marriage (status) 
seems to be an important factor in discrimination cases.133 Also notable is the case of 
MC v. Bulgaria134 where a young woman had been raped but her case had not been 
prosecuted because of a finding that she had not resisted.  Alleging violations of 
                                                 
128 European Convention on Human Rights, ETS No. 5, 213 UNTS 222. 
129Belgian Linguistic Case (No. 2) (1968), I EHRR, 252. 
130 Ibid, 284. 
131 Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 13580/88, 
Judgment of 18 July 1994. 
132 Van Raalte v. the Netherlands, European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 20060/92, 
Judgment of 21 February 1997; Petrovic v. Austria, European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 
20458/92, Judgment of 27 March 1998; Willis v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 
Application No. 36042/97, Judgment of 11 June 2002. 
133 Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 
Application Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81, Judgment of 28 May 1985; Marcx v. Belgium (1979), 
EHRR 330B. Schuler-Zgaggen v. Switzerland, Judgment of the ECtHR, 24 June 1993; Wessels-
Bergervoet v. Netherlands, Application No. 34462/97, Judgment of 4 June 2002. (The latter is a 
benefits case). 
134 MC v. Bulgaria, Judgement of the European Court of Human Rights, 4 December 2003.  See also 
Aydin v. Turkey, (1998) 3 Butterworths Human Rights Cases, 300. 
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articles 3, 8 (1), 13 and 14 of the Convention, MC noted that Bulgarian law did not 
provide effective protection against rape as only cases where the victim had actively 
resisted were prosecuted.  There had also been a failure by authorities to properly 
investigate the allegations made.  The Court held that there was indeed a positive 
obligation under articles 3 and 8 requiring Bulgaria to enact criminal law proceedings 
which effectively punished rape regardless of the behaviour of the victim. It was the 
absence of consent that was crucial and not the failure to resist the assault. Moreover, 
the State was under an obligation to investigate allegations of rape thoroughly and 
also to prosecute. 
 
More recent is the case of Tysiac v Poland.135 A woman had been advised by her 
doctor not to proceed with pregnancy because of a risk to her health. She had sought, 
but had been denied an abortion. She sued alleging that there had been a breach of her 
rights under articles 3, 13 and 8 read with 14 of the ECHR. The court found for her 
and ruled that States had a duty to ensure access to abortion where it was legal.  In 
June 2007, the Polish government announced that it would be appealing the decision, 
136 thus calling into question the assertion made by one of the delegates that attended 
the CEDAW session at which Poland presented its report in January 2007, concerning 
reproductive rights: 
 
“abortion was legal for women in cases of rape and when the pregnant woman’s 
health was in danger. All women had the right to reproductive services. Under the 
conscience clause, doctors could refuse to perform an abortion. However, if all 
doctors in a hospital refused to do so, the hospital was required to have a contract with 
another health care facility willing to perform the procedure. All doctors were obliged 
to perform abortions for women whose health was seriously imperilled by the 
pregnancy. In such cases, the conscience clause could not be invoked as reason for 
refusing to perform the procedure.  In all the circumstances doctors were subject to 
the Penal Code’s provisions concerning abortion rights and the Professional Conduct 
Code.”137
 
                                                 
135 Tysiac v. Poland, ECHR Application no. 5410/03, 20 March 2007. 
136 Center for Reproductive Rights “Poland appeals Tysiac”, available at: 
http://www.reproductiverights.org/ww_europe.html#polandappeals. 
137 UN Department of Information “Progress made in mainstreaming gender equality into Poland’s 
national legislation, women’s anti-discrimination committee told”, General Assembly WOM/1591. 
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In the decision of the ECHR in Leyla Sahin v.Turkey138 the ban on the wearing of 
headscarves by Muslim women in public (University) was upheld by the majority.  
This decision contrasted with that of the Human Rights Committee in 
Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan139 in which the Committee found that restrictions on a 
woman’s right to wear the hijab in public or private constituted a violation of article 
18 (2)  of the ICCPR prohibiting coercion that would impair an individual’s freedom 
to have or adopt a religion.140 The difference in approach between the regional court 
and the international committee raises interesting questions about standards and 
interpretation of human rights norms.141  
 
In 2000 the Council of Europe adopted Protocol 12 to the European Convention.142 It 
reads into the Convention a free-standing equality provision, the equivalent of article 
26 of the ICCPR, guaranteeing the enjoyment of rights “set forth by law without 
discrimination on any ground…”143
 
The Inter-American system 
The American Convention on Human Rights, 1969144 proscribes discrimination on 
the basis of sex145 and guarantees equality before the law.146  If national law is not in 
line with the Convention, then “States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with 
their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative 
and other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.147” 
The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of 
                                                 
138 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, ECHR Application no. 44774/98, judgment 29 June 2004. D. McGoldrick 
Human Rights and Religion: The Islamic Headscarf Debate (Oxford, Hart, 2006). Special Rapporteur 
on Freedom of Religion and Belief, Asma Jahangir Civil and Political Rights including the question of 
religious intolerance, E/CN.4/2006/5, 9 January 2006, paras. 41 and 43-50. 
139 Hudoyberganova v. Uzebekistan (931/2000), ICCPR, A/60/40 vol. II (5 November 2004). 
140 Ibid, para.6.2. 
141 In Rahime Kayhan v. Turkey, CEDAW Communication no. 8/2005. A complaint made to CEDAW 
on the same issue was held to be inadmissible due to the author’s non exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
She had brought a claim on the basis of freedom of religion to the Turkish courts but claimed violation 
of the non discrimination provisions in CEDAW. Interestingly Turkey noted that the matter had already 
been heard in the ECHR in the Sahin case. 
142 Protocol 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Rome. 
143 Protocol 12, art. 1(1).   
144 American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, 1144 UNTS 123.  See also the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International 
Conference of American States, 1948, art. II. 
145 Ibid, art. 1(1). 
146 Ibid, art. 24. 
147 Ibid, art. 2. 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1988 (Protocol of San Salvador) also 
guarantees freedom from discrimination.148 The State’s obligation to enact domestic 
legislation in line with the Protocol is also repeated.149  Moreover, the San Salvador 
Protocol recognises that different groups may require additional protection hence 
there are separate provisions for children, the elderly and persons with disabilities.150        
 
There has since 1994, been a Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women whose 
initial remit included analysing the compliance of member States laws and practices 
complied with the provisions on non discrimination on grounds of sex and equality 
provisions of the American Declaration and also the Convention on Human Rights. 
Thereafter, the Rapporteur has been tasked with receiving communications and also 
“supporting the investigation of broader issues affecting the rights of women in 
specific countries of the region through on site visits and country reports.”151
 
Jurisprudence from the OAS on discrimination against women has included 
consideration of nationality laws,152 violence against women and153 reproductive 
rights issues.154 The Inter-American system has also been responsible for the leading 
decision on State responsibility for the actions of non State actors, 155which has 
impacted significantly on the understanding of State duty to prevent and punish 
violence against women in the private sphere. The Velasquez case established the 
principle of due diligence: 
 
“An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly 
imputable to a State (for example because it is the act of a private person or because 
the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility 
                                                 
148 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 1988, OAS Treaty Series 69, art. 3. 
149 Ibid, art. 2. 
150 Ibid, arts. 17-19. 
151 Inter American Commission on Human Rights “Special Rapporteurship on the Rights of Women of 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Background and Mandate”, downloaded from 
http:///www.cidh/oas.org/women/mandate.htm. 
152 Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica, 
Inter American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of 19 January 1984, Ser A No. 4. 
153 Mejia Egocheaga v Peru (1997), 1 Butterworths Human Rights Cases 229.   
154 Maria Mestanza Chavez v. Peru, Case 12.191, Rept No. 71/03, Inter. American Court on Human 
Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118.  Doc 70 rev.2 at 668 (2003), Paulina Del Carmen Ramirez Jacinto v 
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155 Velasquez Rodriguez Case (Honduras) (1994). 
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of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to 
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.”156
 
In Velasquez it was further noted that the State’s duties included: 
 
“The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations 
and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations 
committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the 
appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation.”157
 
In 1994 the Organisation of American States adopted the first human rights treaty 
focusing on violence against women. The provisions of the Convention de Belem do 
Para158 warrant closer examination.  The preamble notes that violence against women 
constitutes a violation of their fundamental rights, while article 1 defines violence as: 
“…any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or 
psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private 
sphere.” 
 
The Convention then follows the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women, 1993 (DEVAW)159 identifying the loci of violence as family, 
community and State160 before listing the human rights norms that are violated when 
violence occurs.161 The duties of the State under the Convention are listed in articles 7 
and 8. Article 7 of the Convention requires that States parties: “take all appropriate 
measures, including legislative measures, to amend or repeal existing laws and 
regulations…”162 Crucially the Convention recognises intersectional 
discrimination.163 Despite the 1994 Convention, the Inter American Commission of 
Women has noted that States have not always met their obligations: 
 
                                                 
156 Ibid, para 172. See also Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women “The Due Diligence 
Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence against Women”, E/CN.4/2006/61, 20 January 
2006. 
157 Velasquez Rodriguez,  para. 174.  See also Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, judgements of the 25 
November 2003, Inter-American. Court on Human Rights, (Ser.C) No 101 (2003).         
158 Inter American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against 
Women, 9 June 1994 , 33 International Legal Materials (1994) 960. 
159 DEVAW, art. 2. 
160 Convention Belem do Para, art 2 
161 Ibid, art 3. 
162 Ibid, art. 7 (e). See also arts. 7(a), (c) (f) (g) and (h). 
163 Ibid, art. 9. 
 27
“That although efforts are being made throughout the Hemisphere to prevent, punish 
and eradicate violence against women, it continues to exist on a scale making it 
imperative to continue to implement strategies designed to free the women of the 
Americas of this scourge.”164
 
Ten years after the adoption of the Convention, Amnesty International echoed this 
call and noted that the situation of women in the region had not improved 
significantly because States parties were failing to fulfil their duties under the 
Convention.165 Amnesty noted that research had shown:  
 
“…that in some countries in the region as many as 70% of women have suffered some 
form of gender-based violence. What is more up to 2003, an average of around 80% 
of states in the Continent had not outlawed sexual abuse within marriage.”166   
 
These shortcomings were highlighted in the decision of the Inter American court in 
Fernandez v. Brazil.167 This case involved a man who shot his wife when she was 
asleep. He had been violent towards her in the past. The author brought a claim before 
the Inter American Commission in which she alleged failure to guarantee equal 
protection before the law and to ensure due process under the American Convention 
on Human Rights, 1969. She also alleged that the State had failed to fulfil its duties 
under article 7 of the Convention de Belem do Para.168  Upholding the complainant’s 
claims, the Inter American Commission noted that although Brazil had made changes 
to its constitution and institutions to make them more responsive to claims such as 
those brought by the complainant,169 those policies had not translated into effective 
practice on the ground.  Evidence was produced showing that in cases of domestic 
violence against women, only one per cent of complaints made to the specialised 
police stations (designed to deal with claims of violence against women) were 
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actually investigated.170 Moreover research showing that only two per cent of 
complaints made about domestic violence led to conviction of the accused.171  In 
making a finding for the complainant, the Commission identified a violation by the 
State of article 7 of the Convention of Belem do Para and articles 8 and 25 of the 
American Convention; “both in relation to article 1:1 of the Convention, as a result of 
its own failure to act and tolerance of the violence inflicted.”  Before making a list of 
comprehensive recommendations,172 the Commission identified the effects of Brazil’s 
failure to investigate and punish those who perpetrate violence against women: 
 
“Given the fact that the violence suffered by Maria de Penha is part of a general 
pattern of negligence and lack of effective action by the State in prosecuting and 
convicting aggressors, it is the view of the Commission that this case involves not 
only failure to fulfil the obligation to prosecute and convict, but also the obligation to 
prevent these degrading practices.  That general and discriminatory judicial 
ineffectiveness also creates a climate that is conducive to domestic violence, since 
society sees no evidence of willingness by the State, as the representative of the 
society, to take effective action to sanction such acts.” 
 
The African System 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981173, contains a non 
discrimination provision covering sex,174 an equal protection before the law 
provision175 and most importantly, the injunction that the State shall ensure “the 
elimination of every (my emphasis) discrimination against women.”176 In Legal 
Resources Foundation v. Zambia177the African Commission, adopted the Human 
Rights Committee definition of equality from general comment 18 noting: 
 
“The right to equality is very important. It means that citizens should expect to be 
treated fairly and justly within the legal system and be assured of equal treatment 
before the law and equal enjoyment of the rights available to other citizens. The right 
                                                 
170 Ibid, para. 49 at 754.  Statistics appeared to show that women experienced violence 
disproportionately to men and that women were 30 times more likely to be murdered by husbands than 
husbands by wives (see para. 47 at 753). 
171 Ibid, para. 49 at 754. 
172 Ibid, para. 61 at 758-9. 
173 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 
174 Article 2. 
175 Article 3. 
176 Article 18(3).  This provision is reserved by Egypt on the basis of potential incompatibility with the 
Shariah. Egypt is the only reserving state. See C. Heyns (2004) vol. 1 at. 52, 53 and 58-9. 
177 Legal Resources Foundation v. Zambia, Communication 211/98, Decision of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 29th Ordinary Session, April/May 2001. 
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to equality is important for a second reason. Equality or lack of it, affects the capacity 
of one to enjoy many other rights.”178
 
Despite this the African Commission which is tasked with receiving State reports, 
individual complaints and with investigating “grave and systematic” breaches of 
human rights, has not in its 21 year history ever heard a complaint pertaining to 
discrimination against women in violation of the itemised provisions.  Clearly this 
cannot be because the rights of African women are universally respected and upheld 
on the continent. Rather it may reflect the fact that those bringing complaints on 
behalf of people focus on violations of public sphere rights and rights affecting 
mainly men or communities in general. The dearth of cases also speaks to general 
ignorance of the possibility of bringing such claims and the lack of expertise amongst 
women’s NGOs about this avenue of redress. Nevertheless, in its consideration of 
State reports, the Commission has identified discriminatory laws and cultural 
practices as impeding women’s ability to enjoy their rights. 
 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990 (ACRWC) 179  is 
suitably robust in its demand that principles of non discrimination and equal 
protection before the law should prevail.180 It is alive to the impact of harmful social 
and cultural practices on the ability of children to enjoy their rights, and in particular 
discrimination experienced by the girl child,181 providing that States shall take 
appropriate steps to eliminate customs and practices that discriminate on grounds of 
sex182 and importantly, that child marriages should be proscribed and laws passed 
setting the minimum age of marriage at 18 for both sexes.183
 
It is notable that the African system has a Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Women, one of whose tasks has been chairing the drafting of the Protocol to the 
African Charter on the Rights of Women.184  She has also issued a joint communiqué 
                                                 
178 Ibid, para. 63. 
179 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49. 
180 Ibid, arts.3 and 21 (1) (b). 
181 Ibid, art. 21. 
182 Ibid, art. 21 (1) (b). 
183 Ibid, art. 21 (2). 
184 Draft Terms of reference for the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa, 
DOC/OS/34c (XXIII), Annex II, 1996. See also M. Evans and R. Murray “The Special Rapporteurs in 
the African System” in M. Evans and R. Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
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with the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on the rights of women on the 
need to eliminate violence against women.185
 
The dissolution of the Organisation of African Unity led to the constitution of the 
African Union. Its founding document, the Constitutive Act, 2000186 in addition to 
pledging to uphold human rights,187 also evidences a commitment to gender 
equality.188
 
In a move that reflects the history of the drafting of CEDAW,189 the African Union 
adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, 2003 (African Women’s Protocol). Dubbed the “African 
CEDAW”, the Protocol came into force on 25 November 2005.190 Like CEDAW and 
the other African human rights instruments, the Protocol has both civil and political 
and economic social and cultural rights.  The preamble to the Protocol makes clear 
that despite widespread ratification of the African Charter and several international 
human rights instruments and states “solemn commitment to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination against women and harmful practices against women, women in Africa 
still continue to be victims of discrimination and harmful practices.“ The definition of 
discrimination owes much to CEDAW providing: “‘Discrimination against women’ 
means any distinction, exclusion or restriction or any differential treatment based on 
sex and whose objectives or effects compromise or destroy the recognition, enjoyment 
or the exercise by women, regardless of their marital status, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in all spheres of life.”191
 
This is not the only provision that is inspired by CEDAW.  There is within the 
Protocol an acknowledgement of the need to tackle both de jure and de facto 
                                                                                                                                            
Rights: the System in Practice, 1986-2000  (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), 280 and 
295.  
185 International Experts urge States to take Immediate Action to end Immunity for Violations of 
Women’s Rights, UN Press Release, WOM/1330, 8 March 2002. 
186 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000, CAB/LEG 23.25, 11 July 2000. 
187 Ibid, preamble, arts. 3 (g), 3 (h) and 4 (m). 
188 Ibid, art. 4 (l). R. Murray Human Rights in Africa (Cambridge, CUP, 2004), 134-162. 
189 See L. Rehof (1997). 
190As of 30 July 2007, it had received 20 ratifications out of a possible 53. See www.africa-
union.org/documents. 
191 African Protocol, art. 1 (f). 
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discrimination and specifically to challenge gender stereotyping.192As with CEDAW, 
the first State obligation requires States to ensure that their constitutions prohibit 
discrimination against women.193 Moreover, States are under an obligation to “enact 
and effectively implement appropriate legislative or regulatory measures, including 
those prohibiting and curbing all forms of discrimination particularly those harmful 
practices which endanger the health and general well being of women.”194 Crucially 
States are under an obligation to ensure the “reform of existing discriminatory laws 
and practices in order to promote and protect the rights of women.”195
 
Temporary special measures are also provided for in article 2 on State obligations 
requiring States, inter alia, to “take corrective and positive action in those areas where 
discrimination against women in law and fact continues to exist.”196 Article 9 on 
participation in political and decision making processes also calls on States to take 
“specific positive action…through affirmative action, enabling legislation and other 
measures” to ensure that women can participate without discrimination in elections 
and public life.197 The preamble recalls Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, 
Peace and Security while article 10 focuses on the right to peace and provides that 
States should ensure “increased participation of women” in peace processes as well as 
local, national, regional, continental and international decision making structures.”198 
The provision on access to justice calls on States to ensure that women are 
“represented equally in the judiciary and law enforcement organs.”199 Moreover, 
given the centrality of culture, and the narrow and gendered construction thereof, it is 
important that provision is made for women to participate in the determination of 
cultural policies.200  Intersectional discrimination is recognised in the Protocol’s focus 
on elderly, disabled women and those in distress.201 Moreover the definition section 
makes clear that the term woman includes the girl child.202
                                                 
192 This, the equivalent of CEDAW arts. 2(f) and 5 (a), is found in art. 2(2). 
193 African Protocol, art. 2 (1) (a). 
194 Ibid, art. 2(1) (c). 
195 Ibid, art. 8 (f). 
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197 Ibid, art. 9 (1). 
198 Ibid, art. 10 (2). 
199 Ibid, art. 8 (e).  Echoing CEDAW article 14, states are also to ensure that women participate in the 
conceptualisation of development policies.  
200 Ibid, art. 7. 
201 Ibid, arts. 22, 23 and 24. 
202 Ibid, art. 1 (k). 
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Although drawing its inspiration from CEDAW and the African Charter, the African 
Protocol on Women’s rights fills in lacunae found in CEDAW. Unlike CEDAW, the 
Protocol has multiple provisions addressing violence against women and the girl child 
in both the public and private spheres.203 The types of violence covered include rape, 
sexual harassment at work and in schools, trafficking, violence against women in 
armed conflict and the outlawing of degrading and harmful widowhood 
practices.204Female genital mutilation is dealt with in article 5 which explicitly 
prohibits the practice and enjoins States to outlaw the practice and also to provide 
rehabilitative services for those who have already undergone female genital 
mutilation.  
 
In light of the AIDS pandemic on the continent, it is important to note that the African 
Protocol provides that women have the right to protect themselves from HIV. One of 
the more controversial aspects of the Protocol is article 14 on the reproductive rights. 
Unlike previous instruments, the African Protocol is clear that a woman has the right 
to control her own fertility and to decide on the number and spacing of children that 
she has. The Protocol also provides, for the first time in human rights law, for a 
limited right to abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest and where the 
continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the health of the mother or the 
foetus.205 While abortion is clearly controversial the world over, it is important, on a 
continent where it is estimated that over 4 million illegal abortions are carried out a 
year,206that African States have recognised that eliminating discrimination against 
women, may involve providing services needed only by women.  Failure to do so may 
result in violations of the right to health and indeed life of women forced to carry on 
with unwanted pregnancies. 
 
                                                 
203 CEDAW only has article 6 on trafficking and prostitution. The Committee has attempted to fill the 
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Other positive measures include the setting of a minimum age of marriage (18 
years)207 and also requiring States to promote women’s access to resources including 
land.208  
 
Like the African Charter, the Women’s Protocol is silent on the issue of reservations. 
This is worrying especially when one considers the many reservations that have 
blighted CEDAW and also in light of the objections that were made during the 
drafting of the Protocol to provisions which could legitimately be considered the 
objects and purpose of the Protocol. 
 
The Protocol is not without its problems. Chief amongst these is the shifting standard 
of equality. The definition of discrimination is clear. It suggests equality between men 
and women. It is reinforced by article 8 which provides that “men and women are 
equal before the law and shall have the right to equal protection and benefit of the 
law”. States are expected to aim for equality of opportunity and result, or substantive 
equality.  However, this understanding of equality is not found throughout the 
Protocol. If anything, there appears to be a lowering of standards where women’s 
right to property on death or divorce is considered so that both articles 7 on divorce 
and 21 on inheritance provide for an “equitable sharing” of marital or inheritance 
property.209 Equitable and equal do not mean the same thing.210 Equity, or fairness, is, 
like beauty, in the eyes of the beholder. Equality is clearly a more objective measure. 
The use of the word equitable was not a drafting slip, but the subject of considered 
debate.211  Given the similarity of the definitions of discrimination found in CEDAW 
and the Protocol, it is interesting to note, that when presented with a Paraguayan 
report that referred to equitable rather than equal treatment of women, CEDAW noted 
in its concluding observations  that the two terms, equal and equity, were not 
interchangeable. It recommended the use of the term “equality.”212
 
                                                 
207 African Protocol, art. 6 (b). 
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209 Ibid, art. 7 (d) and art. 21(2). 
210 Special Rapporteur on Religion (2002), para. 36. 
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Africa (as adopted by the Meeting of Ministers, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 28 March 2003, 
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Also problematic is the equivocation of States parties over the issue of nationality of 
children exemplified in article 6 (h) which puts national law above international 
obligations providing: “a woman and a man shall have equal rights, with respect to 
nationality of their children except where this is contrary to a provision in national 
legislation or is contrary to national security interests.”213
 
The African States with reservations to article 9(2) of CEDAW were the same States 
that pushed for a watered down provision on nationality of children. That they 
succeeded constitutes a reversal in progress and a lowering of internationally agreed 
standards.214Now clearly the watering down of equality and the rolling back on 
nationality provisions in the African Protocol creates tension between regional 
interpretations and international commitments. 
 
In interpreting the Protocol it is important to refer back to the definition of 
discrimination in article 1 (f) which does not admit of any qualification. Moreover, 
given that the Protocol is additional to the African Charter, it is worth recalling that 
article 60 of the Charter enjoins the African Commission to “draw inspiration from 
international law on human and peoples’ rights…the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations…” This is reinforced in the 
preamble to the Protocol which lists the non discrimination provisions of the African 
Charter and notes that “women’s rights have been recognised and guaranteed in all 
international human rights instruments” before identifying,  the international bill of 
rights and CEDAW, amongst others.215 It is noteworthy that the African Commission 
has adopted the CEDAW guidelines on State reporting as the basis for State reports to 
be submitted under the Charter216, and until Protocol specific ones are drafted, the 
Protocol as well. 
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In 2004 the African Union adopted a Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in 
Africa217 which reinforces provisions found in the Protocol. However, it has a 
separate monitoring mechanism requiring States parties to send reports to the African 
Union every four of years.218 All States were required to report in the first year but 
only 8 out of 53 States reported.219  This highlights a problem that pervades the whole 
human rights monitoring system-the delays in reporting and sometimes the complete 
failure of States to send in reports thus making constructive dialogue well nigh 
impossible.  By implication follow up is also affected. Although some of the UN 
treaty bodies now proceed in the absence of States parties, it is note worthy that UN 
officials working within the system acknowledge the extraordinary burden placed on 
States of an ever expanding human rights reporting system leading one to note that “it 
was exhausting for States parties.”220
 
The Arab Charter 
Revised a decade after it was first adopted, is the Arab Charter on Human Rights, 
2004.221 In light of the criticism that had been received on the content of the original 
Charter, and indeed the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 1990222 the aim 
was to bring the Charter into greater conformity with existing human rights standards. 
The jury appears to be out on whether this goal has been achieved.223  
 
The preamble to the Charter reaffirms a commitment to the existing international bill 
of rights and the UN Charter while also “having regard to the Cairo Declaration on 
Human Rights in Islam.”  The Charter contains many positive provisions not least the 
standard non discrimination provision found in international human rights instruments 
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which includes the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex.224 Article 3(2) 
requiring effective equality in the enjoyment of rights suggests the adoption of a 
substantive rather than formal model of equality. Moreover, it provides that all 
persons are equal before the law and are entitled to be protected without 
discrimination.225 Article 22 further provides that “every person shall have the right to 
recognition as a person before the law”. This is reinforced by a guarantee of equality 
for all before the courts.226 Guarantees of the right to work without discrimination and 
also of the right to equal pay for work of equal value are also to be found in the 
Charter.227 Also noteworthy is the Charter’s acknowledgment of intersectional 
discrimination against minorities and people with disabilities.228 Equally important is 
article 33(b) prohibiting abuse and violence against women and children.  
Interestingly, the article goes on to provide that States should “ensure the necessary 
protection and care for mothers, children and older persons and persons with special 
needs and shall provide adolescents and young persons with the best opportunities for 
physical and mental development.” 
 
The criticisms of the Revised Arab Charter are linked to the many provisions that 
appear to make rights subject to national law or which appear to suggest religious 
interpretations of the rights.  Key for women is article 3(3) which provides in part: 
“Men and women are equal in respect of human dignity, rights and obligations within 
the framework of positive discrimination established in favour of women by the 
Islamic Shari’ah, other divine laws and by applicable laws and legal instruments.”  
The use of the phrase ‘positive discrimination’ suggests that temporary special 
measures are anticipated. However, Rishmawi argues that “while positive 
discrimination in favour of women… is badly needed within Arab societies, 
subjecting it to such qualifications as Shari’ah or national legislation could seriously 
undermine attempts at equality.”229
 
                                                 
224 Arab Charter, art. 3(1).  See also UNDP Arab Development Report 2005 on how equality is “at the 
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225 Ibid, art. 11. 
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Other claw back clauses in violation of article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the 
law of Treaties include provisions on the right to freedom of movement which 
guarantees a person the right “to freely choose his (sic) residence in any part of that 
territory in conformity with the laws in force.”230 This is potentially problematic for 
some Arab women whose national laws require the permission of a husband, father or 
guardian to be able to exercise their right to freedom of movement. Echoing the 
African Protocol on Women’s Rights, the Charter also seeks to make nationality of 
children subject to “domestic laws on nationality”.231Although the national laws of 
some States recognise that a child can acquire the nationality of her mother, the 
reservations made to article 9(2) of CEDAW on this issue, suggests that many do 
not.232  The Arab Charter not only enshrines “a father preference” but also clearly 
discriminates against women, and indirectly, children.  Also problematic is the family 
provision which provides that family is constituted by marriage between a man and a 
woman and that “The laws in force regulate the rights and duties of the man and 
woman as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution”.233  Again recalling the 
reservations to CEDAW one is reminded that many of them pertain to article 16 on 
the family.  Regulating marriage by reference to existing national norm, which the 
CEDAW, Human Rights Committee and CESCR have all identified as problematic is 
to seek to apply a lower standard at the regional level than is provided for at the 
international level. Also problematic is the narrow construction of family which 
ignores CEDAW and Human Rights Committee jurisprudence on the plurality of 
family form, all of which require support and protection.234   Moreover, it looks like 
an attempt to roll back the gains made by women. This is unfortunate as States such 
as Algeria235 and Morocco236 have, in amending their personal status laws to better 
comply with international human rights norms, shown that it is possible to improve 
the rights of women within the family. Indeed in its third periodic report under the 
ICCPR, Algeria noted: 
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“The many social changes that had taken place in Algerian society, combined with the 
need to bring domestic legislation into line with international conventions ratified by 
Algeria, in particular the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, made 
it natural that the Code should be revised.”237
 
Seeking to enshrine national law in a human rights instrument removes the incentive 
for States to act and permits the retention or indeed enactment of laws that 
discriminate against women.  
 
The absence of a complaints mechanism in the Charter is a shortcoming which is 
exacerbated by the non ratification of many Arab States of optional mechanisms of 
international bodies which would permit citizens to bring complaints before these 
bodies. 238 Finally, the confusion about the hierarchy between national and 
international law is exacerbated by article 43:  
 
“Nothing in the Charter may be construed or interpreted as impairing the rights and 
freedoms protected by the domestic laws of the States parties or those set in force in 
international and regional human rights instruments which States parties have adopted 
or ratified, including the rights of women, the rights of the child and the rights of the 
persons belonging to minorities.” 
 
This provision seems to be based on the assumption that national law and 
international and regional human rights instruments are at one in their construction 
and protection of women’s rights. Clearly they are not.239 International law 
obligations voluntarily entered into by States parties should prevail. As noted in 
article 1(4) of the Charter it is important to “entrench the principle that all human 
rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated”.240
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PART C – MAINSTREAMING WITHIN THE UN 
The UN has in recent decades made a concerted effort to bring the interests of 
women, and indeed other groups, from ‘margin to centre’. In addition to proclaiming 
that women’s rights were human rights, the Vienna Declaration, 1993 also proclaimed 
that “The human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and 
indivisible part of universal human rights.” 241 There was a demand that women’s 
rights “be integrated into the mainstream of United Nations wide activity”.242 This 
call was taken up at the 1995 Beijing Conference.243 Thereafter, the policy of 
integrating a gender perspective into the work of the UN was formally adopted. The 
UN has sought to integrate gender through a process called mainstreaming which it 
defines as: 
 
“…the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned 
action, including legislation, policies and programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It 
is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an 
integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women 
and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to 
achieve gender equality.”244
 
Although there have been criticisms of the UN’s mainstreaming efforts, 245 there has 
been a marked improvement in the consideration of women’s rights within the UN not 
least in the work of human rights committees and special procedures. This section 
looks briefly at treaty body jurisprudence as it pertains to laws that discriminate 
against women. It concentrates on CEDAW jurisprudence on laws that discriminate 
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against women. Thereafter the work of special procedure mandate holders in this area 
is considered in outline.246
 
Treaty Bodies 
Prior to the mid 1990s the human rights treaty bodies, apart from CEDAW, did not, in 
their general comments, pay much attention to the specific violations of women’s 
human rights.247 In 1998, the Human Rights Committee acknowledged that it had 
hitherto not taken a sufficiently gendered approach in it is interpretation of Covenant 
provisions in its general comments.248 The change was brought about by the move 
towards mainstreaming that followed the Vienna conference.249 It would appear that 
hereafter treaty bodies took seriously the Secretary-General’s injunction that in the 
field of human rights mainstreaming “involves realizing that there is a gender 
dimension to every occurrence of a human rights violation.”250 This can be seen by 
the adoption of general comments 28 by the Human Rights Committee,251 16 by the 
CESCR and 25 on intersectional discrimination by CERD, amongst many others. The 
consideration of treaty jurisprudence throughout this report is testament to the greater 
attention being paid by treaty bodies to issues pertaining to women’s rights including 
laws that discriminate against them.252  Although receiving fewer communications 
from women than from men, the Human Rights Committee has dealt with complaints 
pertaining to the rights of minority women,253 discriminatory laws on nationality254 
and social security,255 reproductive issues,256 dress257 and temporary special 
measures.258
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There is greater cross-pollination between committees aided in part by the regular 
joint meetings of Committee chairpersons. It is not uncommon for reference to be 
made to the concluding observations of a different committee in the process of 
“constructive dialogue” with a State party. Moreover, it is not unknown for 
committees to cite each other’s jurisprudence. An example of this is the concern 
expressed by the Committee on the Protection of Migrant Workers when considering 
the Mexico’s initial report to the Committee where it noted: 
 
“However, the Committee remains concerned-like the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child-at the situation of extreme vulnerability of a great many unaccompanied 
minors…which leaves them at very high risk of exploitation of various kinds…”259
 
CEDAW 
In its jurisprudence, the committee has always realised the importance of challenging 
discriminatory laws. It is currently working on a general recommendation on article 2 
on State obligations.260 The first CEDAW general recommendation to mention 
discriminatory laws was the fifth on temporary special measures which noted that 
although much had been done to repeal or modify such laws, there was still a need to 
“fully implement the Convention by introducing measures to promote de facto 
equality between men and women.”261 As noted in part A of the report, the use 
temporary special measures to address discrimination against women has gained 
currency. In its last general recommendation, 25 on temporary special measures 
CEDAW recommends that States parties: 
 
“…should include, in their constitutions or in their national legislation, provisions that 
allow for the adoption of temporary special measures. The Committee reminds States 
parties that legislation, such as comprehensive anti-discrimination acts, equal 
opportunities acts or executive orders on women’s equality can give guidance on the 
type of temporary special measures that should be applied to have a stated goal, or 
goals in given areas. Such guidance can also be contained in specific legislation on 
                                                                                                                                            
257 Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan, Communication No. 931/2000, 5 November 2004. 
258 Guido Jacobs  v. Belgium, Communication No. 943/2000, 7 July 2004. 
259 Committee on the Protection of the rights of Migrant workers and members of their families, 
Concluding Observations: Mexico, CMW/C/MEX/CO/1, 20 December 2006, at para. 41. 
260 Center for Reproductive Rights “Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW): Comments for the formulation of general recommendation 
No. 26” CRR, New York, July 19, 2004. See also A. Byrnes, M. Hermina Graterol and R. Chartres 
IWRAW Asia Pacific Expert Group Meeting on CEDAW Article 2: National and International 
Dimensions of State Obligation, 14-16 February, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Background Discussion 
Paper, prepared February 2007, revised May 2007. Available at: http:///www.iwraw-ap.org. 
261 CEDAW general recommendation 5. See also CEDAW general recommendation 8. 
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employment or education. Relevant legislation on non-discrimination and temporary 
special measures should cover governmental actors as well as private organizations or 
enterprises.”262
 
It is in its general recommendations on violence that CEDAW first actively 
considered the impact of law on the ability of women to enjoy their rights. In general 
recommendation 12 it called on States parties to provide information on legislation 
that was in force to protect women “against the incidence of violence in every day life 
(including sexual violence, abuses in the family, sexual harassment in the workplace 
etc).263 Interestingly while it was silent on the use of law in its general 
recommendation 14 on female circumcision264, by the time of its influential general 
recommendation 19 on violence against women, legislation was seen as an important 
tool in the armoury for eradicating violence against women hence States were asked 
to consider changing their laws to deal with the myriad disadvantages faced by 
women as a result of gender based violence. Focusing on article 6 on trafficking and 
exploitation of prostitution, the Committee noted that because of their unlawful status 
prostitutes may be marginalized and that “they need the equal protection of laws 
against rape and other forms of violence.”265 The Committee further noted that armed 
conflict sometimes lead to an increase in sexual violence against women requiring 
“specific protective and punitive measures.”266  In its recommendations, the 
Committee identified several legal measures that should be taken to eradicate violence 
against women including “criminal penalties where necessary and civil remedies in 
case of domestic violence”267 and also the suggestion that States introduce 
“legislation to remove the defence of honour in regard to the assault or murder of a 
female family member.”268
 
CEDAW has also spent time considering the disadvantages experienced by women in 
the workplace and also the non recognition of their domestic labour.269 In so doing, it 
                                                 
262 CEDAW general recommendation 25, para. 31. 
263 CEDAW general recommendation 12, para. 1. 
264 This was remedied in CEDAW general recommendation 24 on health, para. 15 (d). 
265 CEDAW general recommendation 19, para. 15. 
266 Ibid, paras. 16, 24 (g) and (h). See also CEDAW general recommendation 24, para. 15 (a). 
267 CEDAW general recommendation 19, para 24 (r) (i) and also para. 24 (t) (i). 
268 Ibid, para. 24 (r) (ii). 
269 CEDAW general recommendation 16 on Unpaid women workers in rural and urban family 
enterprises, UN Doc. A/46/38 (1991); CEDAW general recommendation 17 Measurement and 
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has urged States to create implementation machinery to put into place the provisions 
of CEDAW and the ILO Convention on equal pay for work of equal value270 and also 
to put into place laws outlawing sexual harassment in the work place.271  
 
It is in its consideration of family life and the discrimination that women experience 
that CEDAW has paid the most attention in both state reporting and also 
consideration of discriminatory laws.272 To mark the international year of the family 
in 1994, the Committee produced general recommendation 21 on equality in marriage 
and family relations. It focused on articles 9 on nationality, 15 on equality and 16 on 
family relations. Identified as problematic are marital property systems that result in 
women losing their capacity, discriminatory procedural laws and domicile laws that 
indicate a wife’s domicile is to follow that of her husband.273 Identified as 
discriminatory and deserving of attention are States whose laws permit polygyny and 
which do not have a minimum age for marriage or provide for compulsory 
registration of marriages.274 Omissions in law and specifically the non recognition of 
de fact unions are identified as requiring State attention.275Discriminatory laws 
privileging parental responsibility of married over unmarried parents or mothers over 
fathers are to be addressed.276 Similarly laws enshrining discriminatory property 
entitlements on death or divorce are to be amended.277
 
In its general recommendation on political participation, CEDAW argues that 
compliance with and implementation of the rights of women is better in democratic 
States where there is “full and equal participation of women in public life and 
decision making.”278In addition to using temporary special measures279 to increase 
                                                                                                                                            
quantification of the unremunerated domestic activities of women and their recognition in the gross 
national product, UN Doc. A/44/38 (1991). 
270 CEDAW general recommendation 13 on equal remuneration for work of equal value, UN Doc. 
A/44/38 (1989). 
271 CEDAW general recommendation 19, para. 24 (t) (i). 
272 CEDAW general recommendation 21, paras.45-50. 
273 CEDAW general recommendation 21, paras 7-9, 17 and 31. 
274 Ibid, paras. 14, 16, 36 and 39. See also CEDAW general recommendation 24, para. 15 (d). 
275 Ibid, paras. 13 and 18. 
276 Ibid, para. 19. 
277 Ibid, paras. 25-35. 
278 CEDAW general recommendation 23, para. 14. 
279 Ibid, paras. 15 and 43. 
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the participation of women, States were obliged: to ensure that effective legislation is 
enacted prohibiting discrimination against women” 280 and also that: 
 
“States parties are under an obligation to take all appropriate measures, including the 
enactment of appropriate legislation that complies with their Constitution, to ensure 
that organizations such as political parties, which may not be subject directly to 
obligations under the Convention, do not discriminate against women and respect the 
principles contained in articles 7 and 8.”281
 
Reproductive rights throw up challenges when considering the principle of equality 
and non discrimination. Clearly the liberal model of equality based on comparing 
similarly situated men and women does not work. Instead, there is a need to recognise 
differences between the sexes whilst ensuring that those differences do not result in 
one group, usually women, experiencing discrimination.  In its general 
recommendation 24 on health, CEDAW defines States’ obligations as including:  
 
“The duty…to ensure, on a balance of equality of men and women, access to health 
care services, information and education implies an obligation to respect, protect and 
fulfil women’s rights to health care.  States parties have the responsibility to ensure 
that legislation and executive action and policy comply with these obligations.”282
 
While not prescribing abortion, CEDAW has recommended that punitive abortion 
laws should be amended as these lead to maternal mortality and morbidity.283 Other 
“women specific” legal requirements included passing laws prohibiting female genital 
mutilation and early marriage.284 Moreover, States parties: “should not permit forms 
of coercion such as non-consensual sterilization, mandatory testing for sexually 
transmitted diseases or mandatory pregnancy testing as a condition of employment 
that violate women’s rights to informed consent and dignity.”285
 
The coming into force of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, 1999286 provided an 
avenue for individuals to bring individual complaints alleging violations of the rights 
                                                 
280 Ibid, para. 47 (a). See also para 48 (a). 
281 Ibid, para. 42. 
282 CEDAW general recommendation 24, para. 13. 
283 Ibid, para. 31(c): “When possible, legislation criminalizing abortion should be amended, in order to 
withdraw punitive measures imposed on women who undergo abortion.” See also para. 11. 
284 Ibid, para. 15 (d). 
285 Ibid, para. 22. 
286 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 1999, GA Res 54/4, 6 October 1999. Sokhi-Bulley “The Optional Protocol to CEDAW: First 
Steps” (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 143. 
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in the Convention to the Committee. For those States not opting out, it also provided 
for the Committee to invoke article 8, the inquiry procedure, to investigate reports of 
grave or systematic violations of rights. It is noteworthy that one of the first cases 
dealt with by the Committee under the complaints provisions of the Optional Protocol 
to CEDAW relates to violence against women in the family and resulted in a 
recommendation that the State change its laws.287
 
In A.T. v Hungary, a woman had been severely assaulted by her partner on many 
occasions. She had complained to the police and the courts. However, little concrete 
assistance had come of her many complaints. A complaint was made to CEDAW. The 
Committee decided that Hungary had violated articles 2 (a), (b) and (e) as well as 
articles 5(a) and 16 of CEDAW.  The Committee censured Hungary for not having 
provision in its law for restraining or protection orders. Moreover, it was censured for 
the absence of shelters to house Ms A.T and her children. The existing shelters had 
failed to offer refuge to Ms AT because one of her children was disabled and the 
refuges could not cope with children with disabilities. The prioritisation by the civil 
courts of the abuser’s property rights over the victim’s right to be protected from 
violence came under criticism. Echoing the recommendations found in its General 
Recommendation No. 19 on Violence Against Women and the General Assembly 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 1993, the Committee 
made clear that to address the failings identified in the A.T. case, would require the 
State to undertake a range of measures which included providing legal aid, giving Ms 
AT and her children a safe and secure home, ensuring that she received the requisite 
child support, as well as compensation for the harm that she had suffered. In addition 
to implementing a national policy on the prevention of violence within the family, 
officials including judges and the police should be given training on CEDAW and its 
Optional Protocol.  Moreover the State was to ensure the introduction of a specific 
law outlawing violence against women288and to: “Investigate promptly, thoroughly, 
impartially and seriously all allegations of domestic violence and bring the offenders 
to justice in accordance with international standards.” 
 
                                                 
287 A.T. v Hungary, Communication No. 2/2003, views adopted on 26 January, thirty-second session.  
288 A. T. v. Hungary, para 11 (e). 
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The first inquiry undertaken by the CEDAW was to Mexico to investigate reports of 
abduction, rape and murder of women, made by two non government organisations 
(NGOs).289 The NGOs alleged that more than 230 women had been killed near 
Ciudad Juarez and that little had been done to investigate their deaths and 
disappearances or indeed to bring the perpetrators to justice. Families of the victims 
had been kept in the dark.  The Committee sent two of its members to investigate. In a 
long and comprehensive report the Committee detailed the widespread violence 
against women and the fact that a culture of impunity appeared to have developed. 
The Committee produced a comprehensive list of recommendations for Mexico to 
implement.  These included timely investigation of crimes committed against women, 
training of police and judges, ensuring that families were kept appraised of progress in 
investigations and that the law was enforced with punishments being meted out to the 
guilty and adequate remedies including compensation for those who had experienced 
violations of their rights.  The State was asked to report on progress in its next report 
under article 18 of the Convention. 
 
CEDAW has also, from the outset, engaged with States about laws that discriminate 
against women and also de facto discrimination.290 Questionnaire responses indicated 
that in some instances, changes had been made to the law as a result of the State-
committee dialogue so that the OHCHR response from Guatemala noted: “a provision 
regarding the possibility of avoiding prison for a rapist that would marry the victim 
                                                 
289 CEDAW Committee “Report on Mexico Produced by the Committee on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination against Women Under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
and Reply from the Government of Mexico”, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO, January 27, 
2005. 
290 Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women to the combined second and third periodic report of Azerbaijan (CEDAW/C/AZE/2-3) 
at its 765th and 766th meetings, on 23 January 2007. 
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Elimination of Discrimination against Women to the combined third and fourth periodic reports 
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of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to the combined initial, 
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of Burkina Faso (CEDAW/C/BFA/4-5) at its 695th and 696th meetings, held on 14 July 2005 
(see CEDAW/C/SR.695 and 696), CEDAW A/60/38 part II (2005), paras. 339 and 340. 
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was change(d), in part, because there were recommendations of CEDAW to the 
Guatemalan State in that respect.”291
 
Questionnaire responses also identified positive engagement with civil society and the 
use of shadow reports produced by the lobbyists so that the questionnaire response 
from WILDAF in Ghana attached the shadow report submitted to CEDAW when 
considering Ghana’s last report.292 The interaction between NGOs and CEDAW is 
important to both for committee members learn about the key issues affecting a State 
from NGO reports and rely on NGOs to lobby and pressure governments to 
implement the recommendations made in concluding observations. In turn, NGOs 
realise that opinions and recommendations emanating from international human rights 
experts are likely to carry greater weight with States and therefore rely on the 
monitoring efforts of treaty bodies such as CEDAW.293  In its response to part D of 
the questionnaire on interaction with human rights bodies, the Nepal based Forum for 
Women, Law and Development (FLWD) answered as follows: 
 
“3) Have you ever written a shadow report for a treaty body? If yes, please specify 
which. 
 
 Yes. 
 1. Initial Shadow report on CEDAW, 1999 
 2. Second and Third periodic Shadow report on CEDAW, 2004. 
 
4) If you have written a shadow report, did you identify laws that discriminate 
against women? 
 
 Yes. The discriminatory laws identified by the study were mentioned in the 
shadow report and also the critical areas of concern.  
 
5) How did the Committee respond to the shadow report-did they refer to the 
laws that your organisation had identified as discriminating against women in 
questioning the State or in concluding observations? If yes, please provide the 
name of the committee and year.  
 
 Yes. It was responded by the CEDAW Committee in 1999 and 2004. 
 
6) Are the concluding observations of human rights committees disseminated in 
your country? 
                                                 
291 OHCHR Guatemala questionnaire response Part D:8. 
292 The website of the Asia Pacific International Women’s Rights Action Watch also has shadow 
reports. See http://www.iwraw-ap.org. 
293 S. Engle Merry (2006) 85 and 87. 
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 Yes. The concluding observations were translated into Nepali and 
disseminated to all the concerned agencies and also in the various programs. 
 
7) Have you or your organisation used the concluding observations of    the 
human rights committees to lobby your government to change the law? 
 
 Yes. 
 
8) If yes, with what result? 
 
It was strongly and effectively used to advocate and lobby to amend the 
discriminatory laws against women.” 
 
Equally positive was the response from Georgia: 
 
“3) Have you ever written a shadow report for a treaty body? If yes, please specify 
which.  
  
Georgian NGOs prepared two shadow reports on the implementation of 
CEDAW.  In 1999 the first report was presented to the CEDAW Committee. 
In August 2006 the joint second and the third report was discussed by the 
SEDAW committee where also two shadow reports were submitted by various 
NGO groupings. UNCT in Georgia have not so far prepared separate report 
for CEDAW. 
 
4) If you have written a shadow report, did you identify laws that discriminate 
against women? 
 
N/A 
 
5) How did the Committee respond to the shadow report-did they refer to the 
laws that your organisation had identified as discriminating against women in 
questioning the State or in concluding observations? If yes,  please provide the 
name of the committee and year. 
 
Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women Chamber B, 
747th & 748th Meetings, and Women’s anti-discrimination committee 
encouraged Georgia to widen scope of efforts to promote gender equality; 
experts express concern regarding liberalization of employment rules, lack of 
state regulation, vulnerability of female refugees. 
 
6) Are the concluding observations of human rights committees disseminated in 
your country? 
 
 Yes (Relevant NGOs are usually aware of the concluding observations) 
 
7) Have you or your organisation used the concluding observations of the human 
rights committees to lobby your government to change the law?  
  
Yes 
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8) If yes, with what result? 
 
National Action Plan (NAP) on Gender Equality Issues which have been held 
up for a while by Government is now put on the agenda again for further 
consideration.” 
 
While this is clearly impressive, it is worth noting that it is unusual for concluding 
observations to be widely disseminated or indeed translated into local languages.  The 
questionnaire response from the Solomon Islands noted: “Concluding observations 
are not well disseminated in the Solomon Islands but to some extent they are taken 
into consideration within various key stakeholders.”294 Similarly FEMNET in Kenya 
said: “The concluding observations are not usually disseminated in Kenya. There are 
often found within civil society organizations, which disseminate the same during 
stakeholders meetings and workshops.”295
 
Special Procedures296
Created more than two decades after the establishment of the UN, Special 
Procedures297 have come to take on an important role in monitoring and enhancing 
the human rights work of the organisation.  At the start of 2007, there are 38 country 
and thematic special procedures comprising 28 thematic mandates, including four 
working groups, and 10 country mandates.298 Of the 28 thematic mandates, eight 
focus on civil and political rights, eight on economic, social and cultural rights and 
eight focus on specific groups (including violence against women). The four working 
groups deal with arbitrary detention, enforced and involuntary disappearances, 
mercenaries and people of African descent. The 10 country mandates cover Burundi, 
Cambodia, DPR Korea, DRC, Haiti, Liberia, Myanmar, the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, Somalia, and Sudan. 
 
                                                 
294 OHCHR Solomon Islands questionnaire response Part D:6. 
295 FEMNET Kenya questionnaire response Part D:6. 
296 For a more comprehensive outlook see: I. Nifosi The UN Special Procedures in the Field of Human 
Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005). 
297 See H. Hannum “Reforming the Special Procedures and Mechanisms of the Commission on Human 
Rights” (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 73. 
298 United Nations Special Procedures Facts and Figures 2006 (Geneva, OHCHR) at 
http:www.ohchr.org/English/bodies/chr/special.index.htm. (For the most updated information see: 
Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/index.htm.) 
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The work of special procedures mandate holders, who are independent experts not in 
the employment of the UN, includes country visits, receiving and managing 
communications and reporting to the Human Rights Council.  Increasingly mandate 
holders receive joint communications and may make joint statements or findings.  
Still, it is noteworthy that figures for 2005 show that only 14% of communications 
received were from women. Figures for 2006 show a three per cent increase to 17% 
women applicants. The figure for communications received from men was much 
larger at 76%.  Seven per cent were unaccounted for.  The gender imbalance in 
communications can be interpreted as reflecting women’s ignorance of the 
mechanisms and the fact that they can if they wish submit complaints to any of the 
special procedure mandate holders, or as reflecting the fact that the existence of two 
“women specific mandates” on violence and trafficking has resulted in women 
thinking that these are the only topics that cover them and that they can complain 
about. Any other experiences falling out of these two broad areas are thus not 
complained of.  Of the 1115 communications sent in 2006, 59 communications were 
sent on legislation by 18 mandates including Terrorism, Freedom of Religion, 
Internally displaced persons and independence of judges and lawyers.299  There is no 
specific information on challenges to laws that discriminate against women, although 
one mandate holder, on housing has sent out a questionnaire covering discriminatory 
laws which will be considered in this section.300  
 
As already noted, there are two “women specific” mandates, one on the causes and 
consequences of violence against women301 and the other on trafficking in persons 
especially in women and children.302 Their work has focused on both law and policy 
and practice which allow the practices under consideration to occur as well as 
providing recommendations for amendments to laws and also more proactive 
government and civil society engagement with the issues. 
 
                                                 
299 Ibid, 2. 
300 Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, Questionnaire on women and adequate housing 
(Commission on Human rights resolutions 2002/49 and 2003/22), available at: 
http://www.unhcr.ch/housing. 
301 Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, CHR Res. 1994/45 
(establishing mandate) and CHR Res. 2003/45 (extending mandate). 
302 Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially in women and children, CHR Res. 
2004/110. 
 51
Thematic mandates mentioning women or gender include the Special Rapporteur on 
housing,303 Special Rapporteur on the right to education,304 Independent expert on the 
question of human rights and extreme poverty,305 Special Rapporteur on the right to 
food,306 Special Rapporteur on health,307 Special Representative of the Secretary 
General on the situation of human rights defenders,308 Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous 
peoples,309Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally 
displaced persons,310, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression,311  Special 
Rapporteur on the rights of migrants,312 Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or 
belief,313Independent expert on minority  issues,314Special Rapporteur on torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,315the working group on 
people of African descent,316 working group on enforced or involuntary 
disappearances.317
 
Even without a specific gender focus within their mandates, it is important to 
acknowledge that there is greater awareness of gender within the work of special 
procedures. This can be seen as part of the mainstreaming efforts underway in the UN 
since the mid 1990s. Analyses of the work done by special procedure mandate holders 
                                                 
303 Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of 
living, and on the right to non discrimination in this context, CHR Res 2000/9 (establishing mandate). 
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Res. 2004/41 (no gender directions to rapporteur but note to States and donors to incorporate gender 
perspective in reporting to CAT and also bilateral programmes). 
316 Working group on people of African descent, CHR Res. 2003/30. 
317 Working group on enforced or voluntary disappearances, CHR Res. 2004/40 (extending mandate). 
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shows that there has, over the years been greater attention paid to issues affecting the 
enjoyment by women of their rights.318   While some have identified (discriminatory) 
laws affecting women’s ability to enjoy their rights,319 many more have focused on 
the de facto situation of women painting a picture of exclusion.320 In a series of 
reports, the Special Rapporteur on housing has examined de jure and de facto 
discrimination against women, considering how the rights of women to enjoy their 
rights to housing are impacted by poverty, exclusion and disenfranchisement 
especially as regards ownership of land, legal and attitudinal discrimination and 
violence against them.321 The Special Rapporteur prepared a questionnaire focusing 
on women and the right to adequate housing aiming to elicit information about both 
the legal protections offered to women within the various national systems (part one 
of the questionnaire) as well as the obstacles hampering their enjoyment of housing 
rights (part two of the questionnaire).322 With the Special Rapporteur on religion’s 
2002 report on the impact of religious laws on women’s ability to enjoy their rights, 
this can be said to be the most comprehensive consideration by a thematic rapporteur 
of legal and social rights of women. 
                                                 
318 E/CN.4/2005/68, paras. 4, 10-21, 52 and 55; Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Girl’s 
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321 Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, E/CN.4/2001/51, 25 January 2001, paras. 34-36, 68; 
Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, Women’s equal ownership of, access to and control over land 
and the equal rights to own property and to adequate housing, E/CN/4/2002/53, 15 January 2002; 
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322 Special Rapporteur on adequate housing: Questionnaire on women and adequate housing, available 
at http:www//unhchr.ch/housing. 
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It remains true to say that with some notable exceptions, a consistent focus on the 
rights of women has, at times been missing. This is partly due to the quality of 
information provided. It is also important to acknowledge that central to the work of 
thematic mandates is consideration of a particular area of human rights which may 
necessitate a broader conceptual approach.  Restrictions now placed on the length of 
reports has also meant that it is difficult to explore the way in which violations may 
affect one group in as much detail as might otherwise have been possible. Moreover, 
highlighted in both UN analyses and interviews was the need for greater training of 
mandate holders in using gender analysis in their work. 
 
Questionnaire responses indicate that only a few respondents had had contact with 
rapporteurs, either from the UN or the regions. The rapporteur most often mentioned 
was the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, thus suggesting that the one 
with a specific “women’s rights” mandate was the most well known. Positive 
comments were made about these contacts. Noteworthy was the response from 
Afghanistan noting that in addition to handling two cases from Afghanistan, the 
Special rapporteur on violence had visited the country in July 2005.  As a result of her 
visit which included a visit to the female wing of Kandahar prison, there had been 
“increased interest in women’s rights in Afghanistan at the Human Rights 
Commission in 2005.”323  
 
 Responses from Nepal and Palestine revealed that there had been contact with more 
than one special rapporteur. The Palestinian Women’s Legal Centre (WLAC) 
identified meetings with the country rapporteur and the special rapporteurs on 
education and violence against women. In responding to the question: were issues 
affecting women, especially laws that discriminate against women raised in your 
correspondence or meetings, the WLAC responded: “yes, but not in a condensed and 
focused way.”324  
 
OHCHR-Nepal invited the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples; and the Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related 
                                                 
323 UNAMA questionnaire response Part E:4. 
324 WLAC questionnaire response Part E:3. 
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intolerance as part of an advice mission to assist OHCHR-Nepal with its work on 
discrimination and social exclusion from 23-27 April 2007. 
 
“Within the meetings with Special Rapporteurs, discrimination against women was 
considered as one of the major challenges in Nepal. Dalit women and girls endure the 
double burden of caste and gender discrimination. Participants mentioned several 
obstacles to the enjoyment of human rights by women: lack of representation in 
political parties, especially at the higher echelons of power; discrimination against 
Dalit women within their own families; lack of access to education and health care; 
lack of access to land.  Women are also denied the right to inherit; they are subjected 
to labour exploitation; they are the subjects of massive migration to urban areas and to 
international migration; they are the victims of smuggling by organized crime 
syndicates.  Indigenous women for their parts are particularly vulnerable to internal 
displacements; informal labour market arrangements.  Women in general are victims 
of a whole range of violations including violence and sexual exploitation.”325  
 
On the usefulness of the meetings, the OHCHR in Nepal responded: “The meetings 
helped inform the Special Rapporteurs about the situation of various groups in Nepal, 
so that they can provide informed advice to OHCHR-Nepal as it seeks to address 
issues of discrimination.”326
                                                 
325 OHCHR-Nepal questionnaire response Part D:3. 
326 Ibid 
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PART D – LAWS THAT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST WOMEN 
It is clear from the responses to the sections on laws that discriminate that follow that 
direct discriminatory laws are a feature of the legal order in many States.327  The 
situation is exacerbated by the co-existence of plural systems of law co-existing 
sometimes harmoniously, but more often in conflict with each other and the 
Constitution.328 Laws governing family life were the ones most likely to be identified 
as containing discriminatory provisions.329 Under this rubric could be found laws on 
age of marriage, consent to marriage, citizenship, divorce, guardianship of children 
and marital power of the husband. Other problematic areas included prejudicial 
procedural provisions in rape or sexual assault laws, employment laws and business 
related laws. One of the responses from Nepal noted that an updated survey carried 
out in 2006 by the Forum for Women, Law and Development: “identified 173 legal 
provisions of the 83 various Acts and Regulations are discriminatory against 
women.”330 Of these, 65 have been amended by the Gender Equality Act 2006.331 
There have also been judicial decisions ruling that discriminatory laws are ultra 
vires332 leading the OHCHR Nepal office to put the figure of laws that discriminate at 
101 pieces of legislation.333 In its response to the questionnaire, the Women’s Centre 
for Legal Aid and Counselling based in Jerusalem, noted that  civil society had 
“presented 65 amendments for all laws with a special focus on Personal Status law” to 
the Model Parliament Project.334 In its Pacific survey, UNIFEM listed 114 indicators 
to measure legislative compliance with CEDAW.  Of the nine islands surveyed, Fiji 
was said to have the best compliance levels, completely meeting 49 of the 114 
indicators listed. 
                                                 
327 Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to the 
combined initial, second and third periodic report of Benin (CEDAW/C/BEN/1-3) at its 687th and 
688th meetings on 7 July 2005 (see CEDAW/C/SR.687 and 688), CEDAW, A/60/38 part II (2005), 
para. 145. 
328 C. Mackinnon “Sex Equality Under the Constitution of India: Problems, Prospects and Personal 
Laws” (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 181. 
329 For example the response from Niger listed 8 areas of discrimination in the Civil Code. ONG 
DIMOL response to questionnaire A:3. Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women to the combined initial, second, third, fourth and fifth periodic report of 
the Congo (CEDAW/C/COG/1-5 and Add.1) at its 606th and 607th meetings, on 27 and 29 January 
2003 (see CEDAW/C/SR.606 and 607), CEDAW, A/58/38 part I (2003), para. 160.
330 Forum for Women, Law and Development (FWLD) questionnaire response A:3, April 2007.  
331 This law will have far reaching effect in striking down discriminatory laws. 
332 Ibid, FWLD Nepal Part A:3 p. 14 and B:1 p. 15. 
333 OHCHR Nepal questionnaire response Part A:3  cited 101 discriminatory laws, May 2007. 
334 S. Hussein Head of Research and Documentation Unit, Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and 
Counselling, OHCHR Questionnaire response Part B:1, April 2007.  See also A. An Na’im (ed.) 
Islamic Family Law in a Changing World: A Global Resource book (London, Zed Press, 2002). 
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This part analyses the responses received to the questionnaires sent out. It does not 
purport to be a comprehensive review of the laws of all 192 States members of the 
United Nations. Rather it tries to present a snap shot of some discriminatory laws that 
remain.  While every effort has been made to check on the accuracy of the 
information provided, it is possible that some States that are listed have amended their 
laws and others have discriminatory laws.  The consultant takes full responsibility for 
any mistakes and would be grateful to receive corrections.  Any inaccuracies are 
inadvertent and not in any way meant to embarrass either the UN or States parties. 
 
The analysis starts with Part A on constitutional provisions. 
 
i) Constitutional Provisions –Does the national constitution guarantee non-
discrimination on grounds of sex and or gender and also equality before 
the law? 
ii) Does the constitution contain provisions dealing with conflict between 
constitutional guarantees of equality and discriminatory customary or 
religious laws/norms? 
 
Constitutional guarantees of equality are important because of the principle of 
constitutional supremacy that prevails in almost all States.335 If the Constitution is the 
supreme law of the country, one would expect that other laws would be in compliance 
therewith.336 However, States parties’ reports to the human rights bodies, the 
concluding observations of said bodies and indeed responses to the questionnaire all 
show that where women’s rights are concerned, this is clearly not always the case.   
 
Questionnaire responses showed that most States had “universalist constitutions”, that 
is, constitutions that respect international human rights norms of non-discrimination 
and equality and had explicit provisions outlawing discrimination on grounds of 
amongst other things, sex or gender337 and which also upheld the principle of equality 
                                                 
335 G. Waylen “Constitutional Engineering: What Opportunities for the Enhancement of Gender 
Rights?” (2006) 27 Third World Quarterly 1209.  Chile, fifth periodic report, CCPR/C/CHL/5, paras. 
57 and 58. 
336 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, para. 232 (b). 
337 The Federal Constitution of Malaysia, arts. 8(1) 8(2); Afghanistan, art. 22; Fiji, arts 38 (1), 38(2); 
Solomon Islands, s. 15; Georgia, art. 14; Nepal, art 1; Nigeria, s.48; Democratic Spanish Constitution, 
1978, art. 14. See also art 1(1) and art 9.(2); Guatemala, art. 4; South Africa, s. 9; Ethiopia, art. 25. 
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and non discrimination above custom, culture or religion. (Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, 
Georgia, Nigeria, Solomon Islands, South Africa)  Some had specific constitutional 
provisions on women’s right to be free from discrimination and other gender related 
harmful practices. (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Ghana, Nepal).   
 
However, it was noted that some constitutions, while guaranteeing equality before the 
law, were silent on the relation between potentially discriminatory customary or 
religious laws and the non discrimination provision.338 Of Bangladesh the Ain O 
Salish Kendra (ASK) project noted: “Bangladesh Constitution is silent on the matter 
of plural laws. However, the guarantee of freedom of religion can implicitly be read to 
protect personal laws.”339Another Bangladeshi group, the National Women Lawyers’ 
Association was less circumspect arguing:  “Personal law regarding marriage, 
divorce, restitution of conjugal life, inheritance, and guardianship will be prevailed 
(sic) if there is a conflict between constitutional and personal law.”340
 
In Niger it was noted that the silence of the constitution on the relation between the 
constitutional guarantee of equality in article 8 and the existence of religious and 
customary laws was because the issue was dealt with in a separate law.341 The ONG-
DIMAL response to the questionnaire noted that to guarantee that article 8 of the 
constitution is upheld, the law provides that only those customs that do not violate 
international human rights norms, legislative provisions or laws on public order and 
security are to be upheld.342  In case of conflict between a discriminatory provision 
and the Constitution, then that discriminatory provision is to be referred to the 
Constitutional Court. Despite this the questionnaire response indicates that there are 
several discriminatory laws on the books. Also worth noting are the concluding 
observations of the CRC to the Niger report: “While noting that discrimination is 
prohibited under the Constitution (art. 8), the Committee is concerned at the 
persistence of de facto discrimination in the State party.”343
                                                 
338 Afghanistan was one such state. 
339 Ain O Salish Kendra (ASK) response to Part A:2 of the questionnaire (May 2007). 
340 Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association response to Part A:2 of the questionnaire (May 
2007). 
341 Niger Law No. 62-11 as amended by Law 2004-50 as cited in ONG-DIMAL response to Part A:2 of 
the questionnaire (May 2007). 
342 Ibid. 
343 Niger, CRC, CRC/C/118 (2002), para. 152. 
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The CRC concluding observations reinforce the importance of seeing de jure and de 
facto discrimination as part of the same continuum. Finally, it is here worth recalling 
that Niger has entered reservations to the provisions of CEDAW (2(f) and 5(a) aimed 
at tackling de facto discrimination.344  
 
In a federal system, the conflict may be between Federal and State law or policy. 
Nigeria appears not to have a definitive solution to any potential conflict: 
 
“Section 14(3) of the 1999 constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria, entrenched 
the federal character principle without affirming the principle of equality and non 
discrimination that should strictly speaking be the basis for the composition of 
government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs.”345
 
By way of contrast is the Spanish approach to the resolution of potential internal 
conflict of laws which is documented in the questionnaire response: 
 
“In the event of a conflict arising between the fundamental right to equality 
established in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and a State or Regional law that 
includes some form of discrimination, Spanish Constitution of 1978 (arts. 161 and 
163) sets forth several proposals for resolving the conflict. Along these lines, an 
appeal of unconstitutionality can be made to the Spanish Constitutional Court against 
the said, allegedly discriminatory law. The declaration of unconstitutionality of the 
law in question by the Constitutional Court will oblige the State or Regional 
Parliament that issued this particular law to modify it in whatever respects have been 
indicated by the Constitutional Court as being contrary to the fundamental right to 
equality; or as the case may be, the declaration of unconstitutionality by the 
Constitutional court may affect the entire law; in such a case the entire parliamentary 
process required for the elimination of the discriminatory content of the law declared 
unconstitutional by a Constitutional court ruling will have to be initiated.”346
 
In a different vein, Professor Marsha Freeman notes with regard to the constitution of 
the United States of America: “The US constitution, 14th Amendment, has been read 
to prohibit discrimination against women, but the test is not as rigorous as it is with 
respect to race discrimination-that is, women’s protection is to a lesser standard.”347 
She later asserts: “The effort to expand the constitutional protection died a generation 
                                                 
344 See also R. Holtmaat (2004). 
345 WILDAF Nigeria questionnaire response Part A:5. 
346 Professor Theresa Piconto Novales, questionnaire response at 2. 
347 Professor M. Freeman response to Part A:1 of the questionnaire (May 2007). 
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ago.”348 Other shortcomings were identified in the shadow report submitted to the 
Human Rights Committee prior to its consideration of the second and third reports of 
the United States of America: 
 
“The Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection provision has not been consistently 
interpreted as protecting women from sex discrimination, and it has not been 
interpreted to require strict scrutiny of sex-based classifications. Instead, the standard 
ranges from requiring a ‘rational basis’ for sex-based distinctions to requiring an 
‘exceedingly persuasive’ justification. The Fourteenth Amendment has not been 
interpreted to apply to sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination. Nor does it 
protect women from discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or childbirth. Further, 
the amendment has been interpreted to require a demonstration of discriminatory 
intent; it is not sufficient that a law or policy has a disproportionate impact on one 
sex.”349
 
Given these criticisms the shadow report requested that the Human Rights Committee 
recommend that the USA hold Congressional hearings “ on the intent and 
applicability of a Constitutional amendment assuring equal protection under the law 
for men and women”350 and also that the U.S Senate move legislation to provide for 
the USA to ratify CEDAW without current reservations.351
 
Ironic in light of the global reach of the “Westminster constitutional model”, is the 
absence of a written constitution for the United Kingdom.  The questionnaire 
respondent from the United Kingdom explained: 
 
“The UK does not have a written constitution as such so discrimination provisions are 
contained within specific statutes such as the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 as 
amended and the Equal Pay Act 1970.  These apply only to certain areas-notably 
employment and provision of services. The Act has been extended to cover issues of 
sexual orientation.  The UK is a member of the EU and covered by Treaty obligations 
including the non discrimination provision which relates to employment although its 
coverage has been extended somewhat by case law.  In addition subsequent directives 
most particularly the framework directive has extended non discrimination measures 
to sexual orientation, age and religion.”352
 
                                                 
348 Ibid, response to Part B:1.  C.f. Reservation/ Understanding of the USA to ICCPR, arts. 2 (1) and 26 
and objections of Finland thereto, available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/treaty4_asp.htm. 
349 Report on Women’s Human Rights in the United States under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights in response to the second and third periodic report of the United States of America, 
eighty seventh session, July 2006, at 2 of the Executive summary. 
350 Ibid, 2. 
351 Ibid, 3. 
352 Professor A. Stewart response to Part A:1 of the questionnaire (April 2007).  
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Although the majority of the constitutions guaranteed non discrimination on grounds 
of sex, there were still a few culturally relativist constitutions which, while 
recognising the principle of equality before the law, upheld customary and other 
personal laws above the principle of equality. In this category were the constitutions 
of Kenya and Zambia. Of the Kenyan constitution, the questionnaire response of 
FEMNET noted: 
 
“Many laws including the Kenyan Constitution are discriminatory against women. It 
is only in 1997 that the Constitution was amended to outlaw discrimination on the 
basis of sex, but section 82(4) acts as a ‘claw-back clause’ by allowing discrimination 
with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial and devolution of property on the 
death or other matters of personal law. Hence contravening Article 2(f) of CEDAW 
that obliges State parties to take appropriate measures to abolish existing laws, 
regulations and customs and practices that constitute discrimination against 
women.”353
 
The FEMNET response highlighted a further problem created by having a 
constitution that sanctions discrimination against women, and that was the difficulty 
of bringing court cases to challenge laws that discriminate against women. If the 
supreme law of the country permits discrimination in certain spheres, “it is therefore 
rare to find court cases challenging the law.” The lack of a clear anti-discrimination 
provision covering all laws wherever applied meant that the judges and magistrates 
were left with a wide discretion to interpret the law as they saw fit.354  The effect of 
this was seen in the Zambian response to the questionnaire: 
 
“The discriminatory provision in Zambia is in Article 23 of the Republican 
Constitution.  Article 23 is the non-discrimination clause that prohibits discrimination 
on different grounds including sex. It has draw-back clauses in sub-article 4 (c) and 
(d). In these it allows discrimination in the practice of customary law and personal 
law especially marriage, divorce, devolution of property and custody of children. The 
effect is that customary law that discriminates against women is not prohibited. 
Therefore, if the custom posits that a divorced woman is entitled to kitchen utensils, 
that is what the court will grant her as settlement of marital property. As recent (sic) 
as 2000 the Supreme Court upheld this in Chibwe v. Chibwe where a woman was 
awarded an equitable share of marital property because the customary law under 
which she was married allowed it. (R. Chibwe v. A Chibwe SCZ Appeal No. 38 of 
2000).”355
 
                                                 
353 FEMNET (Kenya) response to Part A:3 of the questionnaire (May 2007). 
354 Ibid FEMNET Part C:3. 
355 Email correspondence from WLSA Zambia dated Tuesday 10 April 2007. 
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Another exemption was noted in Malaysia. While article 4(1) of the Constitution 
provided that laws that contravened the Constitution were to be considered ultra vires 
“i.e. Null and void as far as the inconsistency goes”356 still: 
 
“There are several worrisome exceptions to this rule, for example, Article 8(5) of the 
Federal Constitution. Pursuant to this Article, certain types of law are not considered 
ultra vires the constitution even if it is discriminatory (in contravention of Article 8 
(2)(prohibiting gender discrimination)) for example, when the law concerns personal 
laws such as family laws. In this situation, said law shall prevail regardless of whether 
the provision in question is discriminatory or not.”357
 
Human rights bodies have engaged States about the need to change or uphold 
constitutional provisions to reflect the principles of non discrimination and equality 
before the law. In respect of the Swiss Constitution, CEDAW notes: 
 
“The Committee commends the State party for including the principle of gender 
equality in its Federal Constitution, which explicitly mandates legislators to ensure 
women’s de jure and de facto equality, particularly in the areas of family, education 
and work, and authorizes legislators to take steps to ensure equality in line with article 
4, paragraph 1, of the Convention. The Committee notes with appreciation that the 
Swiss legal order ensures the primacy of international treaties, including the 
Convention, in domestic law.”358
 
CEDAW regularly recommends that States parties adopt article 1 of CEDAW as the 
constitutional definition of discrimination, even if the national constitution already 
guarantees equality between men and women and prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of sex.359
 
With some exceptions, most States have through their Constitutions, and in some 
cases separate laws on equality,360 formally committed themselves to guarantee that 
there should not be discrimination on grounds of sex and gender and also to upholding 
the principle of equality for all before the law. However, personal status (family) laws 
                                                 
356 Sisters in Islam response to Part A:2 of the questionnaire (May 2007). 
357 Ibid. 
358 Switzerland, CEDAW, A/58/38 part I (2003) 20, at para. 101. 
359 See for example Concluding observations to the combined initial, second and third periodic report 
and combined fourth and fifth periodic report of Angola (CEDAW/C/AGO/1-3 and 
CEDAW/C/AGO/4-5) at its 655th and 661st meetings, on 12 and 16 July 2004, July 2004 
CEDAW, A/59/38 part II (2004), para. 142. 
360 See IWRAW Asia Pacific compendium on gender equality laws at http://www.iwraw-
ap.org/resources/laws.htm. 
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in many jurisdictions show that discrimination against women is ongoing. In its 
concluding observations to the Ugandan report CEDAW noted: 
 
“While noting that article 33 (5) of the Constitution ‘prohibits laws, customs, or 
traditions which are against the dignity, welfare or interest of women’. The 
Committee notes with concern the continued existence of legislation, customary laws 
and practices on inheritance, land ownership, widow inheritance, polygamy, forced 
marriage, bride price, guardianship of children and the definition of adultery that 
discriminate against women and conflict with the Constitution and the 
Convention.”361
 
Family Laws: 
 
Age of Marriage 
Research undertaken by UNICEF362 and the Forum for Marriage has shown that 
despite many legal and policy initiatives both at the UN363 and regional levels,364 
many States continue to have laws that retain different minimum age of marriage for 
boys or young men than women.365  In December 2005 the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation (IPPF) produced a wall chart showing percentages of girls 
married by 15 and the percentage of 15-19 year old girls who had ever been 
married.366  The figures show that early marriage is serious problem primarily, but not 
exclusively, in Africa.  Out of 146 States surveyed, States with joint percentages (that 
is for both marriage by 15 and before 19) in excess of 25% included Angola, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, 
                                                 
361 CEDAW Concluding observations: Uganda UN Doc A/57/38 (2002), para. 154. 
362 UNICEF Early Marriage: A Harmful Traditional Practice (New York, UNICEF, 2005), UNICEF 
(2007) 4. Forum on Marriage and the Rights of Women and Girls Early Marriage: Whose right to 
Choose? (London, Forum on Marriage and the Rights of Women and Girls, 2000). PLAN International 
(2007). A. Melchiorre (2004) “At What Age?”, available at www.right-to-education.org. 
363 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutional Practices 
Similar to Slavery, 1956, adopted by ECOSOC Resolution 608 (XX1) of 30 April 1956, art.2. 
Convention on Minimum Age of Marriage, Consent to Marriage and Registration of Marriage, 1962, 
GA Res.1763A (XVIII) of 7 November 1962. General Assembly Resolution adopting the 
Recommendation Consent to Marriage, Minimum age of Marriage and Registration of Marriages, 
A/RES/2018 (XX), 1 November 1965, Principle II.  CEDAW, art. 16(2); CEDAW general 
recommendation 21, paras. 36, 38 and 39. Human Rights Committee general comment 28, para.23. 
CRC general comment 4 on Adolescent health and development in context, UN. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/4 
(2003), paras. 9. 39 (g). 
364 ACRWC art 21(2) African Protocol on Women’s Rights, art 6 (b). 
365 FWLD notes that in Nepal the Marriage Registration Act, 2028, provides that the minimum age of 
marriage for young women is 18 while that for young men is 21 (s. 4(3)).  FWLD questionnaire 
response A:3 p. 10. 
366 IPPF Wall Chart revised 6 December 2005.  I am grateful to Naana Ooyortey at IPPF for sending 
this to me. 
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Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea Conakry, Haiti, Honduras, 
India, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger,  
Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen, 
Zambia. Niger with a combined figure of 89% was undoubtedly the one with the most 
severe problem while in South East Asia it was Bangladesh with 75%. In South and 
Central America, Nicaragua came top with 53%. The responses to the questionnaires 
confirm the prevalence of early marriage and different ages for marriage.367
 
Tackling early marriage is important in several respects. Early marriage hinders a 
girl’s chances of continuing with her education and this in turn hampers her life 
chances. Early marriage has negative health consequences for a girl not least because 
of the increased likelihood of early motherhood and the attendant health risks. 368 This 
in turn impacts on the health of any children that she may have. It goes without saying 
that a correlation has been established between early and forced marriage. As the age 
of marriage is lower than the legal age of majority in many States, it is understood 
that the girl will have little, if any say in the choice of marriage partner and not having 
a legal veto, cannot refuse to comply with the wishes of a parent or guardian.369 Even 
where the law provides for annulment of a premature marriage, it may also provide 
that once the parties reach the age of majority or in the event of pregnancy, a marriage 
unlawfully contracted due to minority becomes valid, thus by implication condoning 
early marriage.370  Compulsion or duress here constitutes a form of child abuse.371 
Indeed the rationale given by many States for the continued discrepancy in age of 
marriage is that “girls mature faster than boys.” However, far from protecting girls, all 
                                                 
367 See also Special Rapporteur on education, girls’ right to education, E/CN.4/2006/45 paras. 73-75. 
368 CESCR general comment 14 on the right to health, E/C.12/2000/4, CESCR (11 August 2000), para. 
22. 
369 Women Living Under Muslim Law (WLUML) Knowing Our Rights: Women, Family, Laws and 
Customs in the Muslim World  (London, WLUML, 2006), 121. 
370 See combined fourth and fifth periodic report of Burkina Faso, CEDAWC/BFA/4-5, 2:13 on 
article 15 at 44. In its concluding observations CEDAW urged Burkina Faso to “accelerate the 
process of legal reform to raise the minimum age of marriage for girls.” 
Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
to the combined fourth and fifth periodic report of Burkina Faso (CEDAW/C/BFA/4-5) at its 
695th and 696th meetings, held on 14 July 2005 (see CEDAW/C/SR.695 and 696), CEDAW, 
A/60/38 part II (2005), para. 340. 
371 Even when the woman is not a minor, it is important that her consent be sought. WLUML identify 
Central Asia, Fiji, Gambia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Turkey as states where in 
practice forced marriages exist. WLUML (2006), 85-86. For the legal situation see 90-91.   See also 
CEDAW Concluding observations Vietnam, UN. Doc. A/56/38, paras. 258-9. 
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this does is to reinforce ideas about their “availability.”  Moreover, there is the notion 
that young women (girls) are “less experienced” and likely to be more compliant.  
This has led to increased sexual and other assaults on young girls whether married or 
not. Links have already been made between increased sexual assault of young girls 
“because they are clean” and the spread of the HIV virus.  UNICEF also notes that in 
some regions AIDS orphans are often steered towards early marriage by carers who 
are unable or unwilling to look after them.372 By legalising different ages of marriage, 
the State, by implication can be said to condone these harmful attitudes and ideas. The 
absence of registration of marriages or in some cases the lack of enforcement of 
registration provisions makes possible the continuation of child marriages. In this 
regard it is worth noting that India’s declaration to CEDAW article 16(2) that it 
cannot practically enforce compulsory registration of marriages because of the 
“variety of customs, religions and levels of literacy”373 has been successfully 
challenged in domestic courts.374  Acknowledging the government’s declaration to 
CEDAW,375 the Supreme Court noted the disproportionate effect on women of non 
registration of marriages and ruled that all marriages should be registered.376 The 
Supreme Court decision fulfilled an earlier recommendation of CEDAW that India 
implement a marriage registration system to prevent forced marriages.377 In its 
dialogue with CEDAW in January 2007, India revealed that it had still not 
implemented the recommendation.378
 
Despite these contra indications associated with the practice of early marriage, it is 
legally sanctioned in many States. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, le Code de 
la famille provides that girls can marry at 15 while boys can only marry once they 
reach the age of 18.379 The situation in Guatemala is even more severe with boys 
                                                 
372 UNICEF (2006) Excluded and Invisible, 46. 
373 India reservation to article 16(2), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw/htm. 
374 Smt Seema v. Ashwani Kumar T.P. Civ. No. 291 of 2005 (Supreme Court of India 14 February 
2006). See also CRR (2006) 33, 75. 
375 Ibid, para. 2. 
376 Ibid, para. 17. 
377 India, UN. Doc. A/55/38, para. 62 
378 General Assembly Meetings Coverage, CEDAW Chamber A, 761st & 762nd Meetings “Anti-
Discrimination Committee urges India to life Convention Reservations, at 7. 
379 Democratic Republic of Congo, Code de la famille, art.352. Provided by MONUC, Division des 
Droits de l’Homme Lubumbashi, May 2007.  See also le Code Civil nigérien, in ONG DIMAL 
response A:3; Afghanistan UN Asia-Pacific response A:3. 
 65
being permitted to marry at the age of 16 as compared to 14 for girls.380   Similarly 
the questionnaire response from Tanzania highlighted the following discrimination: 
 
“Regarding the minimum age of marriage, the law is discriminatory in sex in respect 
of age of marriage. Section 13(1) of the Law of Marriage Act, is discriminatory to a 
girl child as she can be married before attending the age of majority. On the other 
hand the male counterpart, the law provides strictly that the age of marriage should be 
eighteen years and above and not otherwise. The government is urged to amend the 
law so that a new minimum age for marriage to be 21 years for both male and 
female.” 381
 
The Japanese Civil Code also provides for different ages of marriage for males (18) 
and females (16)382 leading CEDAW to “express concern that the Civil Code still 
contains discriminatory provisions, including those with respect to the minimum age 
for marriage”383
The Syrian Law of Personal Status provides that while men marry at 18, young 
women can marry at 17. 384 However, it also permits earlier (child) marriage with 
article 18 providing: “If the male adolescent claims [to have reached] puberty after 
completing his fifteenth year or the female her thirteenth, and they petition to be 
married, the qadi shall permit it if the truth of their claim and their bodily capacity are 
apparent to him.” 
Noting that the use of age exemptions allowing earlier marriage if a court allows it, 
has led to marriage for girls as young as 12 in the Philippines and even lower in Iran, 
the group Women Living Under Muslim Laws argues that there needs to be: “a clear 
State policy that such provisions are not to be used as loopholes through which parties 
can continue to practice child marriage.”385
In 2007 a group of civil society activists from Sudan presented a list of demands for 
law reform to the Human Rights Committee which was considering Sudan’s third 
report to the Committee. One of the demands related to the age of marriage with the 
                                                 
380 Civil Code, art. 81 in questionnaire response of OHCHR  Guatemala to part A:3 (June 2007). 
381 Tanzania Questionnaire response (April 2007). 
382 From Equality Now (2004), 3. 
383 Japan, CEDAW, A/58/38 part II (2003) 130, at para. 371. 
384 Syria Law of Personal Status law No. 95/1953 amended by  Law No. 34/1975, and Law No. 18/2003 
–as cited in L. Welchman (2007), 165. 
385 WLUML (2006), 120. 
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request that “The legal age for marriage should be 18, and 16 with judge’s order when 
it is in the best interest of the concerned parties.”386  The CRC had, in 2002, already 
identified age (and its seeming flexibility) as a problem in Sudanese law: 
“The Committee is concerned that the definition of the child is unclear under 
Sudanese law and is not in conformity with the principles and provisions of the 
Convention. For example, minimum ages may be determined by arbitrary criteria, 
such as puberty, and discriminate between girls and boys, and in some cases are too 
low (e.g. the minimum age of marriage is as low as 10 years).”387
The Committee had recommended: “that the State party review its legislation so that 
the definition of the child, the age of majority, and other minimum age requirements 
conform to the principles and provisions of the Convention, and that they are gender 
neutral, and ensure that the laws are enforced.”388
In the United Kingdom, a child can marry (with the approval of a guardian) and 
consent to medical treatment at 16, drive at 17 and vote at 18. Writing about Nigeria, 
Nkoyo also identifies how minimum age for marriage for both sexes is set at 18 in the 
Child Rights Act, 2003, but that child in the Children and Young Person’s Act is 
defined as one under 14, while a young person under the same act is between 14 and 
17. She further notes that the Immigration Act defines a child as one under the age of 
16 while the Matrimonial Causes Act identifies as a major, anyone over the age of 
21.389  Considering the Malawian report, the CRC noted that it was “concerned about 
the various legal minimum ages, which are inconsistent, discriminatory and or too 
low.”390 It urged the State to “establish clear minimum ages for marriage and correct 
the discrimination between boys and girls.” 
Also identified as problematic by Nkoyo is the clash of norms engendered by the 
existence of plural legal systems.391  This is a problem identified by the CRC in its 
consideration of the report of Lebanon where it noted that the existence of 15 different 
                                                 
386 “Sudanese women’s demands for Law reform”, presented to the Human Rights Committee during 
the review of Sudan’s third periodic report, July 2007. Forwarded to consultant by OHCHR WRGU. 
387 Sudan, CRC, CRC/C/121 (2002) 53, at para. 243. WLUML notes that “Even where the court’s 
permission is required for an under-age marriage, this requirement may not offer much protection if the 
legal minimum age is already extremely low, as in Sudan.” WLUML (2006), 121. 
388 Ibid, CRC (2002), at 243. 
389 T. Nkoyo “Revisiting Equality as a Right: the Minimum age of Marriage Clause in the Nigerian 
Child Rights Act 2003” (2006) 27 Third World Quarterly 1299, at 1303. 
390 Malawi, CRC, CRC/C/114 (2002), paras. 397-398. 
391 T. Nkoyo, at 1304.  See also Egypt, third periodic report, CCPR/C/EGY/2001/3, para. 187.   
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personal law systems meant that there were in practice, different ages for marriage 
depending on the system of law governing the parties. 
“Noting the average age at which a marriage is concluded (31 years for men and 28 
years for women), the Committee is nevertheless concerned that there are many 
different minimum ages for marriage owing to the existence of 15 personal status 
laws administered by different confessional groups, and above all that some 
confessional groups permit marriage to be entered into by boys as young as 14 and 
girls as young as 9. The Committee is concerned in particular that its previous 
recommendations to review the minimum age for marriage and to adopt legislative 
measures with a view to ensuring respect for the rights of girls, especially in relation 
to preventing early marriage, have not been followed up.”392
The Committee recommended that the State party: “Take all necessary steps to 
increase awareness among the confessional groups - e.g. via information campaigns 
highlighting the de facto average age of marriage - about the need to harmonize the 
minimum age for marriage, to raise it and to make it the same for boys as for girls.”393
The Afghan response to the questionnaire notes the contradiction between marriage 
age for boys being set at 18 and girls at 16.  However, the questionnaire identifies the 
internal conflict of laws highlighted by the Electoral Law: 
“Therefore the woman should be able to obtain all her legal rights by the age of 16 but 
the political rights verified in the Electoral Law of Afghanistan in article 13 says; ‘a 
person is eligible to vote in elections if that person is at least 18 years of age on the 
date of the election.”394
Further confusion is created by the Juvenile Code which gives majority to girls at 17 
and boys at 18.395 Twelve female parliamentarians have formed a network to 
challenge this law.396 One cannot escape the irony of girl children being made to 
marry at 16 and not yet able to vote on issues that affect them directly, for example, 
early and forced marriage.  By way of contrast, is Algeria which in amended its 
Family Code and now provides that “the consent of both future spouses is a 
precondition for the validity of the contract, and the marriageable age is set at 19 
years - the voting age - for both men and women.”397 Similarly, in its initial report to 
                                                 
392 Lebanon, CRC/C/15/Add.54, para. 28. 
393 Ibid, para. 51. 
394 Afghanistan, UN Asia-Pacific response Part A:5. 
395 Ibid, part B:1. 
396 Ibid, Afghanistan Part B:1. 
397 Ordinance No. 05-02 of 27 February 2005, amending and supplementing Act No. 84-11 of 9 June 
1984 establishing the Family Code, Algeria, third periodic report, CCPR/C/DZA/3, para. 127.  See also 
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the Human Rights Committee, Albania reported that it had amended its Family Code 
and equalised the age of marriage to 18 for both sexes thus removing the 18 for males 
and 16 for females discrepancy enshrined in the repealed Code from 1982.398
In Armenia, the minimum age for marriage was lowered from 18 to 17 with the 
possibility for a further lowering by one year for females in exceptional 
circumstances.399
Legal initiatives requiring a uniform age of marriage have to be followed up by 
practical measures. The Afghan questionnaire points to campaigns to ensure that 
marriages are registered with the courts in an effort to curtail forced or early 
marriages.400 However, this requires education not only of the population but also 
court officials and those that solemnise marriages. 
The treaty bodies have identified early marriage as a human rights violation and 
urging States parties to amend their laws to equalise marriage between boys and girls 
and also to raise the age of marriage to 18 as a minimum.401  The CRC has raised the 
matter with States as diverse as Argentina,402 Bahrain,403 Gabon,404 South Korea,405 
Guinea Bissau,406 Malawi,407 Niger,408 Romania409 and St Vincent and the 
Grenadines.410  Similarly CEDAW has also been vigilant pointing out to Cuba that 
the exceptions made allowing earlier marriage for the sexes violated both CEDAW 
and the CRC: 
“While noting that the minimum legal age of marriage is 18 years for both girls and 
boys, the Committee expresses concern that minimum ages of marriage of 14 for 
females and 16 for males may be authorized in exceptional cases. The Committee 
                                                                                                                                            
République Algérienne “Rapport National sur la déclaration solennelle sur l’égalité entre les Hommes 
et les Femmes”, Juin 2006, available at: www.africa-union.org, at 5. 
398Albania, initial report, CCPR/C/ALB/2004/1. 
399 Marriage and Family Code of the Republic of Armenia, amended 1992. See Armenia, second 
periodic report, CEDAW/C/ARM/2, paras. 27 and 116. 
400 UNAMA questionnaire response Part B:1. 
401 CRR and University of Toronto (2002), 37. 
402 Argentina, CRC, CRC/C/121 (2002) 8, at paras. 50 and 51. 
403 Bahrain, CRC, CRC/C/114 (2002) 122, at paras. 470, 471, 476 and 477. 
404 Gabon, CRC, CRC/C/114 (2002) 47, at paras. 196 and 197. 
405 Republic of Korea, CRC, CRC/124 (2003) 24, at paras. 105, 106 
406 Guinea-Bissau, CRC, CRC/C/118 (2002) 12, at paras. 49-50. 
407 Malawi, CRC, CRC/C/114 (2002) 104, at paras. 397 and 398. 
408 Niger, CRC, CRC/C/118 (2002) 37, at paras. 148 and 149. 
409  Romania, CRC, CRC/124 (2003) 49, at paras. 219 and 220. 
410 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, CRC, CRC/C/116 (2002) 101, at paras. 428 and 429. 
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urges the State party to amend the legislation pertaining to age of marriage with a 
view to eliminating the exceptions that allow for marriage of females at age 14 and 
for males at 16 and to bring its legislation into line with article 1 of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, which defines a child as anyone under the age of 18 years, 
with article 16, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women and with general recommendation No. 21 of the 
Committee”.411
In concluding this section, it is important to acknowledge that even when the 
minimum age of marriage is set above the legal age of majority, it can in some cases 
be constructed as having the potential to discriminate against certain groups.  In what 
was described a protective measure, Denmark changed its law to provide that people 
from outside the European Union coming to live in Denmark as spouses had to be at 
least 24. Danish citizens and lawful residents can marry at a younger age.  This has 
been constructed, not as a measure of protection but rather a means of imposing an 
additional barrier to immigration and thus potentially discriminatory against migrants 
and minorities who are most likely to marry someone outside the jurisdiction.412
Linked to early marriage is the notion of “paternal preference or power” in many legal 
systems. The father was privileged in decision making vis-à-vis the child in areas as 
diverse as choosing a child’s name, registering the child’s birth, custody, 
guardianship, applying for passports or granting permission to travel, consenting to 
marriage and nationality or citizenship. This is often linked to the construction of the 
father as being the head of the household or family and ignores the de facto situation 
that pertains in most States; the disproportionate burden borne by women in child 
rearing.413
Questionnaire responses from Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), Malaysia, Nepal and Niger, indicated that in the event of conflict between the 
parents in decisions concerning the child, the father’s decision would prevail. Despite 
the positive changes wrought by the amendment to the Family Code promulgated on 1 
August 1987, it would appear that in the DRC, the father takes precedence in deciding 
                                                 
411 Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to the 
combined fifth and sixth periodic report of Cuba (CEDAW/C/CUB/5-6) at its 739th and 740th 
meetings, on 8 August 2006. CEDAW/SR.739 and 740 CEDAW/C/CUB/CO/6, paras, 13 and 14.  
412 A. Stolovitskaia and B. McElroy “Divorced from Reality: The True Impact of Denmark’s 24 Year 
old Rule”, available at: http://www.humanityinaction.org/docs/Final_report_Anastas130C50.doc. See 
also M. Brabant “Denmark cuts down on Migrant Marriage”, available at 
h:ttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/europe/2057594.stm. 
413 WLUML (2006), 229. Human Rights Committee General comment 19, para. 9. 
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on a child’s name in the event of a disagreement.414 Similarly in the case of 
disagreement over the exercise of parental authority, the father is to take precedence, 
which appears to conflict with CEDAW article 16(1) (d).415 Even when the father is 
removed from the picture, the mother remains disadvantaged because the Code does 
not permit a mother to exercise sole guardianship of any marital children. She is 
required to exercise it in conjunction with members of the father’s family.416 In Niger 
ONG-DIMAL also identifies inequalities in the exercise of la tutelle et de la curatelle 
(guardianship).417 In Senegal: “Under article 277 of the Code de la Famille the 
husband is the head of the family, and he has primary authority over the children 
during the marriage. Accordingly his decision overrides his wife’s in the event that 
they disagree-that is provided his decision is based on the interests of the family 
(article 287)”418
The questionnaire response received from OHCHR-NEPAL pinpointed s. 3(1) of the 
Children’s Act 1991 as discriminatory because the father has priority over the mother 
in naming a child. The Polish Family and Guardianship Code appears to privilege the 
father in the naming of the child providing that: “A child who is presumed to be the 
child of her/his mother’s husband, shall bear his surname, except when the spouses 
have declared that the child shall bear the mother’s last surname.”419  The same 
presumption seems to apply in the event that paternity has been established by the 
man recognising the child as his.420 The default presumption is discriminatory.  In 
South Africa the “name problem” appears to apply to adult women with the 
questionnaire response from the Women’s Law Centre pointing out that “Section 26 
of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992 ‘allows’ for a woman to retain 
her name on marriage.”421
The ASK response to the questionnaire noted that in Bangladesh discrimination 
included the fact that “in all government forms, only the name of the father is required 
                                                 
414 Code de la Famille, art. 59 al. 1er as reproduced by MONUC-HRC, (May 2007). 
415 Ibid, Code de la Famille, art. 317 (2). 
416 Ibid, Code de la Famille, arts. 198 and 200. 
417 Le Code Civil nigérien, arts 389 al. 1, 391, 392, 393, 394, 405, 480, 477, 369, 350. 
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419 Poland Family and Guardianship Code, art. 88 (1), as cited in Equality Now (2004), 4. 
420 Ibid, Family and Guardianship Code, art. 89 (1). 
421 Questionnaire response Women’s Law Centre Part A:3. 
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not the mother’s name”.422 Moreover, de jure discrimination was identified in both 
Muslim and Hindu personal laws. Of Muslim law, ASK averred: “Father is the legal 
guardian of a child. So even if a mother is successful in gaining custody of her child, 
it will be a temporary right only.” 423In Hindu personal laws it was said that 
“Similarly women suffer direct discrimination in matters of child Custody and 
Guardianship of their children.”424  In Malaysia parental rights and responsibilities 
appear to be determined by the religion of the parties so that in its response to the 
questionnaire, the NGO, Sisters in Islam acknowledges that changes have been made 
to the Guardianship of Infants Act to give equal guardianship to both parents, but then 
goes on to say that the change is only applicable to non-Muslims.425 Following on 
from this, the organisation notes that under the Islamic Family Law (Federal 
Territories) Act, 1984 the male members of the family (father and paternal male 
relatives) always exercise guardianship over a child. Guardianship extended to 
disposal of his or her properties426and deciding on the child’s religion.427Rules on 
custody also appear to be stacked against women: 
“Section 83 of Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act 1984 states the situations 
in which a female may lose her right to custody. The female-specific pronoun is used 
rather than gender-neutral ones, implying that men cannot lose the right of custody. 
The interpretation section does not rectify this, and the Interpretation Act 1948 and 
1967 may not be used as there was never any situation in which it is declared that this 
act would be applicable to state-made syariah laws.”428
“Father prioritisation” has been identified in the interaction of States and treaty 
bodies.429
The laws and regulations described above are discriminatory towards women.  
However, the rules which appear to apply mainly in marriage could be seen as 
creating the potential for women electing to have children born out of wedlock and 
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thus free, in many legal systems, from the control of a man.  This in turn creates the 
potential problem of violating human rights principles that parents are to be equally 
responsible for their children and may lead to discrimination against unmarried 
fathers.  This possibility is made manifest in the reservation of the Republic of Ireland 
to the “parental responsibility” articles in CEDAW: 
“Ireland is of the view that the attainment in Ireland of the objectives of the 
Convention does not necessitate the extension to men of rights identical to those 
accorded by law to women in respect of guardianship, adoption, and custody of 
children borne out of wedlock and reserves the right to implement the Convention 
subject to that understanding.” 430
The area in which discrimination against women remains widespread is in relation to 
passing on nationality or citizenship to their children. 
Nationality/citizenship discrimination 
As noted in the discussion on reservations and also regional conventions, the granting 
of nationality and citizenship of children through the male line is one of the clearest 
manifestations of discrimination against women and children. Together with the 
limitations placed on married women in their ability to pass on their nationality to 
their husbands, it is an area where discrimination has been legally enshrined for a long 
time.431  This is despite the clear international injunctions enshrining rights to 
nationality432, which, linked to equality and non-discrimination provisions, ought to 
result in discrimination free laws.433 The effects of nationality and citizenship 
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discrimination are far reaching. For women denied the right to pass on nationality or 
stripped of their nationality on marriage, it infantilises them and may result in the 
denial of core citizenship rights include the right to vote or to participate in public life. 
It may also have an impact on their freedom of movement as indeed may the 
insistence that a child must follow the nationality of its father. In States which permit 
the holding of only one nationality, it should be open to the parents of a child who 
themselves hold different nationalities, to decide which the child should take. On 
reaching the age of majority, it should be open for that child to make a decision for 
him or herself. 
 
In many States, the father presumption only appears to hold where the child is born in 
marriage meaning that an unmarried father may find that he is not able to confer 
automatically his citizenship to his child, as he would if he had married the mother of 
the child.  Unmarried fathers may be required to fulfil further requirements.  An 
example of this is the United States of America Immigration and Nationality Act. 434 
While an unmarried US mother can automatically pass on her nationality to her 
children, unmarried fathers whose children are born outside the jurisdiction are not. 
They are required to provide an acknowledgment of paternity, take a paternity test or 
proof payment of maintenance.  It has been suggested that the law on stereotypes 
mothers as “caring” and unlikely to abandon their children and unmarried fathers as 
feckless until proven otherwise. It has been challenged unsuccessfully in the Supreme 
Court meaning that without Congressional legislative reform, this law is destined to 
remain on the statute books.435
 
Questionnaire responses identifying discrimination in nationality laws included 
Kenya, Bangladesh, Nepal, Malaysia, Vanuatu and the Republic of Cyprus. These are 
not by any means the only States with discriminatory nationality laws as regards 
children. Reservations to article 9 of CEDAW indicate that States as diverse as the 
                                                                                                                                            
a child to have a nationality, it does not provide that nationality laws should not discriminate between 
mothers and fathers.  C. Chinkin (2000), 26. 
434 United States of America Immigration and Nationality Act s. 309.  Reproduced in Equality Now 
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Bahamas, Monaco436, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, Tunisia and the United 
Arab Emirates have also sought to uphold discriminatory laws.437 The list does not 
include those States with general reservations whose impact may include legitimising 
discrimination including in the enjoyment of nationality rights of women and 
children.  In recommendations made to States parties, discriminatory citizenship laws 
have also been identified as requiring amendment or repeal.438  Questionnaire 
responses varied in that while some States laws directly discriminated against women, 
others tried to provide a rationale for the distinction. Those which “directly 
discriminate” include Kenya, Nigeria and Malaysia all of which seemed to enshrine 
discrimination in their national constitutions: 
 
“The (Kenyan) Constitution endorses discrimination on women with respect to 
citizenship as it prevents women from conferring citizenship on their husbands and 
children when they apply for it.”439
 
“Section 26 of the 1999 Constitution directly discriminates against men who are 
married to Nigerian women by preventing their acquisition of Nigerian citizenship 
where they desire.”440
 
Provisions identified by Sisters in Islam as constituting discrimination against women 
vis a vis nationality and citizenship in the Malaysian constitution included: 
 
“Article 14 (1) (b) and Part II of the Second Schedule s1(c) whereby women cannot 
confer citizenship on their children born outside Malaysia. 
 
Article 15 (1) whereby there is no provision that enables foreign husbands of 
Malaysian women to receive the status of Permanent Resident as compared to 
Malaysian men’s foreign wives. Dependents’ spousal visas are given only to wives of 
Malaysian citizens. 
 
Articles 24 (4) and 26 (2) which provides for the deprivation of Malaysian women of 
their citizenship.”441
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Further discrimination is identified in the Malaysian Immigration Regulations, 1963 
which provide that the “foreign husband of a Malaysian woman is not entitled to a 
Dependent’s pass while a foreign wife is entitled to the same.”442 There is also the 
Immigration Act, 1959 which states that “a female holder of a Work Pass/permit 
cannot have her husband’s name endorsed on the permit, unlike the male holder who 
has the right to endorse his wife’s name on his pass/permit.”443
 
The OHCHR Nepal response to the questionnaire identified the 2007 Interim 
constitution as having discriminatory provisions vis-à-vis citizenship. Apparently 
Nepali women: 
 
“…cannot transfer citizenship to a spouse who is a foreign national and also that 
children born to Nepali women married to foreign nationals can only acquire 
naturalised citizenship. However, in the case of Nepali men married to foreign 
nationals, the children acquire citizenship through descent.”444
 
In its response, the FWLD noted that legal challenges to citizenship provisions on 
children contained in the 1990 Constitution445 had been unsuccessful.446 In Part G 
(anything else you would like to add), they go on to say that while amendments had 
been made to discriminatory laws, “some discriminatory laws still exist especially on 
citizenship, foreign employment…” 
 
In 2006 CEDAW, in its consideration of the fourth and fifth periodic report of the 
DRC concluded: “While welcoming article 5 of the new legislation on nationality, 
which enables women to transmit Congolese nationality through filiation in the same 
way as men, the Committee regrets that article 30 provides that women cannot retain 
their Congolese nationality if they marry a foreigner.”447
 
                                                 
442 Immigration Regulations, 1963 s. 10, as cited in Sisters in Islam, ibid. 
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However, commenting on the equalisation of nationality laws removing 
discrimination against Congolese mothers, the World Organisation against Torture, 
notes that in practice: 
 
“the Congolese population disregards this provision: usually, children born of a 
foreign father and of a Congolese mother are considered foreigners, notably in the 
cases of children born during wartime to a father from an enemy country. These 
children are often rejected, which is why it is important that the State be attentive to 
the full implementation of this recommendation.”448
 
In the questionnaire responses, Bangladesh was also identified as having 
discriminatory laws on citizenship: “The Citizenship Act, 1951 and the Bangladesh 
Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order 1972: It states that only a man can transmit 
nationality. A woman does not have the right to transmit her nationality to her 
children born outside Bangladesh or to her husband.”449
 
Following on from this in the same questionnaire response, ASK noted that in its 
lobby efforts to see the discrimination removed from the statute books, it had 
submitted draft “model laws”, including on citizenship to the government. Although it 
describes the government as “largely unresponsive”450 in 2004 CEDAW had raised 
the citizenship issue with Bangladesh which indicated a willingness to change the 
law: 
 
“Although acknowledging that the State party has initiated the amendment of 
the 1951 Citizenship Act, the Committee is concerned that women are still 
unable to transmit their nationality to their foreign husbands and children. 
The Committee urges the State party to ensure that a new citizenship law, which is in 
line with article 9 of the Convention, is adopted without delay, in order to eliminate 
all provisions that discriminate against women in the area of nationality.”451
 
The CRC had also recommended that changes be made by Bangladesh to its 
Citizenship law: 
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“In light of article 7 of the Convention, the Committee is concerned at the apparent 
discrimination in respect of nationality, and that a child’s name and nationality are 
derived solely from her/his father and not her/his mother. 
The Committee recommends that the State party amend its legislation so that 
citizenship can be passed on to children from either their father or their mother. It also 
encourages the State party to introduce proactive measures to prevent 
statelessness.”452
 
In 2001 Zimbabwe passed an amendment to the Citizenship Act requiring a 
Zimbabwean born person who was also entitled to the citizenship (by descent) of 
another country to renounce that citizenship regardless of whether said person had 
ever taken up the other citizenship in the first place. 453 The law which had 
retrospective effect arbitrarily stripped citizenship rights from many people. The 
constitutionality454 of the amended law was successfully challenged by people born in 
Zimbabwe of Zimbabwean born mothers and alien fathers who were legally resident 
in Zimbabwe.455.  Entitlement to foreign citizenship was interpreted by the Registrar 
General through a patriarchal lens so that in practice, had the mother been the 
“foreigner” and the father Zimbabwean born, then a Zimbabwean passport would 
have been issued without requiring prior renunciation thus highlighting sex 
discrimination in violation of Zimbabwe’s international obligations. 
 
Despite the recommendations of committee bodies,456 some States, such as the 
Republic of Cyprus seek to justify the discriminatory laws.  In the questionnaire 
response Cyprus acknowledged that although the law on citizenship had been changed 
in 2001 to provide that “all persons born in Cyprus or abroad, on or after 16.8.1960, 
acquired the Cypriot citizenship automatically if either their mother or father was, or 
would have been entitled to be a Cypriot citizen,”457 this had been amended so that 
“persons born of Cypriot mothers, either in Cyprus or abroad, between 16.8.1960 and 
                                                 
452 Bangladesh, CRC, CRC/C/133 (2003) 93, at paras. 471 and 472. 
453 Citizenship Act of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 12 of 2001 s. 9(7) 
454 Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1979, as amended ss. 4, 5.  See also Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human 
Rights Submissions on the interpretation of citizenship laws to the Parliamentary Committee on 
Defence and Home Affairs (2007), available from: 
http:/hrlr.org.zw/citizenship/citizenship%20submissions%20%20%20committee.doc. 
455 Ricaurdo Manwere v. Registrar General HH/ 87/02, judgment 5 June 2002; Job Sibanda v. 
Registrar General of Citizenship and Another HH/ 3626/02, judgment 20 February 2005; Trevor Ncube 
v. Registrar General HH 7316/06, judgment 24, 25 January 2007. 
456 Cyprus, CRC, CRC/C/132 (2003) 21, at para. 115. 
457 Republic of Cyprus Citizenship Law, 1967 (Law 43/1967), amended by Law 168 (1)/2001. 
Questionnaire response (letter) from L. Koursoumba, Law Commissioner to S. Corcoran, Political 
Officer, Civil Affairs Branch, UNFICYP (April 2007), 2. 
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11.6.1999 are given the option to acquire the Cypriot citizenship if they so wish by 
applying to the Minister of Interior.” This volte face which now added an extra layer 
of bureaucracy to people born of Cypriot mothers, was justified because the original 
amendment, in the words of Law Commissioner Leda Koursoumba: “was not 
welcomed by a large majority of male persons who acquired the citizenship as of their 
mother’s Cypriot citizenship, because automatically they became obliged to fulfil 
their military obligations in Cyprus.” (my emphasis) Cypriot law does not require 
women to carry out military service. The Law Commissioner notes that the Minister 
of the Interior: “considers that they (amendments) do not amount to discrimination 
against persons born by Cypriot mothers during the period between 16.8.1960 and 
11.6 1999; on the contrary, these persons are given the right to choose whether and 
when they wish to acquire Cypriot citizenship.”  
 
Also identified as an “issue of concern” in the questionnaire response from Cyprus is 
that of acquiring the status of displaced person. The Civil Registry Law provides that 
children can acquire the status of displaced persons if their father is a displaced 
person.458 By implication children of displaced mothers do not acquire the status or 
the entitlements attaching to the status. The Commissioner notes that the government 
and the relevant parliamentary committee had reviewed this differential treatment and 
concluded that an equalisation of the law allowing the children of displaced mothers 
the same rights as those of displaced fathers could not be adopted. The reasons given 
were all related to socio-economic and political factors, but not, it would appear, the 
State’s international obligations to prevent or remedy discrimination and to promote 
equality: 
 
“(a) The percentage of the displaced persons will be increased disproportionately to 
the percentage of the displaced persons in 1974.  A study conducted by the Statistical 
Service of Cyprus revealed that the percentage of the displaced persons will 
automatically be increased from 34% (as it was in 1974) to 42%.  This percentage will 
be increasing continuously and by the year 2047 will reach the 80% of the whole 
population.  Consequently, the real picture of the displaced population of Cyprus will 
be distorted. 
(b)The increase of the percentage of the displaced persons will gradually affect the 
electoral lists, leading to an increase of the number of electors in the electoral 
                                                 
458 Civil Registry Law-L.141(I)/2002, s. 119. Ibid. 
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catalogue of the occupied areas and to a decrease of the number of electors in the 
Government controlled area of the Republic.   
The beneficiaries of the various housing plans and other grants for the displaced 
persons will increase to such a level that the Government will not be in the position to 
bear the economic burden.” 
 
In the questionnaire response there is an acknowledgment that in relation to the above, 
CEDAW had stated in its 2006 recommendations: “The Committee also urges the 
State Party to eliminate the legal discrimination against children born to displaced 
mothers in acquiring the status of displaced person, particularly in light of the 
Ombudswoman’s view that the existing legislation constitutes discrimination.”459
CRC had already expressed concern: “Furthermore, the Committee is concerned that 
certain factors linked to discriminatory attitudes may persist, in particular those 
related to acquisition of nationality, children born out of wedlock and Cypriot 
children of Turkish origin.”460
 
Although issues of nationality and citizenship are more often than not legally 
enshrined, the questionnaire responses suggested that policy or rules governed the 
related question of freedom of movement. This was the case when it came to applying 
for passports or the issuance of permission to travel.461 It remains worth noting that 
there are many State sponsored violations of women’s rights to freedom of movement 
manifest in reservations entered to article 15(4) of CEDAW. Monaco’s reservation to 
this article notes that it is bound only in so far as the provision relates to unmarried 
women, meaning that married women may be subject to restrictions on their freedom. 
Moreover research conducted by the UNDP in four Arab States (Jordan, Lebanon, 
Egypt and Morocco) showed that 70% of Egyptian respondents and 56% of Jordanian 
respondents disagreed with a woman travelling on her own.462  By way of contrast 
82% in Lebanon and 59% in Morocco agreed that a woman should be able to travel 
on her own.463
 
                                                 
459 Ibid, at 5.  Report of 30 May 2006 (CEDAW/C/CYP/CO/5), para.32. 
460 CRC Cyprus (2003), para. 115. 
461 Human Rights Committee general comment 27 Freedom of movement, paras. 6 and 18. 
462 UNDP (2006), 264 
463 Ibid. 
 80
Limitations on women’s freedom of movement are also manifest in restrictions placed 
on their right to work (in mixed environments) or to participate in activities outside 
the home without an escort or chaperone and in the most infamous example their right 
to drive cars.464 The World Bank has linked the comparatively lower employment rate 
of women in the Middle East and North Africa to restrictions on their freedom of 
movement.465 There may even be in place a system of “protective custody” whereby 
women viewed as vulnerable may be placed in an institution from which they may not 
come and go as they please “for their own good.” 466Not all of these restrictions are 
State generated. In the case of Sara Longwe v. Inter-Continental hotels467 a Zambian 
woman took on the hotel chain after it had refused her entry to its bar to wait for her 
children who had been swimming at the hotel, because the hotel had a policy of not 
permitting women unaccompanied by men to enter its premises. The same rule did not 
apply to men. Longwe successfully challenged the hotel policy which was held to 
constitute a violation of her freedom of movement and her right to be free from 
discrimination in light of international obligations entered into by the Zambian State. 
  
The questionnaire responses identified as problematic, rules requiring a male guardian 
to consent before a passport or travel document could be issued, especially to 
children. It is here worth noting that denial of a passport to a child or the refusal to put 
the child on the mother’s passport impacts upon both the mother and the child’s 
ability to travel and by implication their freedom of movement.  In its third report 
under the ICCPR Zambia listed the case of Edith Zewelani Nawakwi v. the Attorney 
General.468 Here an unmarried mother challenged a rule that said she needed the 
written consent of the father of her child in order to obtain a passport for him. She 
said the rule discriminated against her on grounds of sex. The court upheld her claim 
finding that the practice requiring a father’s consent before a mother could register a 
child on her passport constituted discrimination: 
                                                 
464 Saudi Arabia Fatwa on Women’s Driving of Automobiles (Shaikh Abdel Aziz Bin Abdallah Bin 
Baz), 1990, reproduced in Equality Now (2004), 13. 
465 World Bank MENA  (2004), 13, 21, 93-127. 
466 Human Rights Watch Libya: A Threat to Society? Arbitrary Detention of Women and Girls for 
‘Social Rehabilitation’ Human Rights (2006), vol. 18 No. 2 [E]. 
467 Longwe v. Intercontinental Hotels [1993] 4 LRC 221. 
468 Edith Zewelani Nawakwi v the Attorney General, 1990/HC/1724.  Zambia, third periodic report, 
CCPR/C/ZMB/3. 
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“it is not at all justified from whatever angle the issue is looked at, for a father to treat 
himself or to be treated by the institutions of society to be more entitled to the affairs 
of his children than the mother of that child or those children.  The mother is as much 
an authority over the affairs of her children as the father is”.469
In Malaysia, Sisters in Islam noted that although the Guardianship of Infants Act 
provided for equal guardianship for both parents, instances of discrimination still 
occurred when applying for passports, because “the immigration forms still read 
‘father/guardian’ and some immigration forms discourage the mother from applying 
for passports for the children/and or require a letter of consent from the father.”470
Questionnaire responses also revealed rules requiring parental or male approval for 
travel outside the jurisdiction, even for adult women.  This was the case in Nepal 
where a woman required the permission of a male guardian to take up employment 
outside the jurisdiction. Both the FWLD and the OHCHR responses identified the 
Foreign Employment Act, 1985471 as requiring the permission of both the guardian 
and the Government as a “prerequisite for women to go abroad for employment. 
There are no such prerequisites for men going abroad for employment.”472  Other 
restrictions related to travel abroad for the purposes of education so that the Nepalese 
Scholarship rules provide that a guardian’s approval is necessary for women/girls to 
study in a foreign country, but not men.473
In the section on the marital relationship, the Qatari personal status law provides: 
“The husband shall give his wife the opportunity to complete her education to the end 
of the mandatory period and shall facilitate her pursuit of university education inside 
the country, in so far as this does not conflict with her family duties.”474 (my 
emphasis) The implication is that he is not required to support her if she chooses to 
study outside the country. Indeed it is questionable that she will be given permission 
to undertake study abroad. 
 
                                                 
469 Ibid, Human Rights Committee report, para 46. 
470 Sisters in Islam questionnaire response Part A:3. 
471 Foreign Employment Act 2042 (1985). 
472 Ibid, art. 12. OHCHR Nepal questionnaire response Part:3,  p. 4 ; FWLD Part A:3, p.7. 
473 Scholarship Rules, 2029 (1972).  In FWLD Part A:3, p. 7. 
474 Qatar Personal Status Law, 2006, art. 68, as cited in L. Welchman (2007), 176. 
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In El Ghar v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya475 a complaint was made to the Human Rights 
Committee. The author, of Libyan nationality was a law graduate who wished to 
undertake postgraduate study in France. She lived in Morocco with her divorced 
mother. She applied for a Libyan passport first obtaining, and attaching to the 
application, the authorization to travel that she had obtained from her father, a Libyan 
citizen still living in Libya. The Libyan consulate issued her with a laissez passer, 
which, not being a full passport would not entitle her to travel to France. After much 
delay the author complained to the Human Rights Committee, which upheld the 
complaint noting that there had indeed been a violation of article 12(2) “in so far as 
the author was denied a passport without any valid justification and subjected to 
unreasonable delay, as a result was prevented from travelling abroad to continue her 
studies.”476 The Committee requested the State party to issue the passport without 
delay and to ensure that such violations were not repeated in future.477
 
Recently Kurdish women have complained about the enforcement of a long ignored 
Iraqi law which states that “a woman who applies for a passport first has to have her 
father, uncle or brother’s written permission.”478 Women’s groups in Iraqi Kurdistan 
are said to be campaigning to abolish the law, organising a petition and taking their 
case to the government.479
 
Closely associated with father preference laws and male preference in decision 
making is the concept of marital power and specifically obedience laws found in some 
jurisdictions. 
 
Obedience Laws - Husband’s marital power 
There appears to be a strong correlation between paternal power and preference in 
relation to legal decisions affecting children and a husband’s marital power over a 
wife or the expectation of obedience. In the DRC the wife is placed under the marital 
authority of her husband in contravention of article 15(2) of CEDAW 480and also has 
                                                 
475 El Ghar v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  (1107/2002), ICCPR A/60/40 vol. II (2 November 2004). 
476 Ibid, para. 8. 
477 Ibid. 
478 K. Tofiq “Kurdish Women Resent new Passport System” ICR No. 223, 8 June 2007. 
479 Ibid. 
480 Code de la Famille, art. 448.  The United Arab Emirates has a reservation to art. 15 (2) of CEDAW. 
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to follow him and agree to his choice of residence.481  Operating along similar lines is 
Niger which makes the husband head of the household482resulting in the curtailment 
of the civil rights of a married woman483 who has to follow the husband’s choice of 
residence and is subject to the domicile of his choosing.484 In Pakistan: 
 
“Under domicile provisions, a woman who had joined government service before 
marrying retains her domicile after marriage, but a woman who joins government 
service after marrying looses her original domicile and acquires the domicile of her 
husband.  These provisions affect a woman’s access to government jobs (which often 
require candidates to be domiciled in a specific area of the country); they have been 
unsuccessfully challenged in court.”485
 
The exercise of the status “head of household” varies between jurisdictions.486  In Iran 
and Egypt a wife needs her husband’s permission to obtain a passport and to travel, 
while in Cameroon a husband has the right to determine ‘whether or not (and under 
what conditions) wives may work or study, what they may study, and what type of 
work they may do. In Sudan a husband’s control extends to requiring the wife to 
obtain the husband’s permission before taking up employment in government.487
 
In States requiring obedience, the consequences of “disobedience” may be onerous 
and often limit a woman’s autonomy.  In States identified as having codified 
obedience, the penalty for a ‘disobedient’ woman involves the forfeiture of 
maintenance or some other economic benefit.488 All States include leaving the home 
without permission or disobeying instructions about working or not working outside 
the home as conditions likely to lead to a wife being said to be disobedient.489  This 
denial of a woman’s independent or unfettered right to work outside the home may be 
because the husband is supposed to support her. However, the effect is to create 
dependence. An exception is Iraq which while providing that a wife will be denied 
                                                 
481 Ibid, Code de la Famille, arts. 454-455. 
482 Le Code Civil nigérien, art. 213, cited by ONG-DIMAL questionnaire response A:2. 
483Ibid, arts. 216, 221 alineas 1, 2 et 3, 219, 222 alineas 1 et 2, 223, 224 and 225. (ONG-DIMAL) 
484 Ibid, arts. 108, 215, 878. 
485 Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) (2006), 161. 
486 WLUML (2006), 157. 
487 WLUML (2006), 157-158. 
488 Jordan and Kuwait also require obedience. Jordanian Law of Personal Status 1976 as amended in 
2001, art 37, 69.  Kuwaiti Personal Status Law 1984 art.87. Reproduced in L. Welchman (2007) 172-
173. Moreover, elsewhere WLUML notes: “2005 amendments to Algeria’s Code de la Famille did not 
repeal the requirement of obedience, profoundly weakening the introduction of wider mutual rights and 
responsibilities. WLUML (2006), 157.
489 WLUML (2006), 162-3. 
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maintenance if she breaches certain conditions, also provides that she will not be 
considered disobedient if the home that is the matrimonial home is “far from the 
wife’s place of work such as to make it impossible for her to reconcile her domestic 
and employment commitments.”490 It is also worth noting that although obedience is 
expected of wives in the legal systems mentioned, the laws do acknowledge that there 
may be instances where a wife is justified in refusing to obey. Moreover, the ‘trade-
off’ is that the husband also has duties.491 Still, the problem remains the imbalance 
between the sexes, the seeming absence of choice re conditions in some systems and 
the gendered nature of the rights and responsibilities not least the requirement in the 
Yemeni Personal Status Law No. 20 legally obliging a wife to do the housework.492
 
Violence against women (in the Family): 
 
Although all States have within their legal systems provisions outlawing assault, 
torture degrading and inhuman treatment and violence, the situation in the home was 
different.  Types of violence identified including wife beating, so called honour 
crimes and what amounts to rape within marriage.493
 
Non Consensual Sex in Marriage 
Although rape is outlawed in most legal systems, sexual intercourse in marriage, 
including that which is not consensual is often not proscribed. The Secretary-
General’s report on violence notes that “Marital rape is not a prosecutable offence in 
at least 53 States.” 494 WLUML note that “By failing to recognize marital rape, most 
systems implicitly deny a wife the right to refuse sexual intercourse.”495 This suggests 
that on marriage a woman is taken to consent to sexual intercourse for the duration of 
the marriage often under pain of divorce or denial of support if she declines.  The 
legal systems of Kenya, Ghana, Ethiopia and Nigeria were all identified as 
“permitting” non consensual sex in marriage.  The Centre for Reproductive Rights 
also identifies Cote d’Ivoire and Benin as not recognising marital rape as a criminal 
                                                 
490 Iraq Law 1959 as amended by Law 1980, art. 25(2) (b), as cited in L. Welchman (2007), 172. 
491 WLUML (2006), 164 
492 WLUML (2006), 163. 
493 See Report of the Secretary-General on violence against women (2006), 83-88. Box 11 at 89.  
494 Ibid. The report notes that there data was not available for 16 states at 90 n. 
495 WLUML (2006), 156. 
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offence.496  The UNAMEE response noted of Ethiopia: “Penal law defines ‘rape 
restrictively as only taking place outside of wedlock thereby indirectly giving 
husbands licence to rape their wives. This is discrimination viewed in light of 
staggering increase of prevalence of domestic violence in Ethiopia.”497
 
In Ghana section 42(g) of the Criminal Code498 justifies the use of force in marriage: 
 
“The use of force against a person may be justified on the ground of consent, but a 
person may revoke any consent which he has given to the use of force against him, 
and his consent when so revoked shall have no effect for justifying force; save that 
the consent given by a husband or wife at marriage for the purposes of marriage 
cannot be revoked until the parties are divorced or separated by a judgment or decree 
of a competent court.”499 (emphasis in the original) 
 
In its report to CEDAW covering the fourth and fifth periodic reports from Ghana, 
WILDAF noted that the government had considered repealing the offending provision 
of the Criminal Code but had not done so because of public opinion and also because 
it would break up marriage and “lead to broken homes”, as if a marriage in which one 
is assaulting another is not already a dysfunctional relationship.500 A few years 
earlier, research undertaken by another NGO had shown that even when married 
women did seek the assistance of the police in marital cases, they were mocked and 
sent away to resolve the problem at home.501 One way forward for Ghana would be to 
follow the lead of El Salvador and enact a law on violence within the family which 
results in the setting up of a special division in the National Civil Police to deal with 
claims of violence.502
 
                                                 
496 Centre for Reproductive Rights Women of the world: Francophone Africa Laws and Policies 
Affecting their Reproductive lives (New York, CRR, 2001, 127 (Cote d’Ivoire) and p.39 (Benin). 
497 UNAMEE questionnaire response Part A:3. The Ethiopian Penal Code, art 589, defines rape as 
forcing a woman to “submit to sexual intercourse outside wedlock…” thus suggesting that force used in 
wedlock is acceptable. F. Banda (2005), 175. 
498 Ghana Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). 
499 WILDAF Ghana questionnaire response-Appendix 1 “Statement by Bernice Sam to the UN 
Committee for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women on the Combined Third, 
Fourth and Fifth Reports from the Government of Ghana”,  para.1.3. 
500 Ibid, para. 1:4. See also questionnaire response Part B:2. 
501 A Tagoe “Nkynkyim Violence against women Project” in Womankind Worldwide (ed) What works 
where: Successful strategies to end violence against women” (London, Womankind Worldwide, 2002), 
12.  CEDAW general recommendation 19, para. 24 (f).  See also UNIFEM Making a Difference: 
Strategic Communications to End Violence against Women (New York, UNIFEM, 2003). 
502 See Center for Reproductive Rights Gaining Ground: A Tool for advancing reproductive rights law 
reform (New York, CRR, 2006), 85. 
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In its second and third periodic reports to CEDAW, Nigeria stated:  
 
“In a traditional setting, spousal rape is inconceivable. Under Nigerian Laws in both 
section 357 of the Criminal Code and section 282 of the Penal Code, a husband 
cannot be charged with marital rape. Once the marriage is subsisting and the wife has 
attained puberty then any sexual intercourse with her is never rape.”503
 
There appear to be gaps in Kenya’s new Sexual Offences Act with FEMNET 
answering the question on gaps in the law thus: 
 
“Yes, there has been a lacuna in the law regarding the overall cause of combating 
sexual violence. For instance the issue of marital rape, it is easy to prove the 
identification of the alleged perpetrator, however there is the thin line between the 
right of a spouse to be granted conjugal rights, the duty of the other to provide the 
same, as well as the individual right not to be forced into sexual intercourse against 
one’s will. Even with the coming into force of the Sexual Offences Act, suspected 
sexual offenders are still being charged under sections of the penal code that have 
been repealed by the new legislation.”504
 
Furthermore the obedience provisions of some legal systems suggested that a wife is 
expected to be sexually available to her husband. (Yemen, Sudan). Refusing or 
withholding sex (without good cause) may be construed as an act of disobedience. It 
is of course worth noting that within some legal systems, a wife is also entitled to 
request sex from her husband505 and in Afghanistan: “Where the wife receives any 
harm from intercourse with the husband, and if this makes the continuation of 
intercourse between the couple impossible, she can demand from the court to grant 
her an order of separation.”506
 
The difficulty of course is whether, in light of illiteracy and general dependence on 
husbands for survival, women feel able to exercise their exit options.  Nevertheless it 
is important that States put in place laws that make clear that forced intercourse in 
marriage is a violation of a woman’s human rights and constitutes a form of 
discrimination against her.  In its concluding observations to the Korean report, the 
Human Rights Committee, noted its concerns about the general non-prosecution and 
                                                 
503 Combined Second and Third Periodic Report of states parties: Nigeria CEDAW/C/NGA/2-3, 22.  
504 FEMNET questionnaire response Part A:6. 
505 WLUML (2006), 156. 
506 Afghanistan, Civil Code, art. 183, questionnaire response Part A:3 UNAMA, Human rights office 
(May 2007). 
 87
punishment of perpetrators of domestic violence before going on to note that it was 
concerned by the fact that marital rape was not criminalised (the State had not 
mentioned it in its report) and urging the State to rectify this in law as well as 
ensuring that police officers be given the necessary training to combat domestic 
violence.507   
 
Although there are unlikely to be many marital rape complaints or indeed 
prosecutions, it is noteworthy that there are States and courts which have sought to 
outlaw the practice thus showing a commitment to protecting women from violence 
within the home.508 In the Nepalese case of:
“In Meera Dhungana for FWLD v. Ministry of Law an Justice509 the Public Interest 
Litigation was filed with the Supreme Court stating that Section 1 of the Chapter on 
Rape did not include marital rape and therefore failed to criminalize marital rape. 
Stressing the implication of "free" and "full consent" as a recognized ground of 
conjugal life, the court ruled that there must be mutual consent between husband and 
wife for the sexual intercourse after marriage.  The court issued directive order to 
introduce a Bill for making complete legal provisions with regard to marital rape 
taking into account the special circumstances of marital relationships and the position 
of husbands.”510
 
The result was the outlawing and punishment of marital rape in the Gender Equality 
Act, 2006.511  Failure to legislate sends out the message that rape within marriage is 
acceptable.512  
 
Another “obedience” related issue is that of so-called honour crimes whereby a 
woman is killed by a family member or someone hired to kill her for “dishonouring” 
the family for behaving or being alleged to have behaved in a manner that they find 
offensive.513  
 
 
                                                 
507 Concluding Observations –CCPR/C/KOR/CO/3, 28 November 2006, para. 11. 
508 Secretary-General’s report on violence against women (2006), 89. 
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512 A comprehensive list of recommendations for tackling violence against women can be found in the 
In-depth study on all forms of violence against women: Report of the Secretary-General, UN GA 
A/61/122/Add.1, 6 July 2006, paras. 363-402.  
513 S. Hossain and L. Welchman (eds) “’Honour: Crimes, Paradigms and Violence against Women” 
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Crimes in the name of “honour” 
Although a great deal of work has been done, there are still States which have laws 
that condone, by sentencing policy or mitigation, the continuation of the practice, thus 
ignoring CEDAW’s  recommendation that  States should “enact legislation to remove 
the defence of honour in regard to the assault or murder of a female family 
member.”514 Equality Now identifies the Penal Codes of Syria515 and Haiti as 
violating this recommendation. The Haitian Code provides: 
 
“The murder committed by one spouse on another spouse is not excusable, if the life 
of the spouse who committed the murder was not being threatened at the actual 
moment that the murder took place. Nevertheless, in the case of adultery as provided 
for in Article 284, the murder by a husband of his wife and/or her partner, 
immediately upon discovering them in flagrante delicto in the conjugal abode is to be 
pardoned.”516
 
By way of contrast, the same statute provides that if the reverse is true then: 
 
“A husband who has kept his mistress in the conjugal abode, and who has been 
convicted upon the complaint of his wife, will be sentenced to pay a fine of 100-400 
gourdes.”517
 
Equally problematic are procedural laws which recognise violence against women as 
problematic only when the woman is adjudged to be of “good character.”518 Laws 
also discriminate in giving greater weight to the evidence of a man over that of a 
woman. 
 
Discrimination in procedural and sentencing laws 
The OHCHR Guatemala questionnaire response identifies the chapter in the Penal 
Code on Sexual Violence (173-180) as still taking into account elements ‘such as the 
good behaviour of the woman’ to qualify as rape and which is aimed to protect the 
                                                 
514 CEDAW general recommendation 19, para. 24 (r) (ii). See also J. Connors “United Nations 
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‘reputation and honour’ and not the physical integrity of women.”.519 Focusing on the 
“good behaviour” of a woman may lead to a married woman complaining about 
forced intercourse in marriage being constructed as a “bad wife” and therefore not 
worthy of assistance. The group WILDAF Nigeria identified parts of the Evidence 
Act as problematic noting: 
 
“the provisions of section 211 of the evidence Act of the federal Republic of Nigeria 
states ‘When a man is prosecuted for rape or for an attempt to rape or for indecent 
assault, it may be shown that the woman against whom the offence was is alleged to 
have been committed was of generally immoral character although she is not cross-
examined on the subject.’ This provision is usually used by lawyers to set rapists 
free.”520
 
Although highlighting the significant changes that have been made to remove all 
discriminatory laws in Fiji including comprehensive submissions to the Fiji Law 
Reform Commission for the enactment of domestic violence legislation, the 
questionnaire response did note: 
 
“Other forms of outdated legislations which may have significant impact on 
women/girls are the Penal Code (Cap 17) and the Criminal Procedure Code which is 
the subject of law reforms, particularly the need to amend certain legislative 
provisions and acceptable common law provisions of “prior sexual history” of female 
complainants in rape or sexual violence cases, rules relating to “corroboration” 
whereby it is often dangerous to convict sexual perpetrators without corroborated 
evidence by the often female complainant. Various debates continue on the 
decriminalising of prostitution and/or soliciting.521  
 
In its concluding observations to the sixth periodic review of Ukraine, the Human 
Rights Committee, while acknowledging the passage of the Domestic Violence Act 
and the establishment of rehabilitation services, expressed concern about “the 
provision in the law regarding the behaviour of the victim and authorizing official 
warnings to be given to the victim of domestic violence about ‘provocative’ behaviour 
(arts.7 and 26).”522
 
                                                 
519 OHCHR Guatemala questionnaire response Part A:3. 
520 WILDAF Nigeria questionnaire response Part. A:3. 
521 OHCHR Fiji questionnaire response Part A:5. 
522 Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations Ukraine CCPR/C/UKR/CO/6, 28 November 
2006, para. 10. 
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Other potential procedural constraints identified in the questionnaire response of 
Sisters in Islam noting that in Malaysia included the different weighting given to the 
evidence of men and women:  
 
“In court proceedings, witnessing the execution of agreements etc, the testimonies of 
women who act as witnesses is considered to be of less or no weight. Two female 
witnesses are equal to one male one in most circumstances. An example of codified 
syariah law that relies on this principle is Section 86 of the Syariah Court Evidence 
(Federal Territories) Act 1997. Please note especially subsection (5) that states, 
witness testimony in general must be given by two males or one male and two 
females.”523
 
The Iranian Penal Code provides: 
 
“Art. 74 Adultery, whether punishable by flogging or stoning, may be proven by the 
testimony of four just men or that of three just men and two just women. 
Art. 75 If adultery is punishable only by flogging it can be proven by the testimony of 
two just men and four just women. 
Art 76. The testimony of women alone or in conjunction with the testimony of only 
one just man shall not prove adultery but it shall constitute false accusation which is a 
punishable act.”524
 
Polygyny 
Laws regulating polygyny may also be discriminatory.  In its general comment 28 on 
equality between men and women, the Human Rights Committee states simply: 
“Polygamy violates the dignity of women. It is an inadmissible discrimination against 
women. Consequently, it should be definitely abolished wherever it continues to 
exist.”525  However the regional systems are less clear.  After a long and contested 
discussion,526 African States agreed on the following provision on polygyny: 
 
“[M]onogamy is encouraged as the preferred form of marriage and that the rights of 
women in marriage and family, including in polygamous marital relationships are 
promoted and protected”527
 
Given that the preambular paragraph to article 6 requires States to ensure that men 
and women enjoy equal rights and are regarded as equal partners in marriage and also 
                                                 
523 Sisters in Islam questionnaire response A: 3 p. 7.  
524 Iran Penal Code, as cited in Equality Now (2004), 26-7. 
525 Human Rights Committee general comment 28, para. 24. See also CEDAW general 
recommendation 21, para. 14. 
526 See F. Banda (2005), 76. 
527 African Protocol on Women, art. 6 (c). 
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that States should enact appropriate legislative measures to meet this objective, it is 
unclear how it is possible to reconcile the clear requirement of non discrimination in 
article 1 and also the provisions guaranteeing women their right to dignity528 and 
equality before the law found elsewhere in the Protocol.529 The government experts 
who decided on the final version of article 6 (c) were of the view that the abolition of 
the practice would be unfair to those women already in existing marriages.  Moreover, 
they contended that polygyny was both a customary law and religious right. The last 
claim, that it is a religious right, is the subject of contestation with arguments about 
whether the Koran sanctions, restricts or renders impossible the practice within the 
parameters laid out in the holy book.530  
 
Many States in Africa, Asia and the Arab region continue to recognise polygyny 
within their legal systems, and few lodge reservations (explicitly) retaining personal 
laws sanctioning polygyny. South Africa’s Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 
1998 permits a man to marry polygynously.531 Still under consideration in South 
Africa are proposals to recognise Muslim marriages.  Recognition has been delayed 
partly because the question of whether polygyny is consonant with constitutional 
principles of non discrimination and equality is under consideration.532 Non religious 
reasons advanced for the continuation of polygyny in South Africa as elsewhere 
include the economic vulnerability of women which make them dependent on a male 
breadwinner for survival.533 There are also social norms which may hold it preferable 
that a woman be a second or subsequent wife, than that she remain unmarried.534 
Women in polygynous marriages in Tajikistan where the practice was banned in 
1992, supported its continuation arguing that it protected them and their children and 
enabled them to access their legal rights.535 Marriage to a polygynously married man 
                                                 
528 Ibid, art. 3 
529 Ibid, art 2, art. 8. 
530 N. Shah “Women’s Human Rights in the Koran: An Interpretive Approach” (2006) 28 Human 
Rights Quarterly,  869, 890-892. 
531 South African Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998 (Act 120 of 1998), 7(6). 
532 W. Amein “Overcoming the Conflict between the right to freedom of religion and women’s rights to 
equality: a South African case study of Muslim marriages” (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 729. 
533 This was the reason given for permitting the continuation of the practice by Namibia in its initial 
report to CEDAW. Initial report of states parties: Namibia CEDAW/C/NAM/1, para. 172. F. Kaganas 
and C. Murray “Law, Women and the Family in the New South Africa” (1991) Acta Juridica 116. 
534 T. Nhlapo “African Family Law under an undecided constitution- the Challenge for law reform in 
South Africa” in J. Eekelaar and T. Nhlapo (eds.) Changing Family (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1997), 
617. 
535 WLUML (2006), 209.  
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may, in some societies be the only acceptable way for a woman who is keen to have a 
child to fulfil that wish.  These justifications or rationalisations notwithstanding, it is 
important to recall CEDAW general recommendation 21: 
 
“Polygamous marriages contravene women’s right to equality with men and can have 
serious emotional and financial consequences for her and her dependants that such 
marriages ought to be discouraged and prohibited.”536
 
Several of the questionnaire responses identified polygyny as being part of the legal 
system and its continuation as a violation of women’s right to equality. These 
included Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ghana, Malaysia, Nepal (bigamy) and Nigeria. 
Concluding observations of committee bodies show that there are many other States 
that one could add.537
 
There are also States recognising plural personal law systems such as India, 
Singapore538, Kenya539 and Uganda.540 Other majority States recognising polygyny 
include Mauritania.541 WLUML highlight that in practice, many of the rules seeking 
to limit or regulate entry into polygynous unions are not implemented.  Women are 
rendered particularly vulnerable due to illiteracy and inequality of bargaining power 
making their “consent” dependant on factors that are beyond their control.542  
Moreover, the laws of some States such as Qatar seem to suggest that an apparent 
inability to meet the conditions for marrying a second or subsequent wife will not lead 
to censure or indeed invalidation of the contract: 
 
“In the event of marriage to another woman, the documenter shall ascertain that the 
wife has knowledge of the husband’s financial circumstances if the husband’s 
situation suggests that financial ability is not in place. The documenter may not refuse 
                                                 
536 CEDAW general recommendation 21, para. 14 
537 Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations: Gambia UN Doc CCPR/CO/75/GMB (2004), 
para. 18; Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations: Uganda CCPR/CO/80/UGA (2004), 
para. 9. 
538 See the reservations of both India and Singapore to CEDAW art. 16. 
539 Kenya Mohammedan Marriage and Divorce Act (Cap 164). 
540 Uganda Mohammedan Marriage and Divorce Act (Cap 214), Laws of Uganda 1964.  E. Naggita 
“Why Men Come out Ahead: the Legal Regime and the Protection and the Realization of Women’s 
Rights in Uganda” (2006) 6 East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights, 34. 
541 Mauritania Code of Personal Status, 2001, art. 45, cited in L. Welchman (2007), 168. 
542 WLUML (2006), 208-210. 
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to document the contract if both parties wish to conclude it. In all cases the wife or 
wives shall be informed of this marriage after it has been documented.”543
 
A different problem was identified in Spain. Minority women in polygynous unions 
sometimes found themselves in legal limbo having contracted what were legal 
marriages in their countries of origin, but finding that they were not recognised when 
they moved to a new country which does not recognise such marriages. 
 
“Furthermore, some of the institutions of Muslim law, such as polygamy and 
repudiation, have given rise to situations of lack of recognition of the rights of these 
women in Spain and Spanish courts have had to make a particular pronouncement on 
these kinds of family conflicts. In this context, for example, due to its significance and 
interest, the ruling made by the Higher Court of Justice of Galicia of April 2nd 2002 
on the occasion of a case of polygamy, is worth pointing out. The details of the case 
involve application having been made to this Court for two widows’ pensions and 
orphans’ allowances for two Senegalese women and for the children that had been 
born of the marriage of these two women to a Senegalese national. According to 
Spanish law, only the first wife would have the right to a widow’s pension, in which 
the legal rights of the second wife would not be recognised, despite the fact that such 
rights are recognised in her country of origin, where the marriage was contracted. 
This judicial ruling divided the widow’s pension equally between the two women, 
making an analogous interpretation of what is stipulated for the sphere of separation 
and divorce in Spanish laws. The said ruling echoed the jurisprudence of other 
European countries, such as France, for example, in this kind of family conflict.” 544  
 
An Na’im has noted a de facto decline in polygyny in many Arab States.545 This is to 
be welcomed.  However, the fact that it remains legal in many legal systems around 
the world is a form of on going discrimination against women. Precedent for 
abolishing polygyny has been established by Rwanda whose constitution explicitly 
provides that the only form of marriage recognised is monogamous marriage.546 Also 
notable is Tunisia’s long standing ban on polygyny grounded in a reading of the 
Koranic verses.547 These precedents suggest that it is not only desirable but possible 
for States to outlaw a practice that so clearly constitutes de jure discrimination against 
women. 
                                                 
543 Qatar Amiri Decree no. 22 regarding the Law of the Family, 29 June 2006, Official Gazette no. 8 of 
28 August 2006, art.14, as cited in L. Welchman (2007), 169. 
544 T Piconto-Novales questionnaire response p.4. 
545 A. An Na’im (ed) Islamic Family Law in a Changing World: A Global Resource Book (London, 
Zed Press, 2002), 160. 
546 Constitution of Rwanda, 1991, art. 25. 
547 Tunisia Code of Personal Status, 1956 as amended 1958, 1964 arts 18 (1), 18 (2) and 21, cited in L. 
Welchman (2007), 170. 
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Grounds for Divorce 
Clear from convention provisions enshrining equality between men and women in the 
family including equal rights to enter marriage, for the duration of the marriage and at 
its dissolution, is the understanding that the law should not discriminate against the 
spouses in any way.548 The existence in some legal systems of different divorce 
grounds for men and women would seem to go against these basic principles. 
Grounds for divorce reveal a multitude of practices and norms which boggle the mind 
of those coming from States with one system of law that applies to all. However, even 
in those States with the same grounds for divorce may see a gendered interpretation of 
the grounds to the detriment of women found to have acted improperly or outside 
acceptable social norms. In plural legal systems, there may be as many divorce laws 
as there are personal law systems. 
 
The obtaining of divorce and the consequences (property division, custody and 
guardianship of children) will often also be different. Summarising the evidence 
before it, WLUML conclude: 
 
“both laws and practices still tend to make divorce easier to access for men than it is 
for women, and to make life tougher for women than for men in the post-divorce 
period. That this is true for both systems based on Muslim law and for those based on 
other sources reflects a commonality of patriarchal control asserted through laws, 
practices and social attitudes.”549
 
To get a feel for some of these differences, I turn to some of the questionnaire 
responses. The UNAMA response on Afghanistan notes that there are different 
grounds for divorce for men and women in the Civil Code.550  ASK reports that in 
Malaysia: 
 
“According to Part V of the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act 1984, 
husbands may divorce a wife unilaterally. He can even pronounce talaq outside the 
court (even via sms (mobile telephone message)) and he will only be asked to pay a 
small fine for this offence when the couple goes to court to register the divorce. This 
is a far cry to what the wives have to go through, as they may only apply for 
                                                 
548 CEDAW art. 16 (1) (1) (a) (b) (c) (h); CEDAW general recommendation 21; ICCPR art 23 (4); 
Human Rights Committee general comment 19, para. 6, and general comment 28, para. 26. 
549 WLUML (2006), 244. 
550 UNAMA questionnaire response Part A: 3, Civil Code arts. 135 (2), 133, 86, 87, 183. 
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dissolution of marriage in court or through lengthy arbitration or court 
proceedings.”551
 
Similar discrimination was noted in Sudan by a group of NGOS presenting a report to 
the Human Rights Committee in 2007: 
 
“There are many cases which give the wife the right to ask for divorce, but the 
procedure is discriminatory as a woman must go to court and seek a judge’s order, 
whilst the husband can make a divorce with a single will by his word and does not 
need to see the judge. The law should be changed so the husband also has to seek a 
divorce in front of the judge and in his wife’s presence and request her wife’s 
consent.”552
 
The FWLD response yielded two interesting cases from Nepal challenging 
discrimination. In the first Meera Dhungana for FWLD v. Office of the Prime 
Minister and Council of Ministers,553 a rule in the Country Code chapter on Husband 
and Wife554 permitting a husband to seek divorce if his wife was found to be infertile 
was struck down as being discriminatory and ultra vires the constitution.  However, in 
Radheshyam Paraluji v. Nepal555 provisions of the same Country Code chapter556 as 
in the Dhungana case allowing women to file for divorce directly to the Court while 
men are required to submit an application for divorce to the concerned Village 
Development Committee or Municipality was challenged as constituting 
discrimination against men. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the case. It held 
that although article 11 of the Nepalese constitution guaranteed equality before the 
law and freedom from discrimination, article 11 (3) provided for special provisions 
“that may be enacted for the advancement of women. The impugned provision is not 
discriminatory against men and is necessary for the advancement of women.”557  The 
use of “special protection measures” to deal with procedural issues seems unusual, but 
may well reflect the reality of the situation on the ground in Nepal. 
                                                 
551 Sisters in Islam, Malaysia questionnaire response Part A:3. 
552 Sudan Shadow Report Human Rights Committee 2007.  The reasons for the different grounds for 
divorce are often explained by reference to the different obligations of men and women within the 
marital relationship. This can most clearly be seen in the reservations of Egypt and United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) to article 16 of CEDAW.  
553 Meera Dhungana  for FWLD v. Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers ( not cited). 
Discussed in FWLD Nepal Questionnaire response Part B:3 (case no. 19). 
554  Ibid, No. 1(1) of the Chapter on Husband and Wife of the Country Code. 
555 Radheshyam Paraluji v. HMG/Nepal, 2056/10/4, as cited in FLWD Nepal questionnaire response 
Part B:3 (Case no. 20). 
556 Ibid, No. 1 and 1A of the Chapter on Husband and Wife of the Country Code. 
557 Ibid. 
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Identified as problematic by Uganda in its third periodic report to CEDAW was the 
Divorce Act558 which provided for different grounds for divorce for men and 
women.559 Three years later, the Uganda Association of Women Lawyers brought a 
constitutional challenge alleging that the Divorce Act violated guarantees of equality 
before the law and constituted discrimination on grounds of sex.560  In dispute was s. 
4 of the Divorce Act which provided that while a man could seek divorce on the sole 
ground of his wife’s adultery, a wife would have to prove adultery in addition to 
another fault ground listed in s. 4(2) of the Act.  The Constitutional Court upheld the 
claim that the law was discriminatory.  To equalise the position between men and 
women, the Court provided that the grounds in the Divorce Act were to be interpreted 
in a gender neutral way thus women could now rely simply on the adultery ground 
without having to allege further facts. A related, and more controversial case on 
adultery, was a challenge to the discriminatory provisions of the Penal Code.561 
Adultery was defined as a crime in the code. However, the definition of adultery was 
differentiated along grounds of sex, so that while for a wife, adultery was intercourse 
with any man, for a husband, adultery was intercourse with an unmarried woman.562 
Again this provision, identified as discriminatory by CEDAW in its concluding 
observations to the third Ugandan report563, was struck down as being 
unconstitutional leaving open three possible interpretations: that wives could now 
have sanction-free intercourse with unmarried men (equalising up) or that adultery for 
a husband meant intercourse with any woman who was not his wife (equalising 
down), or that the provision had been repealed by implication. 
 
Despite the recommendations for change from CEDAW, the DRC still retains double 
standards vis-à-vis adultery of the spouses.564 The OMCT explains: 
 
“Article 3 of the complementary provisions of the Criminal Code which summarises 
article 467 of Book IV of the Family Code does not place spouses on equal footing in 
                                                 
558 Divorce Act (Cap 249). 
559 Third Periodic Report of States Parties: Uganda CEDAW/C/UGA/3, at 67. 
560 Uganda Association of Women Lawyers v. the Attorney General Constitutional Petition No. 2 of 
2003, decision 10 March 2004.  
561 Penal Code (Cap 120) s. 154. 
562 Law and Advocacy for Women in Uganda v. A-G of Uganda Constitutional Petitions no. 13, of 2005 
and 5 of 2006, decision 5 April 2007.  See also E. Naggita at 45. 
563 CEDAW Concluding Observations: Uganda A/57/38, para. 154. 
564 CEDAW Concluding Observations to the initial, second and third reports of the DRC A/55/38, para. 
197. 
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terms of the definition of the crime of adultery. Adultery committed by a woman is 
punishable in all cases, whereas that committed by a man is only punishable if it was 
induced. This seems to indicate that where a man’s will is altered or inhibited by a 
married woman, for example through the use of alcohol, followed by the commission 
of a sexual act, the man is not at fault.  Inequality also exists in the sanctions imposed 
for adulterous acts: article 467 of the Family Code prescribes a punishment of 
imprisonment for six months to one year as well as a fine for married women who 
commit adultery, whereas a married man may receive this punishment only if he is 
judged to have ‘an injurious quality.’ (article 467(2)”565
 
MONUC notes that injurious quality can include committing adultery on the marital 
bed.566  
 
Property: 
 
Key to women’s legal disenfranchisement in many legal systems is the limitation 
placed on their ability to own or manage property and their entitlements to property 
on death or divorce.567
 
Post divorce property settlement 
In spite of many pronouncements by human rights bodies,568 the recognition that 
women have a right to share equally in the proceeds of matrimonial property after 
divorce is in many legal systems a fairly recent development. In England and Wales it 
was not until 2000 that the House of Lords pronounced in the case of White v. 
White569 that there should be no discrimination between the home maker and the 
money earner in the post division of assets. It took until 2003 before a home making 
wife was given half of the matrimonial property.570  This points to a common 
difficulty experienced by women, many of whom do not participate in the paid labour 
market and who are therefore unable to contribute in monetary terms to the 
acquisition of family assets. The non- recognition or minimisation of the unpaid work 
done by women in the home and community results in legal disenfranchisement. 
                                                 
565 OMCT (2006), 20. Also cited in MONUC questionnaire response (Code Penal). 
566 Ibid. 
567 See generally reports by the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing on women and housing. 
568 ICCPR art 23 (3); Human Rights Committee general comment 28, paras. 20, 26. CEDAW art. 16 (1) 
(h); CEDAW general recommendation 21 paras 30-33. 
569 White v. White [2000] 2 FLR 981. 
570 Lambert v. Lambert [2003] 1 WLR 926.  See also Miller v. Miller and McFarlane v. McFarlane 
[2004] UKHL 24. 
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Nyamu-Musembi notes that in Kenya 95% of land is held in the name of the man and 
that “even co-ownership of the matrimonial home is a rarity.”571 She then cites the 
case of Tabitha Wangeci Nderitu v. Simon Nediritu Kariuki572 where a judge 
described a stay at home wife who was seeking to claim a share of matrimonial assets 
after divorce as “sitting on her husband’s back with her hands in his pocket” 
seemingly forgetting that the “cock bird can feather his nest because he does not have 
to spend all day sitting on it” or put differently, that a man is enabled to go out into 
the paid workforce because his wife is taking care of hearth and home for him.573
 
An additional difficulty faced by women is in the existence of many property sharing 
systems ranging from in community of property, out of community of property, 
deferred community and discretion based systems. There is also the possibility in 
some jurisdictions of contractual opt outs or private arrangements.  Moreover, as seen 
in the section on divorce and also in the reservations of certain States parties, some 
legal systems may see the husband’s duty to give dower for the wife and to maintain 
her during the course of the marriage as entitling him to unilaterally divorce her and 
also to keep the matrimonial assets on the dissolution of the marriage.574 Equal 
sharing is made difficult in polygynous systems. Finally the co-existence of plural 
systems of laws means that women’s entitlements in any one State may vary 
depending on which legal system governs their marriage.  This was described as a 
problem in the South African response to the questionnaire where it was noted: 
 
“The fight for equality has shifted to one which challenges laws that discriminate 
against women indirectly such as: 
Section (3) of the Divorce Act  70 of 1979 which deprives women of protections on 
divorce based on their date of marriage, 
Section 7(3) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act of 1998 which provides 
for marriages after the passing of the act to be in community of property while 
                                                 
571 C. Nyamu-Musembi “‘Sitting on her husband’s back with her hands in his pockets’: Commentary 
on judicial decision making in martial property cases in Kenya” in A. Bainham (ed,) International 
Survey of Family Law 2002 (Bristol, Jordan Publishing, 2002) 229, at 231.  See also Human Rights 
Watch Double Standards: Women’s Property Rights Violations in Kenya (London, Human Rights 
Watch, 2003).  
572 Tabitha Wangeci Nderitu v. Simon Nderitu Kariuki, Civil Appeal No. 023 of 1997, as cited in 
Nyamu-Musembi, ibid, 236. 
573 L. Weitzman “Marital Property: Its Transformation and Division in the United States” in L. 
Weitzman and M. Maclean (eds.) Economic Consequences of Divorce: The International Perspective 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992), 85. 
574 See for example the reservations of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates to article 16 of CEDAW. 
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existing marriages are subject to customary law (which makes no provision for 
sharing in the property by the wife).”575
 
The Women’s Law Centre questionnaire response further elaborated: 
 
“There is a glaring gap in that while civil and customary marriages are recognised in 
our law, those conducted by Muslim rites are not. This deprives spouses married 
under religious law of protections that other married couples have on death or divorce.  
The failure to provide any protection for women in domestic partnerships which are 
akin to marriage relationships but where there has been no formal registration.  
The right to access to court for an order that the martial assets be re-distributed on 
dissolution of marriage where the marriages were concluded before 1984 and 1988 
(depending on race).”576  
 
Discrimination against women in de facto unions is widespread. Not having legally 
valid marriages, many find themselves without any protection whatsoever leading 
CEDAW to recommend: 
 
“Women living in such relationships should have their equality of status with men 
both in family life and in the sharing of income and assets protected by the law. Such 
women should share equal rights and responsibilities with men for the care and 
raising of dependent children or family members.”577
 
In its fourth report to the Human Rights Committee, Paraguay showed that it had tried 
to resolve this problem by building into the law a presumption of legality giving the 
parties full marriage rights if the parties had cohabited for a period of 10 or more 
years.578 While this recognition is to be welcomed the waiting period is longer than 
many marriages last. It may well be preferable to adopt the Mozambican approach 
which holds that if parties have lived together for a period of two or more years and 
regard themselves as being in a permanent union and are so regarded by their 
community, then legal recognition should be given to their union. 
 
                                                 
575 Women’s Law Centre (South Africa) questionnaire response Part A:3. 
576 Ibid, Part A:6. 
577 CEDAW general recommendation 21, para. 18. 
578 Article 86 of Act No. 1 of 15 July 1992 partially amending the Civil Code as cited in Paraguay, 
second periodic report, CCPR/C/PRY/2004/2, para. 123. 
 100
Sometimes discrimination is based on policy rather than the formal law. In South 
Africa there is a policy: “to register a Council house in the name of the breadwinner, 
usually the husband, depriving women of security of tenure.”579
 
The different matrimonial regimes throw up different challenges for women. In some 
in community of property systems, a woman loses her capacity leaving her husband to 
be the legal manager of family resources. Lesotho’s Deed’s Registry Act provides: 
“No immoveable property shall be registered in the name of a woman married in 
community of property”.580 Meanwhile in Swaziland section 16 of the Deeds Registry 
Act specifically excludes registration of title in the name of a woman who is married 
in community of property.581  In practice this means that a business woman would 
need to seek the permission of her husband to register the business in his name. 
 
In its fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Chile recognised the 
ongoing discrimination against married women by virtue of a provision in the Civil 
Code making the husband head of the household and providing that he would be 
responsible for administering the both the spouse’s joint property as well as property 
owned by the wife.582 However the State did go on to note that change was underway: 
 
“It is proposed to replace the joint-property marital regime with a new regime of 
‘deferred community of acquisitions’ which would eliminate the notion that the 
husband is the ‘head of the conjugal partnership’ and thus entitled to administer the 
wife’s property. The bill would also put an end to the ‘reserved property’ system, 
which was conceived as a form of compensation to the wife for the husband’s 
administration of her property, and which no longer makes sense if the woman 
administers everything that belongs to her.  The bill was adopted on first reading by 
the Chamber of Deputies in November 2005, and is now going through its second 
reading in the Senate.”583
 
While some legal systems allow parties to retain separate property, this may work 
against women. The Ethiopian Revised Family Code 2000 provides that parties have a 
choice of matrimonial regime on entering into marriage.584 Parties are able to 
                                                 
579 Ibid, Part A:3. 
580 Lesotho Deeds Registry Act (No. 12 of 1967), cited in Equality Now (2004), 15. 
581 Cited by Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, E/CN.4/2003/55, para. 40. 
582 Chile Civil Code, art. 1749. Chile, fifth periodic report, CCPR/C/CHL/5, para. 57. See also Equality 
Now (2004), 15. 
583 Ibid, para. 59. 
584 Ethiopia Revised Family Code, Proclamation No. 213, 2000, art. 85 (1). 
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maintain their personal property separately and so, on divorce, each takes out what he 
or she brought in.585 Any common property or property acquired jointly is shared.586 
In dividing common property it is provided that: “The utmost care shall be taken to 
give each spouse things which are most useful to him.”587 The separate property 
regime, although seemingly respecting the autonomy of each party, ignores the fact 
that often women enter into marriage with very little. Their home-making role, 
particularly in poor societies, makes it unrealistic to think that they will be able to 
acquire any meaningful property during the course of the marriage. Operating on the 
principle of “take what you have paid for” negates a woman’s domestic contribution, 
for all she is able to point to, are the clothes on her back and maybe a few pots and 
pans. Moreover, even when women are able to earn, the division of labour in the 
home means that her money is used to pay for consumables such as food. How many 
people keep grocery receipts for 20 years “just in case we divorce?” Indeed in light of 
the criticisms made of the Labour Code of the DRC which requires that married 
women seek the permission of husbands before joining the labour market, how many 
women are able to decide how money that they earn is spent?588
Some systems recognise these potential pitfalls and provide for the exercise of judicial 
discretion in the division of matrimonial assets after divorce. This is the system in 
operation in England and Wales589 and some of its former colonies.590 The English 
Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) gives judges a list of factors that they are to consider 
in deciding the allocation of marital assets. One of these includes contributions, 
including “any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family.”591 
Where judges are willing to recognise domestic labour as being on par with paid 
labour, there may be fairness. Indeed the African Protocol on Women’s Rights 
requires that states “take necessary measures to recognise the economic value of the 
work of women in the home.”592 However, practice suggests that in many discretion 
based systems, there is a reluctance to do this meaning, again, that wives are left 
                                                 
585 Ibid, art. 86 (1). 
586 Ibid, arts. 90-93. 
587 Ibid, art. 91 (3). 
588 OMCT (2006), 20. The CEDAW asked the DRC to revise its discriminatory labour laws. 
589 See Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, as amended s. 25. 
590 Zimbabwe Matrimonial Causes Act (Cap 5:13) s.7 (3). 
591 English MCA s. 25 (2) (f). 
592 African Protocol on Women’s Rights, 2003, art. 13 (h). 
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disadvantaged. A way forward would be to adopt an approach whereby there is a 
presumption (rebutable) of equal sharing. 
Another way forward is to consider the approach of Paraguay which noted the 
following matrimonial arrangements in its revised Civil Code: 
 
“118. With regard to marriage, article 6 of Act No. 1 specifies that: “In the home, 
men and women have equal duties, rights and responsibilities, regardless of their 
financial contribution to the upkeep of the joint home.  They owe each other mutual 
respect, consideration, fidelity and assistance.”  
119. Article 9 deals with care and maintenance of the home, stating “that it is the 
joint responsibility of the two spouses”. 
120. Under article 15, both spouses have the duty and the right to participate in 
running the household.  They have equal responsibility for deciding jointly on 
questions pertaining to the household economy. 
122. With regard to the administration of community property, article 40 stipulates 
that the management and administration shall be the responsibility of both spouses, 
jointly or separately.”593
 
Succession and Inheritance 
Succession can be divided into two categories-the first being related to appointment to 
take on a certain status or role after the death of another and the other being the taking 
of property again usually following a death. Rules regarding these two understandings 
appear to suggest that in some legal systems, males are privileged. 
 
Starting with the first meaning of succession, one finds that States make reservation 
seeking to ring fence rules of succession to hereditary title from treaty provisions 
including non discrimination. The reservations of Monaco, Belgium, Spain, UK, 
Luxembourg, Micronesia, Cook Islands and Niger to CEDAW fall into this 
category.594  While it is sometimes argued that titular succession is more symbolic 
than substantive, it remains the case that there is a symbolism attached to the idea that 
leadership, however unimportant in constitutional terms, can only be exercised by 
men. The continuation of male preference and privilege (for these titular roles are 
seldom reward free) sends out a message that men are “natural” born leaders while 
                                                 
593 Act No. 1 of 15 July 1992, which partly amended the Civil Code, cited in second periodic report of 
Paraguay to the Human Rights Committee. 
594 The FWLD (Nepal) questionnaire response identified the Succession to the Throne Act, 2044 
(1987) as providing that only male descendants are eligible to succeed to the royal throne. CEDAW 
general recommendation 23, para. 31. 
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women should always follow.595 The questionnaire response from Spain highlights 
social and political disapproval of the male preference: 
 
“Despite the fact that equality is contemplated and guaranteed in the Spanish 
Constitution of 1978 as one of the higher values of the country’s legal system (1.1 
Spanish Constitution), as one of its constitutional principles (art. 9.2) and as a 
fundamental right, it does contain a single exception to the right to gender equality; 
namely, the succession to the Crown of Spain (art. 57). In fact, it is specifically set 
forth that the successor to the Crown of Spain shall preferably be a man rather than a 
woman. Despite this, within Spanish society there is broad social and political 
consensus regarding the need to reform this constitutional provision in order to 
eliminate this unjustified means of discriminating against women in the context of 
succession to the Spanish Crown.”596  
 
In the Hoyos opinion of the Human Rights Committee, it was indicated that the 
present King of Spain appeared to agree with the majority consensus and that in future 
daughters would also be in line to take on the role of constitutional monarch.597 
Precedent for this more egalitarian approach can be found in the revised law on 
succession to the ranks and titles of nobility of which the questionnaire response from 
Spain indicates: 
 
“On the other hand, Law 33/2006, of October 30th, on equality between men and 
women in the order of succession to titles of nobility, establishes the equal right of 
women in this process, thus preventing men from being granted preference over 
women, as had been the case until this law came into force as a result of the extension 
of the application of article 57 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 to these 
circumstances. In more specific terms, art. 2 of Law 33/ 2006 establishes that “the 
provisions of any Royal Letter granting a title of nobility that exclude women (…) or 
grant preference to men (…) or contradict in any manner whatsoever the equal rights 
to succession held by men and women shall cease to have legal effect”.”598
 
Perhaps more problematic in light of women’s lack of access to resources were 
succession laws that discriminated against women as wives and daughters. This 
                                                 
595 See the opinion of Ruth Wedgwood in Hoyos v. Spain (1008/2001), ICCPR, A/59/40 vol. II. 
596 Professor T. Piconto Novales, questionnaire response p. 1. 
597 Professor Wedgwood in Hoyas v. Spain. 
598 Professor Piconto-Novales, questionnaire response at 1. 
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resulted in women, especially wives, being left at the mercy of relatives of the 
deceased husband, open to sexual and psychological abuse and unable to make 
decisions about their own lives and those of their children.599 Discrimination against 
daughters was justified by stereotyped assumptions that they would marry and thus 
leave the family of origin. In this case it would be wrong to allow “natal family 
property” to be given to “outsiders”.  These rationales are still used to justify 
discriminatory rules and laws notwithstanding clearly articulated human rights 
principles on the matter.600 Indeed reservations of States indicate custom (Niger), 
601religion (Libya)602and (Bangladesh)603 being used to seek to circumvent principles 
of equality before the law. 
 
Questionnaire responses indicated that discrimination in matters of succession 
continued to be a problem.604  The Kenyan response noted: “According to nearly all 
customary practices in Kenya, women cannot inherit property from parents or 
husbands because property ownership generally follows a male lineage.”605 Similarly 
the UNAMEE response showed that: “Succession law-spouses do not inherit (from) 
one another (with men having more economic control in the event of a husband’s 
death, the woman may have very law proportion of the common property.”606 
Arguing in favour of the creation of a special mechanism on laws that discriminate 
against women is the Tanzanian questionnaire response which sees such a mechanism 
as forcing the government to address loopholes in the law: 
 
“For instance the right of a widow on custody of children and Inheritance of 
Matrimonial Properties are set out in the Government Gazette No. 279 of 1962 under 
paragraph 62 – 70 ousts the rights of a widow over its (sic) custodian of children, 
second schedule paragraph 1 – 53 provides the rules of Inheritance. These paragraphs 
among other things are congregative, discriminatory, oppressive and biased in favour 
of man to the detriment of woman. For example rule 21 provides for the classes of 
                                                 
599 U. Ewelukwa “Post-Colonialism, Gender, Customary Injustice: Widows in African Societies” 
(2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 424. 
600 Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 1967, art. 6. CEDAW general 
recommendation 21, paras 34-35,; AU Solemn Declaration on Gender, art. 7. 
601 Niger reservation to CEDAW arts. 2 (d) (f). 
602 Libya reservation to CEDAW art. 2. 
603 Bangladesh reservation to the CESCR arts. 2, 3. 
604 See also Special Rapporteur on adequate housing (2006), paras.38-46. 
605 FEMNET questionnaire response Part A:3. 
606 UNAMEE questionnaire response Ethiopia Part A:3. 
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heirs while rule 22 provides their rights thereto. To make it effective rule 30 go even 
further to provide for example of heirs according to gender and age.”607
 
Of practice in Malaysia, Sisters in Islam noted: 
“Section 2 of the Distribution Act 1958 and the Inheritance Act 1971 mandates that 
the statute shall not be applicable to Muslims. This has been used as a basis that 
Muslims cannot inherit from non-Muslims even though the Muslim is a Mualaf 
(convert) i.e. he or she cannot inherit from his or her non-Muslim parents and so on.  
 
Aside from that, the method used to divide the estate of a Muslim (faraid) is 
discriminatory as the rules for division is unequal between male and female 
beneficiaries.”608
 
Other areas of discrimination relate to the continuation of harmful practices not least 
forcible marriage to a brother or relative of the deceased.  In Zimbabwe the 
Customary Marriages Act recognises levirate marriage as long as it is registered.609 
Confusingly the recently promulgated Domestic Violence Act outlaws forced wife 
inheritance.610  As both statutes are on the books it is difficult to know what the law 
is. 
 
Laws on succession and inheritance have formed an important part of the dialogue 
between States parties and human rights committees.611  While it is important to 
acknowledge that many States have changed their laws to remove discrimination 
against women in inheritance and succession and also to outlaw customs and practices 
that constitute degrading and inhuman treatment of women following death of their 
husbands, implementation of these laws remains a problem.612Moreover, there have 
been several court challenges challenging discriminatory laws. Again, although often 
successful, the difficulty has been in enforcement. 
 
                                                 
607 Tanzania –J. Shuma questionnaire response Part F.  
608 Sisters in Islam questionnaire response Part A:3  p. 7. 
609 Customary Marriages Act (Cap 5:07) s. 3 (1). 
610 Domestic Violence Act (Cap 5:16) s. 3 (1). 
611 Nigeria, CEDAW/C/NGA/4-5, CEDAW concluding comments on Nigeria CEDAW A/59/38, part. 
1 (2004). 
612 F. Banda (2005), 148-157. 
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Although family and personal laws comprised the bulk of the laws identified by 
questionnaire respondents as problematic, women were also found to be discriminated 
against in employment.  The discrimination related to denial of access to certain fields 
of employment not least working in the military, equal pay and general equal 
opportunity issues. It is as well to remember that most of the work that women do is 
in the informal sector and is neither paid nor recognised as important.613
 
Discrimination in Employment 
Examination of state reports to human rights bodies show that even States that have 
consistently topped the UN human rights development and gender indices, have a 
gender pay gap across all sectors. Moreover, the take up rate for employment is, in 
almost all sectors, higher for men than women.  Factoring in differences based on 
disability or origin, there are further disparities in work place participation. Much of 
this occurs despite there being laws in place guaranteeing equality in the work 
place.614
 
Similarly the concluding observations of the CESCR report to Germany, echoed 
in a later set of recommendations of the Human Rights Committee, indicated 
concern and noted: 
 
“Like the ILO, the Committee is concerned about the persisting impediments to 
women in German society, in terms of promotion in employment and equal 
wages for work of equal value, both in the private and public sectors, and 
especially in federal bodies and academic institutions, despite the efforts of the 
State party to give a new impetus to the equal participation of women in the 
Labour market.”615
 
Similarly of Luxembourg the CESCR noted: 
 
“with concern that women are still under-represented in the work force. While 
taking note that the disparities between wages of men and women have been 
reduced, the Committee also notes with concern that the current level of wage 
                                                 
613 CEDAW general recommendation 16. 
614 Norway’s Seventh Periodic Report to CEDAW, CEDAW/C/NOR/7 (2007),  part 2:5 et seq. 
615 CESCR Concluding Observations: Germany, E/C/12/1/Add 68, para.19. See also Human Rights 
Committee Concluding Observations: Germany, CCPR/CO/80/DEU, para. 13. 
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difference (women receiving 15 per cent lower wages than men) remains a 
matter of concern.”616
 
The fact that the same issues identified as problematic in the Norwegian, German and 
Luxembourg reports are also found in the CEDAW concluding observations to the 
report of Azerbaijan seems to indicate that there are common challenges facing 
women in the employment sector in many regions: 
 
“The Committee continues to be concerned about the occupational segregation 
between women and men in the labour market and the gap in their wages. The 
Committee is also concerned about the potential negative impact on women of 
the Labour Code, which appears to be overly protective of women as mothers 
and to restrict women’s economic opportunities in a number of areas.”617
 
Problematic on the equal pay front are the reservations entered to article 7 of the 
CESCR by the UK and to article 11 of CEDAW by the Federated States of 
Micronesia. The latter provides: 
 
“The Government of the Federated States of Micronesia advises that it is not at 
present in a position to take the measures either required by article 11, 
paragraph1(d) of the Convention to enact comparable worth legislation, or by 
article 11, paragraph 2(b) to enact maternity leave with pay or with comparable 
social benefits throughout the nation.” 
 
Questionnaire responses, reservations to CEDAW and case law highlight the 
fact that there are still some occupations that women are not permitted to enter.  
Military service is one such. New-Zealand and the United Kingdom618 both 
have reservations to CEDAW noting limitations of women’s ability to 
participate in armed combat or in certain sectors of the defence forces.  
Questionnaire responses also indicated limitations in Australia,619 the Republic 
                                                 
616 CESCR Concluding Observations: Luxembourg, E/C.12/1/Add 86, para. 22.  See also CESCR 
Concluding Observations: Lichtenstein, E/C.12//CO/LIE/1, para. 13. 
617 Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to the 
combined second and third periodic report of Azerbaijan (CEDAW/C/AZE/2-3) at its 765th and 766th 
meetings, on 23 January 2007/ 
CEDAW/C/AZE/CO/3, para. 23. 
618 Sex Discrimination Act, 1975 s. 85(4), as cited by Equality Now (2004), 19-20. 
619 E. Evatt, questionnaire response Part A:3. See also Equality Now (2004), 16, citing the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984, s. 43. However, see the letter written to Equality Now by Kerry Flanagan in 
the Office of the Status of Women, Department of the Prime Minister indicating that the government 
“was undertaking a major body of work to review the Australian Force job roles” but that the question 
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of Cyprus620 and Nepal whose Army Act provides that women can join the army 
only in certain non combatant positions.621 The exclusion of women from 
military service may have other consequences. In Cyprus it was noted that one 
of the reasons for the reversal in policy on granting automatic citizenship to 
children born of Cypriot mothers was dictated to by the fact that a male holding 
citizenship would automatically become eligible for military services and some 
did not welcome this.  Discrimination against women is in their inability to 
access employment in the army and the denial of opportunities to earn a living 
in a field of their choosing. The questionnaire response indicated: 
 
“The Army of the Republic Regulations (P.I. 44/1995) require, inter alia, candidates 
for a 5 year appointment in the army to be (i) male citizens of the Republic of Cyprus 
or Greece and (ii) to have completed their national service. (Regulation 6 of P.I. 
44/1995). 
The justification for the gender requirement is the fact that, women in Cyprus do not 
perform military service and, thus, Cypriot women would not, in any case, qualify for 
appointment. 
Notwithstanding this, the Ministry of Defence is currently reconsidering the matter in 
the light of the Equal Treatment of Men and Women in Employment and Vocational 
Training Law, 2002 (L.205(I)/2002) taking into account the particularities of the 
military service.”622
 
CEDAW has noted that the rule in Eritrea that exempts married women from 
performing national service is discriminatory not least because access to land is made 
conditional on having undertaken national service.623  
 
Other exclusions identified related to women’s ability to work in mines and at night. 
 
Night work and mine work 
Originally limitations on women’s ability to participate in work in mines and at night 
were constructed as being for their “protection.”624 These protections were enshrined 
                                                                                                                                            
of women carrying arms in combat was a “complex cultural and social issue.” Equality Now Annual 
Report 2004, at 4. 
620 Republic of Cyprus questionnaire response p. 3.  
621 The Army Act, 2016 (1959) s. 10, as cited in FWLD questionnaire response Part A:3 p. 7. 
622 Law Commission, Republic of Cyprus questionnaire response –narrative p. 2. 
623 CEDAW Concluding Observations: Eritrea,CEDAW/C/ERI/CO/3, para.14. 
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in international instruments including the ILO Convention Concerning Night work of 
Women Industry.625 This was first concluded in 1919, revised in 1934 and also in 
1948. It “provides protection” to women by limiting their participation in industry 
between the hours of 10pm and 7am. Article 1 provides: “Women without distinction 
as to age, cannot be employed at night in public or private undertakings except for 
members of their family.” The ILO Convention Concerning Employment of Women 
in Underground Work of All Kinds, 1935.626 It provides that no female can be 
employed in underground work at any time (many State refused to accept these 
instruments because of their discriminatory nature). 
 
Although well meant at the time, the instruments are now considered as being out of 
date, discriminatory, paternalistic and as stereotyping women. Specifically the ban on 
night work is criticised for assuming that women are home makers and care givers but 
not breadwinners.  The exemption for working for family reflects expectations that 
women will work without pay for family and indeed suggests that this is not work at 
all. Perhaps crucially in employment terms is the fact that night work is paid at double 
the rate of day time employment thus denying women the right to participate in night 
work is tantamount to limiting their income earning opportunities.  Similarly 
accusations of paternalism have been made about denying women the right to work in 
mines. States are criticised for making choices for women and again for limiting their 
work horizons. Although initially the ban was put in place for the protection of 
women’s health and because it was felt that women should not be made to do work 
which may be potentially harmful or hinder their ability to reproduce, it is now argued 
that developments in medical knowledge should be reflected by the removal of these 
bars.627  While many States have heeded these criticisms, questionnaire responses, 
reservations and information gathered by Equality Now on the Labour laws of 
China,628 Latvia629 and Madagascar630 suggest that many have not.  In its pre-
                                                                                                                                            
624 N. Hevener “An analysis of gender-based treaty law: Contemporary developments in historical 
perspective” (1986) 8 Human Rights Quarterly 70. 
625 ILO Concerning Night Work of Women Employed in Industry, 1919 (Convention No. 4), revised in 
1934 (Convention No. 41), and 1948 (Convention No. 89). 
626 Convention Concerning the Employment of Women in Underground work in Mines of all Kinds 
(Convention No. 45). 
627  CEDAW, art. 11 (3). 
628 China Labour Act 1994 Chapter VII s. 59 (mine work) –as cited in Equality Now (2004) 18. 
629 Latvia Labour Law, 2001 ss. 53, 136, 138 (travel restrictions, over time, night work), as cited in 
Equality Now (2004), 18. 
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sessional questions sent to the DRC in preparation for consideration of the country’s 
fourth and fifth periodic reports, CEDAW raised the issue of the night work 
exemption for women in article 124 of Labour Code.631 In the concluding 
observations to the State’s report, CEDAW merely mentions the Labour Code as a 
cause for concern but does not isolate the exclusion of women from working at night 
as a particular problem.632
 
Some questionnaire respondents cited the existence of these exclusionary rules as 
being positive measures. Nigeria was one which identified the Labour Act as 
providing protection: 
 
“Section 55 which provide that no woman shall be employed on night work in a 
public or private industrial undertaking or in any branch thereof or in any agricultural 
undertaking or in any branch thereof. 
Section 56 (1) provides that no woman shall be employed in any work in any 
mine.”633
 
Also noted in the questionnaires were limitations placed on women’s ability to take 
up work without parental or spousal consent.  
 
Barriers to Employment – the requirement for family or spousal consent 
In Nepal a constitutional challenge brought to the rule in section 12 of the 
Employment Act, 1986 requiring foreign employment agencies to obtain the consent 
of the guardian and government before a woman could take up foreign employment 
was upheld as consonant with special laws for the advancement and protection of 
women.634  
 
In the DRC a married woman cannot participate in commerce/take up salaried 
employment without the consent of her husband. The questionnaire response indicates 
that in practice this means that women cannot participate in the economic life of the 
                                                                                                                                            
630 Madagascar, Labour Code (Law No. 94-029 of August, 25, 1995), art 92 (no night work without 
permission of labour minister), as cited in Equality Now (2004), 19. 
631 CEDAW/C/COD/Q/5, item 23 of CEDAW list of issues, in OMCT (2006), 22.  
632 CEDAW Concluding Observations: DRC fourth and fifth periodic reports, para.21 
633 The Labour Act 1971 Cap 198 laws of the Federation, as cited in WILDAF Nigeria questionnaire 
response Part C:1. 
634 Advocate Sabin Shrestha v. HMG/Nepal, Court Bulletin 2958 b.s. Vol. (19) p.1., as cited in FWLD 
questionnaire response Part B:3 case no. 27 on p. 24. 
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country in the same way that men can.635  Linked to those provisions of the Family 
Code giving the husband marital power636 and which indicate that a husband is 
responsible for making decisions in the home including about what to do with money 
earned by the wife in the course of her profession, 637  this constitutes serious 
discrimination against women. Equally problematic are the reservations of Malta to 
article 13 of CEDAW: 
 
“The Government of Malta reserves the right, notwithstanding anything in the 
Convention, to continue to apply its tax legislation, which deems, in certain 
circumstances, the income of a married woman to be the income of her husband and 
taxable as such. 
The Government of Malta reserves the right to continue to apply its social security 
legislation, which in certain circumstances makes certain benefits payable to the head 
of the household, which is, by such legislation, presumed to be the husband.” 
 
This reservation creates a disincentive for (married) women to work. A different kind 
of (marital) status discrimination was identified in the questionnaire response from the 
Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association. A rule that only married women 
could be appointed to be Health Assistants was successfully challenged as 
constituting discrimination.638  In a slightly different context both FWLD (Nepal) and 
Sisters in Islam (Malaysia) give examples of positive challenges to discriminatory 
practices within the airline industry.  Sisters in Islam cite the case of Beatrice 
Fernandez v Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia & Anor: 
 
“This is a case concerning discrimination at the workplace. In 2005, JAG lent its 
support to female staff of Malaysian Airlines who filed a case against the company 
and the staff union for gender discriminatory practices. Among these were the 
requirement that all female flight attendants resign from their jobs when they became 
pregnant; the practice of limiting each female flight attendant to a maximum of two 
children; and forcing them to retire at 40 years of age (45 years for senior female 
flight attendants) while male flight attendants retire at 55 years of age.”639
 
Another area of discrimination in employment was maternity. 
                                                 
635 Art 4 of the Decree of 2 August 1913, as cited in MONUC (Droit Commercial). 
636 Art 448 Code de la Famille, as cited in MONUC (Code de la Famille). 
637 Arts 497 (2), 515, 524 and 531 Code de la Famille, as cited in MONUC (Code de la Famille). 
638 Health Assistants case cited by Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association questionnaire 
response PartB:3. 
639 Beatrice Fernandez v Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia & Anor [2004] 4 CLJ 403, as cited in Sisters in 
Islam questionnaire response Part B:3.  See also the Nepalese case of Rina Bajracharya v. HMG, 
Secretariat of Minister of Council et al NKP, 2057, Vol. V, pg.376, as cited in FWLD (Nepal) 
questionnaire response Part B:3 (case 3 p.16). 
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Maternity policy – hampering women’s ability to participate in the labour 
market 
While acknowledging women’s unique reproductive burden in bearing children, 
human rights law makes clear that women should not be discriminated against in the 
workplace either because they might fall pregnant or because they have fallen 
pregnant. They are to be given equal opportunities which include access to (paid) 
maternity leave.  The State’s obligation under article 11 (2) (b) of CEDAW were 
spelled out in Dung Thi Thuy Nguyen v. The Netherlands:640
 
“Article 11, paragraph 2 (b, obliges States parties in such cases to introduce maternity 
leave with pay or comparable social benefits without loss of formal employment, 
seniority or social allowances. The Committee notes that article 11, paragraph 2 (b) 
does not use the term ‘full pay’, not does it use ‘full compensation for loss of income’ 
resulting from pregnancy and childbirth. In other words the Convention leaves to 
States parties a certain margin of discretion to devise a system of maternity leave 
benefits to fulfil Convention requirements.”641
 
In a dissenting opinion, three CEDAW members added: 
 
“It can be argued that the explicit wording of article 11, paragraph 2 (b), read in 
conjunction with other subparagraphs of article 11, paragraph 2, is aimed primarily at 
women as salaried employees in the private and public labour market sectors.  On the 
other hand, the provision can also be interpreted to mean that States parties are also 
obliged to provide for a maternity leave with pay for self employed women.”642  
 
The dissenting addendum is particularly important in light of the fact that many 
women find themselves either self employed or working in the informal sector 
without access to employee benefits. In light of this it is important to note the 
provisions of the African Protocol on the Rights of Women requiring States to: 
 
“establish a system of protection and social insurance for women working in the 
informal sector and to sensitise them to adhere to it;”643
 
And: “guarantee adequate and paid pre and post-natal maternity leave I both the 
private and public sectors.”644
                                                 
640 Dung Thi Thuy Nguyen v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 3/2004 Views of the Committee 
CEDAW, A/61/38 (2006) Annex VIII. 
641 Ibid, para. 10.2. 
642 Ibid, Individual opinion of Committee members, Naela Mohamed Gabr, Hanna Beate Schopp-
Schilling and Heisoo Shin (dissenting), para. 10:3. 
643 African Protocol on Women’s Rights, 2003, art. 13 (f). 
644 Ibid, art. 13 (i). 
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There are still States which seek to throw the reproductive burden onto women’s 
shoulders for them to bear alone. In the DRC, the law provides that a woman cannot 
take annual leave if she has already had maternity leave in the same year.645 This 
seems to punish women and suggest that child bearing is something that they do for 
their own selfish reasons rather than as a social function as anticipated by article 5 (b) 
of CEDAW. 
 
The denial of maternity pay to women may also hamper their life chances as they may 
not feel able to have children.  For this reason the reservations of both Australia and 
Micronesia to article 11 (2) (b) of CEDAW noting their inability to guarantee 
maternity pay and social benefits are to be regretted. 
 
A major problem in employment is the non recognition of certain categories of 
employees who are therefore left without legal protection.  Particularly vulnerable are 
domestic workers, especially if they are migrants.646 The questionnaire response from 
Fiji reported: “Moreover Fiji’s 1965 Employment Act does not adequately cover 
domestic workers such as cooks, house cleaners, gardeners, and washerwomen .”647 
In its concluding observations to the report of Germany in 2004, the Committee 
recommended that: “the State party intensify efforts to protect the human rights of 
foreign women domestic workers in diplomatic households.”648
 
A final consideration is that of the different ways in which pensions for men and 
women are calculated and the potential discrimination that may occur. 
 
Entitlement to Pension and other Benefits 
It would appear that in some jurisdictions there is on going discrimination between 
the way that the law treats women in relation to entitlement to benefits and especially 
pensions.  The response of the Nepalese Forum for Women, Law and Development 
showed that the discrimination was to be found in the pension rules of many public 
                                                 
645 Article 25 of Loi No. 81-003 du Juillet 1981 portant statut du personnel de carrière des services 
public de l’Etat, in MONUC questionnaire response (III). See also OMCT (2006), 22. 
646 B. Ehrenreich and A. Hochshild Nannies, Maids and Sex Workers in the New Economy (London, 
Palgrave, 2003); UNIFEM Claim and Celebrate Women Migrants Human Rights through CEDAW: 
The Case of Women Migrant Workers (New York, UNIFEM, 2005), 32. 
647 OHCHR questionnaire response Part A:3. 
648 CEDAW Concluding Observations: Germany, A/59/38, para. 395. 
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bodies.649 The Civil Service Act, 1992 provides that pension entitlement accrues to a 
person who has more than 20 years service. Retirement age is set at 58 years.  The 
Act allows women to join the civil service until the age of 40 whereas men are only 
permitted to join up the age of 35.  Technically therefore, women are given a benefit 
(later entry into the civil service) that is not given to men. However, in practice a 
woman who joins the civil service at 39 or 40 cannot draw a pension because she 
would not have served the 20 year minimum. 650 Clearly what starts off as a measure 
to benefit women, can work against them.  Removing the discriminatory effect of the 
provision may require that pension be paid on a pro rata basis or indeed that the 
pensionable age be raised to 60 to enable those who wish to, to serve the requisite 
number of years entitling them to a full pension. It is here worth acknowledging that 
there was also discrimination against men in the Police Rules, 2049 (1992). These 
provided that a widower’s right to “receive his dead wife’s (women police personnel) 
pension is under discretion.”651 A different, but common, problem was identified in 
South Africa which provides for different ages of retirement for men and women. The 
response of the Women’s Law Centre (WLC) noted that the constitutionality of this 
difference in treatment was being challenged.652
 
Summary 
This part of the report has presented a snap shot of some of the laws identified by 
questionnaire respondents as causing concern.  The fact that more than 60 years after 
the foundation of the UN and the adoption of its Charter “reaffirming faith in the 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women”, one half of the population, women, continue to experience 
State sanctioned and condoned discrimination speaks volumes about the commitment 
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Appellate and District Court, 2048 (1991) ss. 32(5), 32 (3) and (6); Civil Service Rules, 2050 (1993) ss. 
98 (2), 98 (3), 98 (6), 101 (2); Nepal Health Service Rules, 2055 (1999) ss. 95 (2), 95 (3), 95 (6), 99 
(2); Parliament Secretariat Personnel Administration Rules, 2059 (undated) ss. 83 (2), 83 (3), 83 (6); 
Postal Savings Bank Regulations, 2033 (undated) s. 11 (3); Armed Police Rules, 2060 (undated) s. 58 
(3); Rules of Service of the Tribhuvan University Teachers and Staff, 2050 (undated) ss. 56 (3), 57 (1), 
59 (2) and Royal Nepalese Army (Pension, Gratuity and Other Facilities) Rules, 2033 s. 7 (6).  It is 
worth noting that the Gender Equality Act may have resulted in the amendment or repeal of some of 
these. 
650 Civil Service Act, 1992 s. 37(1). See also response of OHCHR Nepal to Part A:4 questionnaire. 
651 Police Rules, 2049 (1992), as cited by FWLD Part A:3. 
652 WLC response to Part A:5. 
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of States to women’s rights. Clearly the pledge made in Vienna and repeated in 
Beijing that “women’s rights are human rights” is still more rhetoric than action.  
Similarly, the promise given in Beijing to tackle de jure discrimination remains 
unfulfilled. 
Although the focus has been on de jure discrimination, it is clear that the conditions of 
oppression and lack of voice and opportunity are as much a part of the discrimination 
that women experience as the laws. If anything the laws merely reflect and reinforce 
this gendered disregard for their worth as human beings.  This calls for a holistic 
consideration of the causes of women’s disadvantage and robust responses thereto.  
From a legal perspective, this demands that discriminatory laws are amended or 
repealed. Furthermore there needs to be greater commitment to the implementation of 
laws. Here is worth recalling the recommendation made in CEDAW’s concluding 
observations to the report of Canada in 2003: “The Committee urges the State party to 
find ways for making funds available for equality and test cases under all jurisdictions 
and for ensuring that sufficient legal aid is available to women under all jurisdictions 
when seeking redress in issues of civil and family law and in those relating to poverty 
issues."653
                                                 
653 CEDAW Concluding Observations: Canada, A/58/38, Part D 336-389, at para. 356. 
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PART E – IS THERE A NEED FOR A SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON LAWS 
THAT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST WOMEN? 
In both interviews and the questionnaire responses, it became clear that the arguments 
being put forward in support and against the creation of a new mechanism on laws 
that discriminate against women mirrored many of those already canvassed.654 From 
the questionnaire responses, the vast majority of those addressing Part F on the 
advisability of a Special Rapporteur on laws that discriminate against women were in 
favour of the creation of such a mechanism. 
 
This section starts by considering the views of those who were opposed or sceptical 
about the need for the creation of new mechanism. They argued the following in 
outline: 
 
vi) that the creation of new mechanism would result in duplication; 
vii) it would take away from the work of CEDAW;  
viii) other committees would stop focusing on women’s rights issues; 
ix) that there was already a special rapporteur dealing with violence against 
women; 
x) that a focus on de jure discrimination was not helpful. 
 
These views were countered by those in favour of the creation of a special mandate to 
deal with laws that discriminate against women.  Bridging the two were those who 
could see both sides of the argument and who were concerned with the implication of 
a special mechanism on laws that discriminate against women on the UN’s 
mainstreaming project. 
 
In presenting the arguments, it seems best to let the voices of the various protagonists 
speak for themselves. 
 
Arguments against the appointment of a special rapporteur on laws that 
discriminate against women 
i) Duplication-Need to consolidate rather than create yet more mechanisms 
                                                 
654 See E/CN.6/2006/8 and E/CN.6/2007/8. 
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It was argued that there was a proliferation of special rapporteurs.  This was seen as 
counter-productive and as an unnecessary expense. Instead there needed to be 
consolidation of existing mechanisms to try to prevent mechanism fatigue. A UN 
official working with a specialised agency argued: 
 
“We do not need other mechanisms. We have enough. We need to work with what we 
have. We need to make them more efficient and try to make them collaborate with 
each other and strengthen each other’s work and disseminate.  Even in the field 
people don’t know all the Special Rapporteurs or what they do or where to find their 
work.  There is a lot that we need to do now with what we have.”655
 
This was echoed by a Geneva based UN official who commenting on the mandate 
review that was on going at the time asked: 
 
“If there are 41 special rapporteurs, do we need another? It is not about numbers but 
about whether the need is there.  It may be political-will the Council approve it?... 
Let’s look at what we have in all parts of the house, especially when CEDAW comes 
here, see what our strengths are and what we can do together. We need to know what 
we have.” 
 
Yet another UN official working for a specialised agency cautioned: “you don’t want 
to expand mandates indefinitely. The more mechanisms there are, everything ceases 
to have meaning or authority.”656
 
ii) What about CEDAW? Will a new mechanism not duplicate it? 
Concerns were expressed about overlap or duplication with CEDAW. A key State 
obligation under the Convention is the amendment or repeal of laws that discriminate 
against women. With this in mind, would not the creation of a Special Rapporteur on 
laws that discriminate against women merely duplicate the work of CEDAW or, as 
suggested by some, result in an encroachment on CEDAW territory?  Responding to a 
letter from the Chief of the Women’s Rights section of DAW asking for his opinion 
on the advisability of a special rapporteur on laws that discriminate against women, 
the Chairperson of the Committee on the Rights of Migrant Workers had noted: 
 
“The Committee discussed this matter at its recently held 5th session. The majority of 
the Committee members is of the opinion, that while it is important to study the issue 
                                                 
655 Interview with UN official, specialised agency, New York, March 2007. 
656 UN Official interviewed in New York, March 2007. 
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of legislation that discriminates against women, care should be taken to avoid 
duplication with existing bodies and procedures, in particular the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women.”657
 
iii) Other Committees will stop addressing women’s rights 
A UN official based in Geneva cautioned that the appointment of a new Special 
Rapporteur on laws that discriminate against women may lead human rights 
committees to abandon the work that they were doing on women’s rights reasoning 
that the matter was being tackled elsewhere.  This recalls the arguments over whether 
there was a need to elaborate a separate treaty focusing on the rights of women: would 
it help to focus to issues of special concern to women or would it lead to their 
ghettoisation? 
 
iv) There is already a special rapporteur on violence against women and another on 
trafficking – why is another needed on laws that discriminate against women?  
The question asked was, what is a Special Rapporteur going to achieve that existing 
mechanisms cannot, or put differently, why is a Special Rapporteur likely to be more 
effective than existing mechanisms? There was a link here with the duplication 
argument it being felt that “women’s issues” were, or should already have been 
covered by the two Special Rapporteurs on violence and trafficking. 
 
The questionnaire response from OHCHR Guatemala noted: 
 
“At the international level, the CEDAW Committee together with the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence against women, are effective mechanisms to address 
discriminatory laws against women. Furthermore, as a crosscutting issue other human 
rights treaty bodies, have addressed these issues successfully. Thus we believe the 
existing mechanisms are effective enough to address this issue.” 658
 
v)  Limitations of a Focus on De Jure Laws 
The criticisms were two fold. One was about the problems thrown up by 
implementation with it being noted that it was not the laws per se that were always the 
problem, but rather the implementation.  The second issue identified was the 
                                                 
657 Letter from Prasad Karlywasam, Chairperson Committee on the Rights of Migrant Workers to Ms 
Christine Brautigam, Chief Women’s Rights Section, DAW, dated Geneva 8 November, 2006. 
658 OHCHR Guatemala questionnaire response Part F. 
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perceived focus on State enshrined laws to the exclusion of community or customary 
laws. This was linked to arguments about the limits of law to change behaviour and of 
course of the usefulness to women of “law”, broadly constructed. 
 
Bringing all these arguments together without rejecting the idea of a special 
rapporteur on laws that discriminate against women outright, was Marsha Freeman, 
founder of International Women’s Rights Action Watch, Minnesota. In an email and 
questionnaire answer, her response to the question “do you think that there is a need 
for the creation of a special mechanism to address laws that discriminate against 
women or are the existing mechanisms sufficient?” was as follows: 
 
 “Not particularly.  I don’t think existing mechanisms are sufficient, but I am not sure 
this is the way to go.   
 
I have some doubts about the Special Rapporteur idea, although I am not totally 
against it. It will be very difficult to get a mandate adopted that covers the territory 
properly, and even more difficult to find appropriate resources.  
 
1. Unless the mandate is drawn very broadly, addressing laws that discriminate on 
their face is on its own not very helpful. As you well know, one can have all the laws 
in place and still have heavy discrimination because of failure to implement or 
enforce, with all the issues of political will, culture, patriarchal power, and resource 
allocation that that entails. I would be concerned that a focus on eliminating 
discriminatory laws, without further elaboration of the mandate, would allow 
governments to claim progress by simply changing some words. Not enough.  
 
2. Addressing laws that discriminate in effect is another issue and requires excellent 
documentation on discriminatory (disparate) impact. The SR would have to both have 
the expertise and be properly resourced to deal with that. Then all the other factors 
noted above still apply.  
 
3. I think the work of any special rapporteur relating to sex discrimination should be 
better integrated with the work of CEDAW and the other treaty bodies than now 
occurs. There is an argument that a SR would unnecessarily duplicate CEDAW's 
work. I see it as potentially expanding upon CEDAW's work, but . . . We have a very 
poor history of coordination between the SR on Violence and CEDAW. The work of 
any SR can build upon and contribute to the work of the treaty bodies, but nobody has 
taken that in hand with respect to the sex discrimination issues. I would hope that with 
CEDAW moving to Geneva we could address that with the current SR on Violence, 
but it remains to be seen.  
 
All that being said, I can't say it would be useless. The UN, the SRs, and the NGOs 
 120
just have not put enough into good coordination so far, and I am not sure about the 
impact, so I would have to be convinced that another SR would add a lot of value.”659  
 
Bridging the Gap- On the one hand – On the other hand-Seeing Both Sides 
What of mainstreaming? 
Professor Hilary Charlesworth noted: 
 
“I have mixed feelings about the proposal, based on familiar debates about 
mainstreaming/sidestreaming women’s issues. Would this SR be able to do things 
CEDAW cannot do?... On the other hand, the SRs generally have raised the profile of 
particular issues (eg Phillip Alston’s recent work) so, on balance, I would support 
such a move.” 
 
Her views on the possibility of CEDAW engaging with the issue including by use of 
the inquiry procedure were echoed by Professor Rebecca Cook. A respondent from a 
London based NGO, (writing in a personal capacity) who asked for anonymity noted:  
 
“V. interesting idea. Not sure about whether a SR (special rapporteur) is the best route 
as very time consuming in lobbying for and getting it set up, and then what would it 
do-is it a one off, to do a report (which gathers dust?) In an ideal world this would be 
done by CEDAW but not sure if they have the capacity or the inclination to do it? 
If it’s not within CEDAW, would be better to approach this on a gender rather than 
women (eg conscription). Would strengthen it, I think.  We’d also of course want a 
strong element of intersectional discrimination to be addressed. I’d recommend, I 
think a flexible approach-saying this word needs to be done by the UN but having a 
couple of proposals about how it could be done (SR, CEDAW, OHCHR etc.)”660
 
Two members of ASK Bangladesh wrote: 
“…we both have mixed feelings about a separate set up. Obviously we believe that a 
focused approach towards discrimination would be useful, but at the same time 
wonder what happens to the ongoing mainstreaming efforts within the treaty bodies 
and special procedures. Basically, if a separate commission does not take away from 
mainstreaming agendas and the two efforts could go side by side, then it would be a 
good initiative we think.”661
 
Seeking Clarification – what would the Special Rapporteur do? 
Those who were prepared to entertain the possibility of the appointment of a Special 
Rapporteur wanted to know what his or her mandate would include and the length: 
would it be a short sharp focus on de jure laws, and if yes, then they wanted to know 
                                                 
659 Professor Marsha Freeman questionnaire response Part F, and also email, 8 May 2007. 
660 Anonymous by email, London, Thursday 17 May 2007. 
661 ASK Bangladesh (two members) by email (1 July 2007). 
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if there were sufficient laws to warrant the existence of a Special Rapporteur?  A UN 
official asked “If the focus is on de jure discrimination, then why not just have an 
academic study of existing laws which the OHCHR can then take it up?”  Another 
asked if the establishment of a Special Rapporteur at the UN level was the most 
effective way of dealing with laws that discriminate against women. The issue of 
compliance was also raised with one UN official asking: How would special 
rapporteur get compliance that is different from that of CEDAW? He noted that if 
there was a mechanism to compel compliance that would be very interesting. 
 
Engaging the arguments against-arguments in favour of the appointment of a 
Special Rapporteur on laws that discriminate against women 
i) On Duplication 
Oft repeated was the idea that the creation of a Special Rapporteur on laws that 
discriminate against women would not add value. Rather, such a mechanism would 
merely be replicating existing mechanisms. Sir Nigel Rodley, who has been both a 
Special Rapporteur and chair of CAT and is now a member of the Human Rights 
Committee while acknowledging that some overlap between treaty bodies and special 
procedures is inevitable, says that the two mechanisms perform different functions 
and can co-exist happily.662 Sir Nigel has noted that the existing thematic rapporteurs 
often cover issues that are already provided for in human rights treaties and yet those 
were not considered to be duplicating work because there is little overlap in their 
purpose.663 Echoing this Marianne Mollman of the Women’s Watch Division of 
Human Rights Watch noted: “I don’t see any duplication at all. If you say there is 
duplication then all the special mechanisms are duplicates of existing human rights 
instruments.” 
 
When it was put to her that existing mechanisms might be able to absorb into their 
work laws that discriminate against women she noted: 
 
“There would be a number of issues that would fall outside fore example family status 
laws would go, also refugees and issues of nationality. How would existing 
mechanisms have time to do legal mapping as well as conceptual mapping they are 
                                                 
662 N. Rodley “United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures of the Commission 
on Human Rights-Complementarity or Competition?” (2003) 25 HRQ 882. 
663 Ibid, at 887.  See also 886. 
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trying to do together with country visits? Unless you say for this year, tell all of them 
to look at the area in your work that highlights discrimination between men and 
women.” 
 
A Geneva based UN official was very cynical about the “duplication idea” asking 
rhetorically: “Why do we have a Special Rapporteur on torture and also a torture 
committee? Maybe because it is seen as immediate and also that it matters. I guess 
they just don’t rate women very highly or maybe they are afraid of the reaction in the 
Council.” 
 
Another UN interviewee noted wryly “one person’s duplication is another person’s 
focus.”  [Also] Contradicting the view of those who were of the opinion that the UN 
was overloaded with mechanisms and now needed to take a step back from adding 
more was a UN official who said that the creation of a Special Rapporteur: on laws 
that discriminate against women:  
 
“was a wonderful way to focus. The Secretariat and the Division for the Advancement 
of Women have so many competing interests and bureaucratic demands.  If you have 
the mandate, then they are duty bound to provide assistance and the mandate holder 
being independent can set his or her own pace of work and conceptualise the problem 
without interference.”664
 
ii)  The CEDAW “conflict” 
Another UN official seemed to be alive to the false dichotomy that seemed to have 
been constructed setting CEDAW up in conflict with any potential Special Rapporteur 
on laws that discriminate against women.   She noted simply that one did not have to 
see the two, CEDAW and or a special rapporteur as being in conflict. In her view the 
Special Rapporteur would focus primarily on legislation and having discriminatory 
laws uplifted.  Similarly the European Women’ Lobby which claims to be ‘the largest 
organisation of women’s non-governmental organisations in the EU comprising of 
over 4000 members’665 noted: 
 
                                                 
664 Interview with UN Official in New York, March 2007. 
665 European Women’s Lobby “Contribution from the European Women’s Lobby to the EU Network of 
Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights - 2005 report” ( European Women’s Lobby, November 
2005). 
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“The mandate of the Special Rapporteur would not clash with the work of CEDAW 
and would in fact be complementary to the work of the Committee. Member States 
submit 4-year reports to the CEDAW Committee indicating the measures taken to 
ensure full compliance with CEDAW. However, while CEDAW address women’s 
social, economic, and cultural rights, some issues are not included, notably violence 
against women.  While country reports usually do include information on this, the 
laws- or lack thereof - that continue to discriminate in this area are not systematically 
reviewed. The Special Rapporteur therefore could assist the work of the Committee 
and as well as identifying discriminating laws, could also provide positive examples 
of law reforms. The fact that she would be reporting yearly would also “fill the gaps” 
in the four-year reporting mechanism.”666
 
The vast majority of questionnaire respondents who engaged with Part F on the 
advisability of a SR on laws that discriminate against women was in favour of the 
idea of a SR. Significantly this included civil society respondents who had had cause 
to engage with CEDAW usually by way of provision of shadow reports. They did not 
see the appointment of a SR as duplicating the work of CEDAW or in any way 
undermining its work. Rather, they were of the view that a SR would enhance the 
work of CEDAW and that the two would complement each other. Indeed one noted 
that CEDAW could issue instructions to the SR about States that needed following up 
and that the two would have a symbiotic, co-operative relationship.  WILDAF Ghana 
argued: 
 
“Often various recommendations to amend discriminatory laws are found in different 
documents such as CEDAW recommendations, recommendations from 
Commonwealth mechanisms, AU (African Union) mechanisms and ECOWAS 
(Economic Union of West Africa) mechanisms. Therefore, state reporting to 
mechanisms under the above frameworks only occurs when a reporting period is due. 
A holistic monitoring of State compliance to various international human rights 
mechanisms is something that NGOs have not been able to do well. A special 
mechanism to address discriminatory laws will provide a one-stop facility that will 
address all discriminatory laws of a country at a go.”667
 
Perhaps most persuasive are the views of two former CEDAW chairpersons, who are 
on record as supportive of the creation of a special rapporteur on laws that 
discriminate against women, thus putting paid to the idea of irreconcilable conflict or 
duplication. Elizabeth Evatt has written: 
 
                                                 
666 European Women’s Lobby “Calls for a Special Rapporteur on Laws that Discriminate against 
Women” January 2007 (sent as part of response to questionnaire), (April 2007). 
667 WILDAF Ghana questionnaire response Part F. 
 124
“As a former Chair of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, I believe that a Special Rapporteur could supplement in a very positive way 
the work of CEDAW.  A Rapporteur could engage a State in constructive dialogue, 
based on the Rapporteur’s knowledge of the experience in other States in dealing with 
discriminatory laws. The reports produced by a Special Rapporteur should be 
invaluable to the CSW overseeing the implementation of the Beijing Platform for 
Action.”668
 
Silvia Cartwright, a former member of CEDAW, has written: 
 
“I have considered the preliminary proposal and agree that the creation by the CSW of 
a Special Rapporteur on Sex Discriminatory Laws would send a powerful signal to all 
States Parties. Not only would it support the commitment made to the Beijing 
Platform for Action, but such an arrangement would also emphasize the importance of 
ensuring that women have the same mechanisms available for the promotion and 
protection of their human right as do the general population.”669
 
iii) What about other committees? 
A keen supporter of the creation of a Special Rapporteur on laws that discriminate 
against women was Professor Catherine Mackinnon who, while acknowledging the 
work undertaken within the UN system to ameliorate the lives of women was of the 
view: 
 
“Existing international mechanisms have been helpful but alone remain insufficient 
for effectively addressing laws that discriminate against women.  
Expertise on this subject has been building, notably under CEDAW since 1979, as 
well as in the Human Rights Committee, laying the groundwork for further focused 
mechanisms. Discriminatory laws pervasively continue to exist, present mechanisms 
having barely begun to scratch their surface, far less to solve the problems they pose. 
A special mechanism would build upon and support the work of CEDAW and others 
in this area, including by generating the ongoing continuous (rather than periodic) 
dialogue with countries that no current mechanism can. It would also heighten the 
visibility of discriminatory laws internationally, including by reporting directly to the 
Human Rights Council, highlighting the issue as a priority in the human rights field.  
Further, while some features of discrimination against women by law are simple and 
blatant, others interface in more subtle and complex ways with women’s inequality as 
a whole. All the dimensions of de jure discrimination are more likely to emerge when 
investigated together in mutual comparative light. Current international mechanisms 
by design can only address these issues one country at a time. A complementary 
mechanism like a Special Rapporteur would offer the unique resources and mandate 
to approach the problem systematically on the global scale on which it exists. From 
the cumulative interconnections, patterns, and themes that can only be discerned in an 
                                                 
668 Elizabeth Evatt, Former Chair, CEDAW, Sydney Australia, in Equality Now, Annual Report 2005, 
at 7. 
669 Silvia Cartwright, CEDAW, Wellington New Zealand in Equality Now, Annual Report 2005, at 7. 
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overarching cross-cutting transnational inquiry, fresh and effective approaches to 
legal equality for women could emerge.” 
 
Echoing her views was a civil society advocate who noted that the “mandate of a 
Special Rapporteur is to give an overview that we don’t have now.”670
 
A UN official familiar with the working of treaty bodies argued: “It would be good to 
have one person with a global overview of laws. The committees look at it from a 
compartmentalised perspective. There is no holistic view of the subject matter.”671
 
The obvious answer to the concern expressed by the UN official who suggested that 
the appointment of a special rapporteur on laws that discriminate against women 
would be the disengagement by non CEDAW committees from considering women’s 
rights, would be to note that existing human rights committees cannot really resolve to 
ignore women’s rights anymore. Their jurisprudence and reporting guidelines all 
highlight the importance of considering the impact of discrimination on the enjoyment 
by women of rights guaranteed by the treaty under consideration. This together with 
mainstreaming within the UN and the impact of shadow reporting to treaty bodies 
militates against an abandonment of the women’s agenda within non CEDAW 
committees.  Also worth noting is the charge that for all the focus on women’s rights, 
the approach of some human rights committees remains, patchy and sporadic.672 The 
response from Tanzania also noted a common problem, the delays in reporting and 
non implementation by States of concluding observations of human rights treaties 
which could be ameliorated by the government being made the subject of “special 
attention” by a dedicated Rapporteur: 
 
“Therefore there is need to create a special mechanism that will set a deadline for the 
countries to act fast and (to) the benefit of its people. 
Reporting obligations by Tanzania as a member State to these treaties is still 
questionable as many reports are not submitted to the respective treaty bodies.” 
 
iv) There is already a Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women 
                                                 
670 Interviewed in New York, 9 March 2007. 
671 Interview with UN official in New York, March 2007. 
672 R. Johnstone (2006). 
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The argument that there is already a Special Rapporteur on violence against women 
seems to suggest that violence is the only violation that women experience. 673  Kapur 
notes that the international community’s coalescing around the issue of violence has 
led to a distortion of the “women’s rights project” with violence against women now 
being seen as the principal human rights violation experienced by women.674 She 
notes that the difficulty with this approach is that: 
 
“It deflects attention from the ways in which States are not implementing their 
obligations under a range of human rights documents, including CEDAW, which, if 
implemented could remove both structural and formal impediments that may 
contribute to women’s experience of violence.  The focus on violence against women 
has thus encouraged a focus on wrongs, rather than on rights and the facilitation of the 
promotion of these rights.”675
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the existence of a wealth of reports by the two 
Special Rapporteurs on violence against women since 1994 did not preclude the 
publication in 2006 of an equally comprehensive report on violence against women 
commissioned by the Secretary-General of the UN.  This shows that an issue can, and 
sometimes should, have multiple beams of light shone on it to highlight the severity 
of the problem and to focus minds on addressing said problem.676  A UN official 
familiar with the work of both the Special Rapporteur on violence and that of 
trafficking noted it was “not bad to have duplication; if you have 192 States then one 
can’t cover them all.”677  Yet another who considered incorporating laws that 
discriminate into the mandates of the Special Rapporteurs on violence and trafficking 
decided it would not be a good idea: “I would be inclined to have a separate one 
because the visibility of the theme is lacking when embedded in an existing mandate. 
The issues may not receive the same consideration.”678
 
Finally it is of course ironic that the success of the Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women, is being used to argue against creation of a new mechanism on laws 
                                                 
673 R Kapur “Feminist Critiques of Human Rights” in R Smith & C van den Anker The Essentials of 
Human Rights (eds.) (2005), 132, 133.  See also R Kapur, ‘The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: 
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674 C.f. S Engle Merry (2006), 81.   
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that discriminate against women, whereas an alternative view could be that the 
success of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women augurs well for one on 
laws that discriminate against women. 
 
v) The Limitations of a focus on De jure discrimination 
Of focusing on de jure discrimination, Laura Katzive, of the Centre for Reproductive 
Rights noted: 
 
“It wouldn’t solve all the problems, but it would be an important step in the right 
direction.  At the very least laws that apply to everybody should not be 
discriminatory. You can’t stop discrimination overnight. Laws reflect the government 
position on women’s rights.”679
 
Simply and powerfully, Equality Now has argued: 
 
“Law is the most formal expression of government policy. A government that allows 
discriminatory laws to remain in force endorses and promotes inequality.  Without 
equality under law, women have no recourse when they face discrimination that 
affects all aspects of their lives…The fact that there are any laws –in fact so many 
laws- that explicitly discriminate against women nearly 10 years after the adoption of 
the Beijing Platform for Action, 25 years after the adoption of CEDAW and 55 years 
after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirming that ‘all 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’ is unacceptable.”680
 
Another questionnaire respondent in favour of the creation of a special mechanism 
argued: 
 
“There is need of special mechanism to address laws that discriminate against women 
specially to identify the discriminatory laws and its impact on women. It is also 
important for addressing the structural and historical discrimination that women have 
been facing for long time. Addressing it at the global context could be an effective 
mechanism to eliminate discrimination at domestic level. It is also important to 
effectively monitor the implementation of equal laws and amended laws as in many 
instances the implementation part is very poor.”681
 
Mainstreaming  
The European Women’s Lobby acknowledged the efforts being made within the UN 
“to rationalise” the gender agenda. However, rather than seeing a Special Rapporteur 
                                                 
679 Interview with Laura Katzive, Centre for Reproductive Rights, New York, 9 March 2007. 
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on laws that discriminate against women as either irrelevant or a duplication of 
existing work, the group was of the view that such a person would enhance, rather 
than detract from the UN policy of mainstreaming and would complement any new 
Gender Architecture: 
 
“It is true that the current proposals to reform the UN Gender mechanism (referred to 
as the Gender Architecture) could be used as an argument to postpone the 
appointment of the Special Rapporteur, when in fact these are two different and 
complementary tools. 
 
In terms of the UN Gender Architecture, the proposal consists of strengthening the 
internal mechanism within the UN structures on the basis of a fragmented, under-
resourced and sometimes incoherent capacity within the UN to promote gender 
equality and gender mainstreaming throughout the UN system. It proposes to merge 
the three main existing mechanisms namely, the Office of the Special Adviser on 
Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), the Division for the 
Advancement of Women (DAW) and the UN Development Fund for Women 
(UNIFEM) and to create a new Office on Gender Equality and Advancement of 
Women (Office), situated at the level of Under-Secretary General. This would 
undoubtedly facilitate and strengthen gender mainstreaming across all UN entities, 
including in the Security Council, the newly created Peace building Commission and 
the Human Rights Council. It is also proposed to establish the post of Executive 
Director at the level of Under-Secretary General, to head the new Office. 
 
The Special Rapporteur would enhance the work of the Office in providing annual 
reports and close co-operation with the Office.”   
 
The group went on: 
 
“We do believe that a Special Rapporteur on Law that Discriminate against Women is 
crucial in the future and would complement the current reforms underway. One area 
of the “added value” of such a Rapporteur would be the strengthening of gender 
mainstreaming across all UN entities. In addition, an annual report to the Human 
Rights Council would give priority to issues relating to gender equality in general and 
progress on the revocation of laws that discriminate against women in particular, and 
would therefore also place women’s human rights at the heart of the work of the 
Council.”682
 
Other arguments in favour of the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on laws 
that discriminate against women 
The focus that the appointment of a Special Rapporteur would bring to the issue was 
highlighted in some of the responses. A Special Rapporteur could act as a spotlight on 
laws that discriminate against women. This was seen to be particularly important not 
                                                 
682 Letter received from President of the European Women’s Lobby, 9 May 2007. 
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least because of the lack of dissemination of concluding observations and also the 
lack of follow up.  It was also suggested that the appointment of a special rapporteur 
would be assist in pressuring States parties to address the problem of discriminatory 
laws and practices within their societies.  Elizabeth Evatt argued: “The process of 
country visits and discussions would help to focus government and public attention on 
laws that are clearly in violation of Convention obligations, and could be helpful in 
achieving change.”683
 
Meanwhile the Malaysian based Sisters in Islam noted: 
 
“Yes, there is a need for the creation of a special mechanism to address laws that 
discriminate women because: 
i) This special mechanism focuses and specialises on law reform. 
         ii)        The mechanism could act as a pressure point to the government in making sure     
that law reform takes place. 
iii) The mechanism would help the women NGOs in their advocacy work  
b) Woman who is being discriminated must have an avenue to get redress or 
heard, apart from the existing legal system. 
c) This mechanism could monitor the status of women vis-à-vis the law.  
Note: Even though Malaysia has ratified CEDAW, but it does not ratify the Optional 
Protocol.”684
 
WILDAF Zambia argued; “A focused mechanism would help the situation.  Other 
mechanisms are broad and little known.”685
 
Similarly the Palestinian Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling argued in 
Part F of the questionnaire, in favour of the setting up of a new mechanism: 
 
“The special mechanism will support the ongoing efforts of women's movements and 
NGO's who are working of law especially on legal reforms.  It will also give a focus 
and light to the importance of legal reforms based on women's-human rights.  Despite 
that there may be some regional and or UN bodies that address laws, a mechanism 
that focuses only and solely in laws will help us on focusing deeper into the issue of 
laws, especially legal reforms.  This mechanism has the potential to gather and 
support the existing work on the field of legal feminist theories.  Moreover, it has the 
potential to open up doors for exchanging experiences on this issue not only 
regionally but internationally as well, also to help regional lobbying and campaigns 
on similar issues of legal reforms. 
 
                                                 
683 Elizabeth Evatt, response to questionnaire Part F (April 2007). 
684 Sisters in Islam Malaysia questionnaire response Part F. 
685 WILDAF Zambia questionnaire response Part F. 
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For us at the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), we support 
the creation of such a mechanism.” 
 
Under the rubric ‘anything else that you would like to add’, they continued: 
 
“The Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC) believes that this is 
an important initiative.  It is a mechanism that if established has the possibility to 
affect and minimize the effects of discriminatory laws, something which has not until 
now become organized and focused enough to be shaken.  Another important point to 
notice is that this mechanism, if established will also clarify any further development 
needed  in the different areas relevant to legal reforms such as documentation, 
monitoring,  which are not systematically done most of the times.”  
 
From Afghanistan, the UNAMA response to Part F of the questionnaire supported a 
new mechanism noting that it would help to hold States accountable for dealing with 
violations of the rights of women: 
 
“Discrimination is rampant in Afghanistan and is practiced in all segments of the 
justice system and in and throughout society. Access to justice for women is difficult 
and currently the reform of the law, although including laws such as ending violence 
against women are tabled in parliament, they are seen as a lower priority. At the same 
time, existing mechanisms could be improved and clearer and more sustained action 
taken to ensure that the State is not allowing discrimination and more importantly not 
practicing it.”  
 
The response from Tanzania also saw the appointment of a Special Rapporteur as 
helping to keep pressure on the government: 
 
“Yes there is a need for creation of a special mechanism to address laws that 
discriminate against women in Tanzania.   This special mechanism will: 
1. Push the government on the implementation of the national laws  
2. Press on the amendments of current laws with loopholes and  
3. Speed domestication of International instruments (protocols) that governments 
ratify every now and then.” 
 
In interviews, the consultant asked respondents to consider the question: “in the event 
that a decision was taken to appoint a special rapporteur on laws that discriminate 
against women, what should his or her mandate be and to whom should he or she 
report-the Human Rights Council or the CSW which originated the project?”  The 
following suggestions were made. 
 
 131
Possible Mandate of a Special Rapporteur on laws that discriminate against 
women  
A UN official who was supportive of the creation of a Special Rapporteur on laws 
that discriminate against women, nevertheless cautioned against an open-ended 
mandate noting: 
 
“It is a good idea but it shouldn’t be a permanent mandate –limit its time like the Sub-
Commission mandates on right to self determination and states of emergency. 
Mandates take on a life of their own and terms of reference change after the real study 
is completed.”686
 
The official suggested a mandate of six years as being “reasonable.” This official was 
particularly helpful in identifying what work the Special Rapporteur on laws that 
discriminate against women could do: 
 
“He or she could do a mapping exercise of the seven Conventions already in place. 
Look at the Regional Conventions. Do they overlap substantially and then see what 
the treaty bodies and regional bodies have said on particular bits. Then look at 
excerpts of concluding observations –the jurisprudence of international and regional 
bodies before coming up with a list of systematic violations of women’s rights for 
example in employment, inheritance, family, reproductive rights etc.  Then distil out 
of the compilation best practices.  If one identifies a systematic pattern, then might 
from the mapping exercise find a common approach on how to remedy patterns of 
discrimination.”687
 
The European Women’s Network suggested: 
 
“The terms of reference for the mandate of the Special Rapporteur might include: 
¾ Compiling laws in force around the world that discriminate against women, 
submitted annually to CSW and the Human Rights Council, with an update on 
progress made during the reporting period; 
¾ Engaging in ongoing dialogue with member States regarding laws that 
discriminate against women and related legal reform efforts 
¾ Undertaking thematic studies and making general recommendations on issues 
of common concern to member States 
Highlighting ways in which member States have used law reform effectively to 
counter legal discrimination against women.”688
 
                                                 
686 UN Official, OHCHR, interviewed in New York, March 2007. 
687 Ibid. 
688 See European Women’s Lobby “Call for Special Rapporteur on laws that discriminate against 
women” January 2007, p. 3. 
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On the question of where a Special Rapporteur should be based, it seemed, on 
balance, that even those who were not overly enamoured of the idea of a Special 
Rapporteur, felt that if such a mechanism were to be created, then the person should 
be mandated by the Human Rights Council and supported by OHCHR team in 
Geneva where the institutional framework for supporting SR already exists. Marianne 
Mollman, of the Women’s Division at Human Rights Watch noted: 
 
“I see the CSW as the place where Beijing is being followed up but if we want the 
Human Rights Council to look more closely at women’s rights then we need to bring 
the machinery to them. At the same time it (having SR with CSW) could give the 
CSW something more concrete to work on and something to focus on.”689   
 
A Geneva based UN official argued that: 
 
“All Rapporteurs on women’s issues should be in Geneva, but they should also have 
to report to the CSW.” Acknowledging the possibility of a CSW derived mandate, he 
noted: “If established by the CSW, then the Rapporteur should also report to the 
Human Rights Council. That should be made clear from the outset. Given that they 
are both independent bodies, it is important that the Rapporteur formally have an 
obligation to report to both.  If we are serious about women’s rights being human 
rights, then any mechanism established by CSW working on non discrimination 
should report to the Human Rights Council.” 
 
Warming to his theme he then asked: “Why not have a joint establishing mandate 
where the mandate holder reports to both Presidents? It would be good to have a 
hybrid model because having a Special Rapporteur that deals with human rights of 
women and also the status of women will help with mainstreaming.”  
 
Overall those arguing for any new Special Rapporteur to be based in Geneva focused 
on practicality, coherence of the special mandate system, the need for mutual support 
and reinforcement and general cost savings implicit in having all under one roof. 
 
It is worth noting that two interviewees, both UN officials put forward alternatives to 
the appointment of a Special Rapporteur. One suggested that a working group on laws 
that discriminate against women comprising legal specialists from different legal 
traditions may be more appropriate.  The other suggested having a special 
                                                 
689 Interview with Marianne Mollman, Women’s Watch, New York, 9 March 2007. 
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independent expert similar to the Secretary-General’s Independent expert on violence 
against children who reported in 2006. The advantage of this was that the expert 
would write just one report and would not have to deal with communications. There 
would then be a study from which the OHCHR could engage in follow up activities. 
 
To have or not to have a Special Rapporteur on laws that discriminate against 
women? 
Human rights committees and existing Special Rapporteurs have clearly taken to heart 
the need to engage with women’s rights within their work.  This was seen from the 
general comments, questioning of States parties and concluding observations.  
However, human rights bodies suffer from 5 common problems: 
 
1) A very tight working schedule. While the number of ratifying States has 
increased, the meeting time and human resources (committee members) have not, 
with the exception of the Children’s Rights Committee, increased to keep pace 
with the increased workload. Even the increase in the CRC personnel has been 
absorbed by the adoption and widespread ratification of the two Protocols to the 
CRC. 
 
2) Linked to the first is the growing sophistication in the analysis of groups or 
categories of people experiencing discrimination. This increased focus on 
intersectional discrimination, while welcome also highlights the limits of the 
committees in their ability to do justice to the concerns of each of the groups.  
This sometimes leads to a “tick box exercise” with Committee concluding 
observations listing disadvantaged groups to which the State should pay particular 
regard.  Clearly it would be wrong to suggest that the rights of some groups 
should be privileged or given greater attention than others, but the current system 
creates a sense of a scatter gun approach which is not necessarily satisfactory for 
any group.  CEDAW is the only committee focusing on women’s rights. Still, it is 
important to acknowledge and pay tribute to the committees for the work that they 
are doing on women’s rights.690 
                                                 
690 Mainstreaming –A/HRC/4/104, 15 Feb 2007. 
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3) Non-compliant States parties.  All committees are forced to confront the problem 
of States parties that either do not report or do not do so in a timely fashion.  
Sometimes this results in the receipt of compound reports covering up to four or 
on rare occasions five reporting cycles that will have been missed. This tardiness 
makes the work of Committees, even those that have tried to put in place a system 
of seeking to hold a non-report producing State accountable at the scheduled time, 
very difficult and renders the monitoring process, in some instances highly 
unsatisfactory.  In its ways and means report, CEDAW noted that there were 13 
States that had not reported for more than 10 years.691  This renders “constructive 
dialogue” difficult. A Special Rapporteur would not be subject to these 
constraints. If anything a Special Rapporteur could assist CEDAW by engaging 
with non reporting States. 
 
4) Follow up-although some of the committees have arranged for one of them to act 
as a follow up rapporteur, the reality is that this function is again limited by time 
constraints. Although human rights committees are now better at using each 
other’s concluding observations in engaging with States parties, it seems that 
some States parties are prepared to ignore these multiple prompts to effect change. 
A Special Rapporteur on laws that discriminate against women could act as the 
on-going follow up rapporteur for all the treaty bodies on the issue. 
 
5) Clearly one of the main tools for shining a light on violations of human rights 
norms and of seeking to hold States accountable is the complaint mechanism 
found in some human rights treaties.  The reality though is that not all States that 
have ratified the main convention ratify the Optional Protocol thereto or submit 
themselves to the complaint mechanism if contained within the body of the treaty.  
CEDAW has 185 States parties but only 90 States have ratified the Optional 
Protocol thereto thus making it difficult for women in States that have laws that 
discriminate against them to appeal directly to the committee. This was raised by 
some of the questionnaire respondents as an important reason to have a Special 
Rapporteur Moreover, although it is possible for other committees to receive 
complaints from women, few are aware of this possibility. Indeed the majority of 
                                                 
691 CEDAW Ways and Means of Expediting the Work of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women: Note by the Secretariat, CEDAW/C/2007/1/4, Annex III. 
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complaints brought to the Human Rights Committee are from men.692  This means 
that an important element in the challenging discrimination arsenal is without 
women’s access.  Moreover, one would have thought that with laws that 
discriminate against a group that constitutes over half of the population, the 
inquiry procedure may have been invoked, but to date it is only CEDAW that has 
used it to investigate violence against women in Mexico. 
 
All these constraints point to the Special Rapporteur system as able to offer some 
relief. Specifically a Special Rapporteur does not need to wait for a State to report, 
she or he may engage directly with the State. Moreover, the Special Rapporteur is 
able to receive communications from people in States parties who may not have 
ratified specific complaints mechanisms or indeed States which may seek to invoke 
reservations entered to treaties as a reason for non engagement or refusal to change 
the law.  Special Rapporteurs may ask the State party for permission to undertake 
missions to that State notwithstanding that the State has opted out of all inquiry 
procedures.  Special Rapporteurs may usefully follow up on concluding observations 
of all treaty bodies where these impact directly on the Rapporteur’s mandate.  Finally, 
having a specific focus on a theme, the Special Rapporteur may be able to more 
comprehensively address discrimination against women or other groups within the 
confines of that more tightly drawn mandate.  
 
Special Procedures  
Again, like treaty monitoring bodies the Special Procedures including existing Special 
Rapporteurs have developed a much better system of monitoring gender based 
violations of their mandates.  For some this may be because they are specifically 
called upon to consider gender or women’s rights within their mandates.  However, 
despite these positive advances, it remains the case that, as with human rights 
committees, Special Rapporteurs have to operate within fairly tightly drawn 
mandates. It may well be that some of the laws identified as discriminating against 
women will fall into the mandate of a particular Special Rapporteur who may then 
take the initiative and recommend that States repeal or amend the laws. However, not 
all discriminatory laws fall into the existing mandates of Special Rapporteurs.  This 
                                                 
692 UN Official interviewed in NY, March 2007.  See also gender mainstreaming A/HRC/4/104, para 
52. 
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highlights the need for a specific focus-specific Rapporteur who will be able to bring a 
global overview to the theme of laws that discriminate against women and whose 
remit will be challenging States on these laws. This will mean that there is a coherent 
rather than hit and miss approach to the issue which is likely to yield results faster 
than a sporadic approach. 
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PART F – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
In addition to the impressive work already being done within the human rights 
monitoring system, particularly by CEDAW, and also the work of special procedures, 
the time may well have come to have a focal point to address this very important 
conference pledge whose fulfilment underpins a great deal of UN policy and work not 
least in the delivery of the MDGs.  Addressing the 51st session of the CSW, the 
President of the Human Rights Council noted: 
 
“…I believe that the commitment to the human rights of women and the girl child 
undertaken in Beijing has been strengthened with the reform of the UN human rights 
system. At the World Summit of 2005, the Heads of State and Government 
recognized Human Rights as one of the pillars of the United Nations and reaffirmed 
their commitment to uphold the rights of women, gender equality and the 
empowerment of women. 
Within this framework, the Commission and the Council have an important role in 
order for the United Nations to undertake integrated and coordinated strategies for the 
effective promotion and protection of the rights of women and the girl child.”693
 
He went on: 
 
“Madame President, I would like to emphasize that the relevance of the rights of 
women and the girl child and their eminently crosscutting nature, has been clear 
during the first months of the work of the Council, even when it has been focusing 
primarily on the work of institution building. 
…the importance that the States and civil society grant to the rights of women and the 
girl child, as well as the necessity for the Council to address the issue in a 
comprehensive manner and through coherent mechanisms, has become evident. 
Finally, I would like to indicate that the Council and the Commission could further 
their collaboration is (sic) the incorporation of a human rights and gender perspective 
in the United Nations system, as there are ample opportunities for cooperation in that 
field, in order to achieve further progress.”694
 
A Special Rapporteur on laws that discriminate against women may be the focal point 
that has hitherto been missing. The mandate of such a rapporteur could include the 
following. 
 
 
 
                                                 
693 Office of the President, Human Rights Council, Statement by the President of the Human Rights 
Council, Ambassador Luis Alfonso de Alba, at the 51st Session of the Commission on the Status of 
Women, United Nations, New York, 7 March 2007. 
694 Ibid. 
 138
Mandate of a Special Rapporteur on laws that Discriminate against women 
1) In keeping with the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action pledge made 
by States, the focus of a Special Rapporteur, should be on laws and regulations 
that discriminate against women. The concept of what constitutes “law” would 
perforce be dependent on the legal system under consideration. 
 
2) If a broader mandate were considered appropriate then it should include 
consideration of issues pertaining to implementation, access to justice and 
enforcement. 
 
3) Initially, the Special Rapporteur, should be supported by the WRGU of the 
OHCHR in deciding on priorities and devising a work plan which could 
include: 
 
A conceptual analysis of the obligations of States emanating from the pledge 
made in Beijing linked to an analysis of violations most often identified in the 
work of human rights treaties bodies and other information brought to the 
attention of the Special Rapporteur as requiring urgent attention.  Here it 
would be crucial to develop a close working relationship with CEDAW in 
particular to follow up its recommendations to States parties whose laws were 
found to be problematic. Although onerous, given the excellence of its 
methodology, the framework used by UNIFEM in its Pacific law project 
should be closely examined for its adaptability to a project by a Special 
Rapporteur on laws that discriminate in his or her work. 
 
Thereafter, could be the adoption of thematic approach focusing on a looking 
at a specific problematic area which could include nationality and citizenship 
laws or constitutional norms or any other area deemed a priority. The Special 
Rapporteur could promote the exchange of information among member States 
on issues of common concern. 
 
In the course of his or her mandate, the Special Rapporteur would also identify 
and record examples of good practice, across geographical and legal traditions, 
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which could be used in interactions with States parties and in any training that 
he or she may undertake. 
4) In carrying out his or her mandate, the Special Rapporteur should have the 
same powers and access to the same resources and institutional resources that 
other rapporteurs have. 
 
5) In addition, her mandate could include co-operating with the two regional 
Special Rapporteurs on the Rights of Women of the African Union and the 
Organisation of American States. Working together where the subject matter 
demanded could lead to a more efficient data gathering process, greater 
pressure being put on States parties to change discriminatory laws and an 
exchange of examples of good practice. 
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Appendix A – Consultant’s Terms of Reference 
Women’s Rights and Gender Unit 
Research and Right to Development Branch 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
 
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE PREPARATION OF AN  
 
Analytical report on a mechanism to address laws that discriminate 
against women 
 
Consultancy: Dr. Fareda Banda 
 
Background: 
 
 International human rights law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex 
and includes guarantees for men and women to equally enjoy their civil, cultural, 
economic, political and social rights.  CEDAW article 2 commits States Parties ‘to 
take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against 
women.’  In 1995, at the 4th World Conference on Women in Beijing, 
Governments undertook to ‘revoke any remaining laws that discriminate on the 
basis of sex.’  In 2000, at the Special Session of the General Assembly, States set 
2005 as the target for removing discriminatory legislation against women.  In 
2005, when the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) reviewed the 
commitments that had been undertaken at the 4th World Conference, it recalled 
the pledge to revoke remaining discriminatory laws and the concern expressed at 
the Special Session that ‘legislative and regulatory gaps, as well as lack of 
implementation and  enforcement  of  legislation  and  regulations, perpetuate  de 
jure  as  well  as  de facto  inequality  and  discrimination,  and  in  a  few cases,  
new  laws  discriminating  against women  have  been  introduced,’ and decided 
to consider ‘the advisability of the appointment of a special rapporteur on laws 
that discriminate against women, bearing in mind the existing mechanisms with a 
view to avoid duplication …..’ 
 
 OHCHR was requested to submit its views to the 50th (2006) session of 
CSW on the implications of the creation of a position of special rapporteur on laws 
that discriminate against women.  Its submission is contained in document 
E/CN.6/2006/8 dated 13 December 2005.  CSW took note of the report and 
asked for further ‘views on ways and means that could best complement the work 
of the existing mechanisms and enhance the Commission’s capacity with respect 
to discriminatory laws,’ for consideration at its 51st (2007) session.  OHCHR 
responded on 10 October 2006 that while its views contained in the afore-
mentioned report were unchanged, certain developments such as the review of 
the Special Procedures had to be taken into account.  OHCHR suggested that a 
decision on the usefulness and viability of a special rapporteur be deferred to 
CSW 52nd session (2008) in order to incorporate and build on the review’s 
outcome.  To further assist the process, OHCHR offered to prepare an analytical 
report on the complementarity of such a mandate to the existing mechanisms, 
identifying how the existing mechanisms have addressed de jure discrimination 
against women and the resulting protection gaps. 
 
Objectives: 
 
To prepare an analytical report responding to the following objectives: 
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1. To identify how the treaty bodies and special procedures have addressed 
de jure discrimination against women, with the assessment and analysis including 
but not limited to: 
 
- context in which de jure discrimination against women has been 
taken up, with reference to the mechanisms, treaty provisions 
and/or other relevant issues; 
- the types of observations and recommendations made by the 
treaty bodies and special procedures mandate-holders; 
- actors to which recommendations have been addressed; 
- how treaty bodies and special procedures mandate-holders have 
followed-up on issues of concern and recommendations; 
- the extent to which the treaty bodies and special procedures have 
cooperated/complemented each other on cases/issues of de jure 
discrimination; 
- gaps in coverage across the mechanisms with indication of how 
external partners have filled/are filling or could fill in the gaps.     
 
2. Based on the assessment and analysis, to examine how existing 
mechanisms could work towards reducing and ultimately eliminating de jure 
discrimination against women, and the viability of the mechanism currently being 
considered in the CSW.  Consideration should also be given to how UN entities 
including DAW, UNIFEM and other organisations can contribute to the objective of 
reducing and ultimately eliminating de iure discrimination against women. 
 
Scope of work: 
 
The analysis should: 
 
- review the work of the treaty bodies and special procedures along 
with initiatives outside the UN System, including regional and non-
governmental organisations, and academic institutions; 
- include lessons learnt and good practices for amending or revoking 
discriminatory laws against women; 
- assess the extent of coverage and gaps; 
- analyse and assess whether the existing mechanisms are sufficient 
or whether the proposed mechanism would be useful (taking into 
account the need to avoid duplication and enhance complementarity 
between the mechanisms as well as the ongoing reviews); 
- present observations and recommendations on the substance, form 
and scope of a mechanism(s) which could contribute to eliminating de 
jure discrimination against women. 
 
Suggested methodology: 
 
The consultant will conduct consultations with all relevant stakeholders including 
the treaty bodies and special procedures mandate-holders, OHCHR and other UN 
staff supporting the mechanisms, NGOs and others; s/he will develop, 
disseminate and analyse a questionnaire designed to help ascertain the report’s 
objectives; s/he will conduct research including reviewing general comments, 
concluding observations, individual complaints, country, thematic and 
communications reports, and other relevant materials such as the Secretary-
General’s report on the appointment of a special rapporteur (E/CN.6/2006/8).  In 
addition, s/he will conduct a mission to Geneva/New York for consultations with 
relevant staff, mechanisms, UN departments and organisations, NGOs and 
academic institutions.  
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Due attention should be paid to the treaty bodies and special procedures 
consideration of civil and criminal laws in all areas affecting women’s civil, 
cultural, economic, political and social rights; equal geographical emphasis should 
be achieved.  
 
Output: 
 
An analytical reporting on a mechanism to address laws that discriminate against 
women with annexes containing a comprehensive listing/synopsis of each 
mechanism’s consideration of de jure discrimination against women; a mapping 
of how the UN and other external organisations are addressing the issue; and 
source references.  
 
Workplan: 
 
This project will start on 1 February to 30 April 2007 for a period of three months.  
The consultant will submit a draft for comments to OHCHR before finalisation.  
The final report incorporating OHCHR’s comments should be submitted no later 
than 30 2007. 
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Appendix B: 
 
Methodology 
In deciding the parameters of the project on de jure discrimination, a major 
question to resolve was what was meant by “law”?695  In many States law is 
complex, comprising plural normative systems including statute law, common 
law, customary laws and religious laws. These co-exist, sometimes 
harmoniously, often not.  The WRGU of the OHCHR noted that the project 
focused on de jure discrimination hence the decision to concentrate on State 
law. It chimed in with the stimulus for the project, namely the injunction in the 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action that governments should “revoke 
any remaining laws that discriminate on the basis of sex.” However, given the 
multiple configurations of many legal systems, the resolution was to allow the 
respondents to determine, within the parameters of a focus on de jure 
discrimination, what constituted State law.  The preamble to the questionnaire 
that went out said:  
 
“The project covers State sanctioned laws and regulations ‘in all areas 
affecting women’s civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.’ By State 
sanctioned is meant those laws that receive official recognition within the 
formal legal system.” 
 
While de jure discrimination was the focus, the questionnaire made clear that 
information on de facto discrimination would also be welcome. Indeed the 
adoption of the definition of discrimination found in article 1 of CEDAW made 
this a sine qua non.  Moreover, evidence from State reports and general 
comments all pointed to the fact that de facto discrimination was a key factor 
in women’s lack of enjoyment of their rights. 696Additionally, a UN official with 
experience working in plural legal systems noted:  
 
“There is a distinction between cultural discrimination and de jure 
discrimination. There are few laws promoting discrimination but many de facto 
practices.  It is more about practices than laws. The law will say there is 
equality but the practice is different”697
 
His views were echoed by Professor Marsha Freeman, Director of the 
Minnesota based International Women’s Rights Action Watch, who in 
response to the questionnaire noted: 
 
“I have considerable experience working in multiple legal systems and 
eliminating the laws (or customs) that discriminate against women rarely solve 
the problem, as knowledge of the law and having the power and resources to 
claim rights remain huge issues. Moreover, it is far to easy for governments to 
throw their hands up and say, ‘it is the law, it’s the custom, and we can’t 
                                                 
695 See also WLUML (2006), 27-30. 
696 See also CEDAW general recommendation 21 on marriage and family relations, paras, 3, 12, 15, 24, 
28, 33, 45, 46; CEDAW general Recommendation 23 on Women in public life, UN Doc a/52/38/Rev. 
1, paras, 9, 10.   
697 See also R. Holtmaat (2004). S. Ali (2000) 82n.151. Human Rights Committee General 
Comment 18 on Non-Discrimination, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1.Add.1, para. 9. 
 144
infringe on identity expressed through custom’ or ‘it’s the culture’ or ‘can’t 
interfere with religion.’” 
  
Also highlighted by many interviewees was the importance of recognising the 
impact on women, of the non implementation of those laws that do exist. The 
UNAMEE response to the questionnaire noted simply “Implementation of a 
law is as good as the law itself.”698 For this reason, questions were put about 
the ease or difficulty of accessing law and also State and judicial response to 
claims of violations of rights. 
 
Data collection techniques 
Meeting the objectives of the project necessitated the use of three data 
collection techniques.  To address the issue of the work currently being 
undertaken within the UN required collecting and analysing treaty body 
general comments, State reports, concluding observations and where 
relevant, communications.  Time constraints limited the consideration of State 
reports to the past five years. It also required examining the mandates of 
Special Rapporteurs.  Some of the reports of the Special Rapporteurs were 
further analysed for their gender content.  Moreover initiatives undertaken by 
UN agencies in the field of women’s rights (including the girl child) were 
considered. UN documents on mainstreaming were considered.) A second 
data collecting mechanism involved conducting interviews with UN officials 
and NGOS. This was to try to get the views of those charged with 
administering the system-did they consider a new mechanism necessary?  
What did their work involve? The NGOS provided the civil society perspective. 
I was grateful to them all for their time and candour. 
 
Finally, given that the focus of the project was on laws that discriminate 
against women, it was necessary to try to ascertain the extent to which such 
laws were still in existence. While the campaigning NGO, Equality Now had 
already done excellent work, producing a list of States with discriminatory 
laws and reproducing the offending provisions, it was still important to send 
out a questionnaire to ascertain the current position. The questionnaire can be 
found in Appendix C. A total of ??? questionnaires was emailed to 
organisations and individuals around the world.  Reminders were later sent 
once the deadline for responses had passed. A list of people and 
organisations emailed is found in Appendix D. The questionnaire invited 
recipients to pass it on and data received indicates that some did indeed pass 
the questionnaire on. This means that the exact number of recipients cannot 
be stated.   
 
The questionnaire was in English.  Two requests were received for different 
languages.  One asked for the questionnaire in French, while another 
correspondent from an international NGO noted that partners in the field may 
require different languages without specifying which. A request for translation 
of the questionnaire was forwarded to the OHCHR which duly passed on the 
questionnaire to the UN translation department, for translation into the 
                                                 
698 UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Human Rights Section response to Part F questionnaire (May 
2007). 
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remaining five languages of the UN. Although a time frame of 15 days for 
receipt of the translated questionnaire was given in early April, the reality was 
that the process took over nine weeks.  This created scheduling problems not 
least because the translated questionnaires would have to be sent out, three 
weeks given to respondents to answer, before sending the replies back to the 
translation service for conversion to English. In any event the Spanish 
questionnaire was received on 4 June and was sent out that week.  It was 
important to send out the Spanish questionnaire as only 1 questionnaire had 
been returned from the region. 
 
Further details of data collection methods two and three are considered 
below. 
 
Interviews 
In February and March 2007, the consultant travelled to both Geneva and 
New York, spending three full working days in each place. The interviews with 
both UN staff and NGOs were kindly organised by UN staff from the WRGU of 
the OHCHR. They sent emails notifying colleagues about the project and 
requesting interviews.  In Geneva interviews were held with OHCHR staff 
only. Interviews were conducted with people in the special procedures 
department, mainly Special Rapporteurs’ advisors, as well as those whose 
work focused on servicing the human rights committees.  By way of contrast, 
in New York interviews were conducted with staff in the human rights office 
including DAW and OSAGI, as well as some of the UN agencies including 
UNICEF, UNDP, UNIFEM and UNFPA.  Interviews were also conducted with 
three non-government organisations working in the area of women’s rights. 
These were Centre for Reproductive Rights, Equality Now which initiated this 
project and finally Human Rights Watch, Women’s Rights division. 699 Finally 
an interview was held at the IOM in New York. 
 
I found the interviews very helpful not least because interviews always 
present an ideal opportunity for the researcher to get opinion at first hand. 
One is able to pick up on nuances that are absent in printed material. One is 
also able to learn about the internal dynamics of an organisation which may 
make some solutions or suggestions more or less acceptable than others.  
Inevitably interviews also throw up the biases or fears (“perspectives”) of the 
interviewee.  On a practical level, in both Geneva and New York, I was 
acutely aware of the extreme time pressures that people appeared to work 
under and was therefore very grateful for their time.  In passing, as an 
outsider, I was somewhat taken aback by the shortage of office space which 
necessitated much doubling up and which resulted in a not insignificant 
number of interviews taking place in the UN café, not least in Geneva. In 
Geneva, some staff were also in the process of packing to move offices. They 
agreed to be interviewed amongst their packing boxes, apologising, 
unnecessarily, for the “chaos.”  I have to confess that it came as a surprise to 
find to find so many “internally displaced” UN personnel.  It is a testament to 
the dedication and hard work of the staff that they were able to maintain a 
                                                 
699 I have used quotes from the interviews which quotes are based on my hand written notes. I have not 
had the opportunity to cross check the quotes with the interviewees, but have in any event rendered UN 
officials anonymous.  
 146
high degree of professionalism in difficult working conditions. I was 
enormously impressed. 
 
Questionnaires 
Given the relatively short period of time in which the project was originally 
scheduled to be completed (three months), it seemed efficient to use a 
questionnaire to try to get information about the existence and scope of laws 
that discriminate against women.  The widespread use of electronic 
communication which is almost instantaneous made this method a quick, 
efficient and cost efficient way of sourcing data.  However, for all these 
advantages, questionnaires as a data gathering method have the 
disadvantage of having a relatively low response rate.700  People receive 
questionnaires and mean to respond, but do not always get round to doing so.  
The technical specificity of the information required by this questionnaire 
(specific provisions from national laws) meant that time and effort was needed 
to provide accurate answers, and this may (have) militated against a high 
response rate.  In any event the responses comprised completed 
questionnaires, while others sent in opinions on particular aspects of the 
questionnaire and links to reports and other information.  Finally, one of the 
challenges in preparing the report has been the uncertainty over the future of 
the special procedures as a result of the on going Human Rights Council 
mandate review.701 Interviewees and correspondents noted variously that  all 
Special Rapporteurs were to be abolished or  that only the country mandates 
were to be extinguished. Another view was that the mandate “rationalisation” 
would see an amalgamation of some mandates and the non renewal of some 
mandates, both thematic and country. Others were of the view that the scope 
of the mandates of Special Rapporteurs were to be severely curtailed.702. In 
the midst of it all, I was sent an NGO petition addressed to the Human Rights 
Council and requesting that Special Rapporteurs not be abolished. It has 
been difficult to write this report in the light of the uncertainty. 
                                                 
700 M. Maclean and H. Genn Methodological Issues in Social Surveys. 
701 See generally 2007 (7) Human Rights Law Journal. 
702 See NY times Sunday 11 March 2007. 
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Appendix C – Cover Letter and Questionnaire 
OHCHR Cover letter- Project: Laws that Discriminate against Women 
Dear Colleague 
 
I am writing to ask for assistance on a project that I have been asked to do by 
the women’s rights and gender unit of the United Nations Office of the High 
Commission for Human Rights in Geneva.  The project concerns the 
advisability of setting up a mechanism to address laws that discriminate 
against women.  This might include the possibility of appointing a Special 
Rapporteur on laws that Discriminate against Women. It is focused on de jure 
discrimination and arises out of two Secretary-General Reports which can be 
accessed by looking up these documents: 
 
E/CN.6/2006/8 and E/CN.6/2007/8 (Both are available in the six working 
languages of the UN). 
 
The project is divided into two parts. The first is an analysis of UN and 
regional bodies to see if and how they address laws that discriminate against 
women. The second involves identifying current laws that discriminate against 
women.  This is the part that I need help with. One cannot comment 
meaningfully about the advisability of setting up a special mechanism focusing 
on laws that discriminate against women, without knowing how many such 
laws still remain and in which areas they remain.  It is for this reason that I am 
writing to ask for your assistance in sending me information about laws in your 
country or region that pertain to the issue of de jure discrimination.  I have 
prepared a list of questions that I would be grateful if you could answer.  I 
would appreciate it, when commenting on laws that discriminate if you could 
provide specific details about the nature of the discrimination and, if possible 
attach a copy of the relevant offending sections. 
 
Although the terms of reference specify de jure discrimination, I am alive to 
the fact that in some instances one may have to also discuss de facto 
discrimination. Moreover, I am also aware that implementation of law is an 
important issue when considering women’s ability to enjoy their rights.  
 
The time frame for completing the project is relatively short. I would be 
grateful if you could send me your response by the 31st of May at the very 
latest.  I know that this is an imposition on your time and would like to thank 
you in advance for your help. Your assistance will be fully acknowledged in 
the report that I write. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Fareda Banda (Dr) 
School of Oriental and African Studies 
London 
WC1H 0XG 
Email:fb9@soas.ac.uk 
Telephone: *44-207 898 4664 
Fax: * 44-207 898 4759. 
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United Nations OHCHR Project on a Mechanism to address laws that 
Discriminate against Women-March 2007 
 
Introduction 
 
As noted in my covering letter, the women’s rights and gender unit of the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has asked me 
to prepare a report on the advisability of setting up a special mechanism to 
address laws that discriminate against women.  The project covers State 
sanctioned laws and regulations “in all areas affecting women’s civil, cultural, 
economic, political and social rights.” By State sanctioned is meant those laws 
that receive official recognition within the formal legal system. The focus is on 
de jure discrimination. 
 
Discrimination is understood as comprising article 1 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women: 
 
“For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination against 
women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis 
of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment and exercise by women, irrespective of their marital 
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field.” 
 
I appreciate that you are busy, but please may you answer as many questions 
as you can. Even if you do not manage to complete the entire questionnaire, 
do please forward the completed part. Please feel free to share this 
questionnaire. May I ask that if at all possible, replies be provided in English? 
My language skills are limited and for that I apologise. Unless you request 
anonymity, your assistance will be acknowledged in the final report.  Please 
indicate those aspects of your answers that you would wish to be confidential, 
that is, not directly attributable to you.  
 
  Part A –The Constitution and National Laws 
 
1).  Does the constitution of the country prohibit non discrimination on the 
basis of sex and or gender and does it provide for equality before the 
law/equal protection of the law? Please list the provisions. 
2).  If the constitution recognises plural laws, for example in the family law 
field, does it specify what is to occur if there is a conflict between 
equality provisions of the constitution and a discriminatory personal 
law? 
3).  If there are still laws that discriminate against women, please provide 
statute name, chapter number or other identifying feature and relevant 
sections/provision. 
4).    In what way does the law discriminate? Is it direct discrimination or    
indirect? 
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5).  Please identify any laws that discriminate either directly or indirectly 
against certain groups including, but not limited to, the aged, disabled 
indigenous women, different minorities and migrant women and girls.  
6).  Are there gaps (omissions) in the law which could, or do lead to, 
discrimination against women? 
 
Part B -Responding to Discriminatory Laws 
 
1).  What has been done about the discrimination –by 
governments/agencies/NGOs/ other? 
2).  Have governments been responsive to lobbying by NGOs/other 
agencies? 
3).  Have court cases been brought challenging the law? (Please comment 
briefly on the ease or difficulty of accessing/using the law to challenge 
discrimination). Also please give names and citations for case law 
mentioned. 
4).  Have court challenges been successful, that is, have courts struck 
down discriminatory laws? 
5).  Have governments responded by changing the law or ignoring courts? 
Any good practice to share? 
 
Part C -Omissions and the use of temporary Special Measures  
 
1).  Are there any laws that can be said to depart from the non-
discrimination principle in a positive way for women (e.g. the use of 
temporary special measures, sometimes called positive discrimination 
or affirmative action)?  
2).  If yes, in what spheres are these laws found (e.g. employment/political 
participation/other) ? Please give details (chapter numbers and 
sections of relevant laws). 
 
Part D-The International and Regional Human Rights Systems 
 
1). Which international and regional human rights instruments has your 
State ratified? 
2).  Please list the regional and international instruments that are part of 
national law? (That is those that are incorporated into the national legal 
system). 
3).  Have you ever written a shadow report for a treaty body? If yes, please 
specify which. 
4).  If you have written a shadow report, did you identify laws that 
discriminate against women? 
5).  How did the Committee respond to the shadow report-did they refer to 
the laws that your organisation had identified as discriminating against 
women in questioning the State or in concluding observations? If yes, 
please provide the name of the committee and year. 
6).  Are the concluding observations of human rights committees 
disseminated in your country? 
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7). Have you or your organisation used the concluding observations of    
the human rights committees to lobby your government to change the 
law? 
8).  If yes, with what result? 
9). Have you taken part or assisted in bringing a complaint or requesting 
an inquiry investigation under any of the treaty mechanisms? 
10).  When and with what result?  Please give details. 
11).  Did the government change the law or alter its policies? 
12). Have you found the treaty mechanisms useful in challenging laws that 
discriminate against women? 
 
 
Part E-Special Procedures 
 
1).  Are you aware of the existence of thematic and country Special 
Rapporteurs or working groups? (Please specify regional, UN or both). 
2).  Have you ever made use of the Special procedures, for example, 
written to, or met with a Special Rapporteur on a visit to your country? 
3).  Were issues affecting women, especially laws that discriminate against 
women raised in your correspondence or meetings? 
4).  What was the result of any communications or meeting?  
5). In your view, is your State likely to comply with requests or 
recommendations made by a Special Rapporteur? 
 
 
Part  F- Advisability of Special Mechanism to Address Laws that 
Discriminate against Women 
 
1) Do you think that there is a need for the creation of a special 
mechanism to address laws that discriminate against women or are the 
existing mechanisms sufficient? 
Please give reasons for your answers. 
 
Part G–Anything else that you would like to add.  
 
Please add anything other comments you wish. Feel free to comment 
further on regional perspectives on the issue of laws that discriminate 
against women. This could include the challenges of operating within 
plural legal systems. 
 
In conclusion, may I thank you again for your time and urge you to please 
send your answers back as soon as you can. 
 
Sincerely 
Fareda Banda 
Email: fb9@soas.ac.uk
Fax: *44-207898 4759. 
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Appendix D –Questionnaire Recipients 
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 Indexed name 
    
full name & title email address institution country 
      
 Adjamagbo-Johnson 
Kafui Adjamagbo-
Johnson info@cawtar.org 
Center for Arab 
Women Training and 
Research 
Tunisia 
 Agengo Cosero Agengo cosero_agengo@equalitynow.orgEquality Now USA 
 Agreda Claudia Agreda claudiaagreda@yahoo.com CLADEM Guatemala
 Airaldi Carmen Coronel Airaldi clademparaguay@cledem.org CLADEM Paraguay Paraguay 
 Alamilla Ileana Alamilla cerigua@guate.net CLADEM Gautemala
 Ali Prof. S.S. Ali s.s.ali@warwick.ac.uk University of Warwick: Law Dept. UK 
 An-Na’im 
Abddullahi Ahmed 
An-Na’im, Prof. of 
Law 
aannaim@law.emory.edu Emory University, Georgia USA USA 
 Andrade Ana Evelyn Orozco Andrade naaferpuig@yahoo.es CLADEM Nicaragua Nicaragua 
 Bhagwandin 
Dutima 
Bhagwandin, 
[Gender Advisor] 
bhagwandin@un.org UN OHCHR UN New York 
 Brennan Susan Brennan smbrennan@ozemail.com.au WRANA Australia 
 Bunch Prof. Charlotte Bunch cwgl@igc.org 
Rutgers Univ.,Center 
for Women’s Global 
Leadership 
USA 
 Bush Dominique Bush Dominique Bush bushd@un.org UN UN 
 Campbell Scott Campbell scampbell@ohchr.org 
UN OHCHR Capacity 
Building & Field 
Operations Branch 
UN 
Geneva 
 Castillo Isabel Castillo inica@ibw.com.ni CLADEM: Centro de DDHH de Matagalpa Nicaragua 
 Cedano Maria Ysabel Cedano clademperu@cladem.org CLADEM Peru Peru 
 Centeno Luisa Centeno mcc@ibw.com.ni CLADEM: Red de Mujeres de Condego Nicaragua 
 Charlesworth Hilary Charlesworthcharlesworthh@law.anu.edu.au Australian National University, Law Australia 
 C
 
hinkin Prof. Christine Chinkin c.chinkin@lse.ac.uk 
London School of 
Economics, UK UK 
   
Debora Cobar, 
[Regional Rights of 
the Child Advisor] 
   
 Cobar debora.cobar@plan-international.org 
Regional Rights of the
Child – Americas 
 Panama 
 Colon Dessy Bones Colon cladempuerto@cladem.org CLADEM Puerto Rico Puerto Rico
 Contreras Lourdes Contreras lcontreras@intec.edu.do CLADEM enlace Republica Dominica 
Dominican 
Republic 
 Cook 
Prof. Rebecca Cook, 
[Chair Intl. Human 
Rights Law] 
cook@utoronto.ca University of Toronto Canada 
 Corcoran Sally Anne Corcoran [Political officer] corcoran@un.org UNICYP 
Cyprus, 
Rep. 
 D'Auchamp Paul D'Auchamp pdauchamp@ohchr.org 
UN OHCHR Capacity 
Building & Field 
Operations Branch, 
Africa Unit 
UN Geneva
 Daoud Hansa Barkat Daoud cabinetasnabarkat@intnet.dj  Djibouti 
 David 
Paulo David, 
[Regional 
Representative] 
paulo.david@undp.org OHCHR, Regional Office for the Pacific Fiji 
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 De La Torre Virginia Gomez De La Torre mujer@andinanet.net CLADEM Ecuador Ecuador 
 Demeyer Isabeau Demeyer isabeau.demeyer@up.ac.za Pretoria Human Rights Centre RSA 
 Diaz Rosalina Ochoa Diaz rosa_ochOA1@yahoo.es CLADEM colombia Colombia 
 Dlamini Lomcebo Dlamini wlsaszd@africaonline.co.sz Women & Law in Southern Africa Swaziland 
 Edjidike Martin Edjidike ejidike@un.org OHCHR UN New York 
 Eknes 
Moira Eknes, 
[Regional 
Coordinator – W & S
Africa] 
 moira.eknes@care.no Care Norge Norway 
 Evatt Elizabeth Evatt  UN OHCHR Australia 
 Falkman 
Helle Falkman 
[Associate Expert 
onGender Affairs] 
falkman@un.org 
UN Dept. 
Peacekeeping 
Operations 
UN New 
York 
 Fall Alpha Fall afall@africaninstitute.org 
Institute for Human 
Rights & 
Development in 
Africa 
Gambia 
 Feix Virgina Feix cladembrasil@cladem.org CLADEM Brazil Brazil 
 Fottrell Deirdre Fottrell deirdrefottrell@hotmail.com University of Essex UK 
 F
 
reeman M. Freeman mfreeman@umn.edu University of Minnesota (IWRAW) USA 
     
Jacob Blaustein 
Institute for the 
Advancement of 
Human Rights 
 
 Gaer Felice Gaer [Director] gaerf@ajc.org USA 
 Garcia Angela Garcia jaibimi@hotmail.com CLADEM Enlace Jalisco Mexico 
 Gorczyca 
Vanessa Gorczyca, 
[Programme 
Assistant] 
vgorczyca@ohchr.org 
OHCHR Women's 
Rights & Gender 
Unit 
UN 
 Guven Prof. Fatma Guven fatma.guven@emu.edu.tr 
Eastern 
Mediterranean 
University 
Cyprus, 
North 
 Hellum Prof. Anne Hellum anne.hellum@jus.uio.no 
Univ. of Oslo: 
Dept. Public & 
Intl. Law 
Norway 
 Herrera Mayra Dinora Gil Herrera 
clademguatemala2000@yahoo.es 
d123gil@hotmail.com 
CLADEM 
Guatemala Guatemala 
 Hinz Prof. Dr. Mo Hinz okavango@mweb.com.na University of Namibia Namibia 
 Hossain Sara Hossain hossains@citechco.net  Bangladesh
 Hudson Andrew Hudson hudsona@humanrightsfirst.org 
Human Rights 
First [Latin 
America - HR 
Defenders 
Program] 
USA 
 Hussein Soraida A. Hussein [Head of Unit] soraida@wclac.org 
Women's Centre 
for Legal Aid & 
Counseling 
Palestine 
 Isaack wendy Isaack . Gay & Lesbian Equality Project 
South 
Africa 
 Jamal Randa Jamal, Programme Analyst] randa.jamal@undp.org 
UNDP: Regional 
Bureau of Arab 
States: 
UN 
 Jordan Ann Jordan [Director, Initiative Against annj@globalrights.org Global Rights USA 
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Trafficking in 
Persons] 
 Kabeya Diane Kabeya dkebaya@ohchr.org 
UN OHCHR 
Capacity Building 
& Field 
Operations Branch 
UN Geneva
 Kane Ibrahima Kane ikane@interights.org Interights UK 
 Katzive Laura Katzive, [Deputy Director] Lkatzive@reprorights.org 
Centre for 
Reproductive 
Rights: 
International 
Legal Program 
USA 
 Kirkland 
Antonia Kirkland, 
[Program 
Coordinator] 
akirkland@equalitynow.org Equality Now (USA) USA 
 Kolthoff Kristi Kolthoff [President] ewl@womenlobby.org 
European 
Women's Lobby  
 Koursoumba Leda Koursoumba [Law Commissioner] olcommissioner@olc.gov.cy 
Office of Law 
Commisioner 
Cyprus, 
Rep. 
 Kritesashvili 
Ekatrina 
Kritesashvili, 
[Nat.Prog.Officer] 
ekatrina.kritesashvili@undp.org UN Office of the UNRC in Georgia Georgia 
 
     
Women’s Rights 
Action Network, 
Aus. 
 
 Lambert Caroline Lambert carolinelambert@optusnet.com Australia 
 Lambertz Goran Lambertz goran.lambertz@justitiekanslern.se Chancellor of Justice Sweden Sweden 
 Lamptey 
Comfort 
Lamptey, [Gender
Advisor] 
 lampteyc@un.org 
UN Secretariat, 
Dept. Peacekeeping 
Operations/pbps 
UN 
 Maboreke 
Dr.Maboreke, 
[Head of Gender 
Unit] 
dgender@africa-union.org Gender Unit, African Union AU 
 MacKinnon 
Dr. Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, 
[Professor of 
Law] 
 Univ. Michigan USA 
 Maingi Grace Maingi grace.maingi@icj-kenya.org 
International 
Commission of 
Jurists 
Kenya 
 Mama Prof. Amina Mama Amina.Mama@uct.ac.za 
Univ. Cape Town, 
African Gender 
Institute 
RSA 
 Manji Firoze Manji firoze@fahamu.org Fahamu  
 Mantilla Julissa Mantilla julissamantilla@terra.com.pe  Peru 
 Marias Carrie Marias c.marias@unesco.org UNESCO UN 
 Matache 
Margareta 
Matache 
[Executive 
Director] 
magda@romanicriss.org Romani CRISS Romania 
 Maugy 
Valery Maugy, 
[Human Rights 
Officer] 
maugy@un.org UN Observer Mission in Georgia Georgia 
 Mbaidjol Ngonlardje Mbaidjol mbaidjol@un.org UN UN 
 McColgan Prof. Aileen McColgan aileen.mccolgan@kcl.ac.uk 
Kings College 
London UK 
 McQuoid-Mason 
Prof. DJ 
McQuoid-Mason mcquoidm@law.und.ac.za University of Natal RSA 
 Melo Angela Melo, melotoma@tvcabo.co.mz Gender Unit,  
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[Special 
Rapporteur] 
angelamelo_rs@hotmail.com African Union 
 Meneses Martha Meneses martha263_f@yahoo.com 
CLADEM: 
Col.Mujeres 8 de 
Marzo 
Nicaragua 
 Mijangos Eugenia Mijangos eugemij@intelnett.com CLADEM Guatemala
 Miller  miller4@un.org UNDP UN 
 Minkah-remo P
 
Sheila Minkah-
Premo smpremo@yahoo.co.uk 
Leadership and 
Advocacy for 
Women in Africa 
Ghana 
     
Intl. Women’s 
Development 
Agency 
 
 Mitchell Suzette Mitchell smitchell@iwda.org.au Australia 
 Mohamed A. Mohamed amohamed@sahrc.org.za 
South African 
Human Rights 
Commission 
South 
African 
 Mokhiber Craig Mokhiber mokhiber@un.org  UN 
 Molina Yamileth Molina dosgener@tmx.com.ni 
CLADEM: Centro 
"Dos 
Generaciones" 
Nicaragua 
 Mollman 
Marianne 
Mollman, 
[Advocacy 
Director] 
 UN Women’s Division 
UN New 
York 
 Monga 
Nivedita MC 
Monga, [Policy 
Officer] 
nivedita.monga@plannederland.nl Plan Nederland Netherlands
 Mossi Marie Mossi motadok@hotmail.com  DR Congo 
 Muringa-Mutimba 
Lynette Muringa-
Matimba 
[Programme 
Officer] 
lynette@wildaf.org.zw 
Women in Law & 
Development in 
Africa 
Zimbabwe 
 Murray Andrea Murray andrea.murray@britishcouncil.org 
British Council: 
Gender & Social 
Inclusion 
UK 
 Murray Prof. Rachel Murray, Rachel.murray@bristol.ac.uk 
Univ. Bristol, 
School of Law UK 
 Mutukwa 
Gladys Mutukwa 
[Acting regional 
Coordinator] 
msodzi@consultant.org 
Women in Law & 
Development in 
Africa 
Zimbabwe 
 Naomi Katrina Naomi katrina.naomi@mrgmail.org Minority Rights Group UK 
 Nayacalevu 
Romula 
Nayacalevu 
[National HR 
Officer] 
romulo.nayacalevu@undp.org UN OHCHR - Pacific Region Fiji 
 Naylor N.M. Naylor nmnaylor@gmail.com   
 Ndashe Sibongile Ndashe sndashe@interights.org  South Africa
 Nino Monica Benson Nino cladempanama@gmail.com CLADEM Panama Panama 
 Nwabueze Jessie Nwabueze jjgold@hotmail.com FIDA Europe  
 Orozco Ana Eveling Orozco aorozco@simujer.org.ni 
CLADEM: Si 
Mujer Nicaragua 
 Orozco Patricia Orozco patyama@midwar.com CLADEM Nicaragua 
 Otoo-Oyortey Nanna Otoo-Oyortey notoooyortey@ippf.org 
International 
Planned 
Parenthood 
Federation 
 
 
     
University of 
Melbourne 
 
 Otto Dianne Lynette Otto  Australia 
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 Oyortey Nana Oyortey notoooyortey@ippf.org 
International 
Planned 
Parenthood 
Federation 
 
 Patel Dr. Reena Patel reena.patel@warwick.ac.uk 
University of 
Warwick: Law 
Dept.: 
UK 
 Pena Jumpa Prof. Antonio Pena Jumpa apena@pucp.edu.pe 
Pontificia 
Universidad 
Catolica del Peru 
Peru 
 Piconto-Novales 
Prof. Theresa 
Piconto-Novales tpiconto@unizar.es 
University of 
Zaragoza Spain 
 Pulikuthiyil George Pulikuthiyil [Executive Director] gpneethi@sancharnet.in Jananeethi Institute India 
 Quirao Elizabeth Quirao elizabethqc@yahoo.com CLADEM Guatemala 
 Rajput Dr. Pam Rajput [Executive Director] pamrajput@yahoo.co.in 
Women's Resource 
& advocacy 
Centre, 
Chandigarh 
India 
 Rees Madaleine Rees, [Head of Unit] mrees@ohchr.org 
UN OHCR 
Womens Rights & 
Gender Unit 
UN 
 Rewald 
Michael Rewald, 
[Sen. Advisor – 
Rights Based 
Programming] 
rewald@care.prg Care USA USA 
 Riascos 
Norma Enriquez 
Riascos Regional 
Coordinator] 
coordi@cladem.org CLADEM Colombia 
 Rios Elizabeth Placido Rios placidoeli@yahoo.com CLADEM Mexico Mexico 
 Roque Deysi del Carmen Roque 
clademelsalvador@yahoo.com, 
cristyroque@yahoo.com 
CLADEM El 
Salvador El Salvador
 Rosas Andrea Medina Rosas andreagdl@infosel.net.mx CLADEM Mexico Mexico 
 Ruiz Siria Oliva Ruiz solivia@sinfronteras.org.mx  Mexico 
 Sahgal Gita Sahgal [Head of Gender Unit] Gita.sahgal@amnesty.org 
Amnesty 
International UK 
 Salamatou Traore Salamatou, [Presidente] ongdimol@intnet.ne ONG DIMOL Niger 
 Salinas Gaudalupe Salinas gsv@ibw.com.ni CLADEM Nicaragua 
 Salvatierra Julieta Montano salvatierra cladembolivia@gmail.com CLADEM Bolivia Bolivia 
 Samanke 
Bouare Bintou Foune 
Samanke [Chargee de
Programme] 
 wildafmali@yahoo.fr 
Women in Law & 
Development in 
Africa 
Mali 
 
   
Stephanie 
Schlitt 
   
 Schlitt Stephanie.schlitt@amnesty.org Amnesty Gender Unit  
 Schmidt 
Brita Schmidt, [ 
Advocacy 
Officer] 
brita@womankind.org.uk Womankind Worldwide UK 
 Schuster Gloria Schuster loli@tau.org.ar CLADEM Argentina Argentina 
 Shrestha Kusum Shrestha kusum@mos.com.np  Nepal 
 Shrestha Ratna Shrestha ratna@fwld.wlink.com.np Forum for Women Law & Development, Nepal Nepal 
 Silawal-Giri 
Bharati Silawal-
Giri, [Gender & 
Devt. Adviser] 
bharati.silawal@undp.org UNDP UN 
 Simois Mabel Simois clademuy@adinet.com.uy CLADEM Uruguay Uruguay 
 Solis Azehalea Solis cdc@cablenet.com.ni CLADEM: Centro de Nicaragua
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 Stewart Prof. Ann Stewart a.stewart@warwick.ac.uk 
University of Warwick: Law 
Dept. UK 
 Swaashtya Swaashtya swaashtya@sayatam.net.in Swaashtya swaashtya@sayatam.net.in India 
 Tamale Prof. Sylvia Tamale stamale@muklaw.ac.ug  Uganda 
 Teriba Yetunde Teriba teribay@africa-union.org Gender Unit, African Union  
 Traore 
Nene Eddedine 
Traore, 
[Directrice de la 
Promotion de la 
Femme] 
nene.traore@uemoa.int Union Economique et Monitaire Ouest Africaine  
 Turner Atuki Turner atukiturner@mifumi.org   
 Ultvedt Inger Ultvedt ultvedt@undp.org UNDP: Oslo Governance Centre 
UN 
Norway 
 Umana 
Maria Del 
Carmen Castro 
Umana 
cesadeh@yahoo.es CLADEM Honduras Honduras 
 Vadala 
Selma Valada, 
[Human Rights 
Officer] 
vadala@un.org MONUC - Luubumbashi Congo, DR
 Vasquez 
Roxana 
Vasquez, 
Coodinadora de 
la Alianza 
rvasquez@cladem.org 
CLADEM: [Campana por una 
Convencion Interamericana de 
los DDSS y los DDRR] 
 
 Vervik 
Ann-Kristin 
Vervik, [Child 
Rights Advisor] 
ann-kristin.vervik@plan-
norge.no Plan-Norway Norway 
 V oces Alzando Voces kika_son@hotmail.com CLADEM Guatemala
   
Anne Walker 
[Special Projects 
Coordinator - 
Australia] 
   
 Walker annewalker@iwtc.org 
IWTC International 
Women's Tribune 
Center 
Australia 
 Wandia 
Mary Wandia, 
[Advocacy 
Office] 
wandia@femnet.org.ke 
African Women’s 
Development & 
Communication 
Network 
 
 Wanitzek Prof. Ulrike Wanitzek ulrike.wanitzek@uni-beyreuth.de 
University of 
Beyreuth Germany 
 Welchman Dr. Lynn Welchman lw10@soas.ac.uk 
School of Oriental & 
African Studies, 
London UK 
UK 
 Zamora Sandra Seguel Zamora enlaceclademchile@terra.cl 
CLADEM enlace 
Chile Chile 
   wlsazimbabwe@africaonline.co.zw Women & Law in Southern Africa Zimbabwe 
   wlsazambia@zamnet.zm Women & Law in Southern Africa Zambia 
   forward@dircon.co.uk 
Foundation for 
Women’s Health 
Research & 
Development 
UK 
   hrwuk@hrw.org Human Rights Watch, UK UK 
   southallblacksisters@btconnect.com Southall Black Sisters UK 
   ukinfo@equalitynow.org Equality Now (UK) UK 
   wildaf@cafe.tg Women in Law & Development in Togo 
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   grefels@senoo.sn Women Living Under Muslim Law senegal 
   sharon@wlce.co.za Women's Legal Centre, Cape Town RSA 
   sgah@sgah.org.pk 
Shirkat Gah 
Women’s Resource 
Centre 
Pakistan 
   anaferpuig@yahoo.es CLADEM Nicaragua Nicaragua 
   genderequality@mgecw.gov.na Gender Ministry, Namibia Namibia 
   info@lac.org.na Legal Assístance Centre, Namibia Namibia 
   wlsamoz@tropical.co.mz Women & Law in Southern Africa Mozamique
  
 
  
 wlsamalawi@hotmail.com Women & Law in Southern Africa Malawi 
   
Women & Law in Southern 
Africa 
 
   wlsales@ilesotho.com Lesotho 
   admin@femnet.or.ke 
Femnet: African Women's 
Development & 
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   equalitynow@kenyaweb.com Equality Now Kenya kenya 
   info@fida.co.ke FIDA Kenya Kenya 
   Kenya: info@fida.co.ke FIDA Kenya Kenya 
   cdm@cablecolor.hn CLADEM: Centro de Estudios de la Mujer Honduras 
   ciprodeh@sdnhon.org.hn CLADEM Honduras 
   ewla@ethionet.et Ethiopia Women Lawyers Association Ethiopia 
   wlsa@info.bw Women & Law in Southern Africa Botswana 
   bettina@wlce.co.za Women's Legal Centre South Africa
   cemh@cablecolor.hn CLADEM Honduras 
   cesadeh@yahoo.es CLADEM  
   cnfmga@hotmail.com CLADEM  
   coalicion_ong@yahoogroups.com   
   connie@zlhr.org.zw Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights Zimbabwe 
   editor@pambazuka.org Pambazuka News -weekly forum for Justice in Africa  
   fidales@leo.co.ls  Lesotho 
   gone@interights.org   
   info@cawtar.org Center for Arab Women Training and Research Tunisia 
  
 
 
 iwraw-ap@iwraw-ap.org International Women's Rights Watch Asia Pacific  
    
Coalition on Violence 
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   legalaid@covaw.or.ke Kenya 
   msodzi@consultant.org WiLDAF Zimbabwe 
   mujeres@ibw.com.ni  CLADEM  
   nonose@telkomsa.net   
   svaw@amnesty.org.uk Amnesty International  
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